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Executive Summary 
Background 
Current National Health Service (NHS) policy sets out a number of broad 
themes that include organisational freedom from central control, patient 
empowerment and clinical empowerment. These reflect many of the 
assumptions made in the literature about the benefits of decentralisation. In 
other sectors, as in the NHS, decentralisation is usually seen as a good thing 
because it: 
• frees managers to manage 
• enables more responsive public services, attuned to local needs 
• contributes to economy by enabling organisations to shed unnecessary 
middle managers 
• promotes efficiency by shortening previously long bureaucratic 
hierarchies 
• produces contented and stimulated staff, with increased sense of room 
for manoeuvre 
• makes politicians more responsive and accountable to the ‘people’. 
Aims of the study 
This review examines the nature and application of decentralisation as an 
organisational model for health care in England. The study reviews the 
relevant theoretical literature from a range of disciplines relating to different 
public- and private-sector contexts of decentralisation and centralisation. It 
examines empirical evidence about decentralisation and centralisation in 
public and private organisations and explores the relationship between 
decentralisation and different incentive structures, which, in turn affect 
organisational performance. 
Methods 
The review encompassed two main activities. The first was an analysis of the 
conceptual literature on decentralisation to clarify parameters that could be 
measured. Second we undertook a review of the extant literature: 
• to map the available literature 
• to provide a critical overview of existing work in relation to appropriate 
themes 
• to identify areas where more research may be of use 
• to consult with users to complement and enhance overall findings. 
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Findings 
It is clear that decentralisation in health policy is a problematic concept. First, 
there are significant problems of definition. The term decentralisation has 
been used in a number of disciplines, such as management, political science, 
development studies, geography and social policy, and appears in a number 
of conceptual literatures such as public choice theory, principal/agency 
theory, fiscal federalism and central–local relations. It has links with many 
cognate terms such as autonomy and localism, which themselves are 
problematic. Other commentators tend to use different terms, such as agency 
central–local relations, and national versus local. Whereas decentralisation 
and devolution tend to be the dominant terms, they are rarely defined or 
measured, or linked to the conceptual literature. Second, much of the 
literature refers to elected local government with revenue-raising powers or is 
related to changes in so-called developing or lower-income countries. 
Application to the English NHS, which is appointed and receives its revenue 
from central grants, is therefore problematic. 
The discussion in this report identifies three main problems associated with 
the analysis of decentralisation. These are as follows. 
• There is a lack of clarity regarding the concepts, definitions and measures 
of decentralisation. 
• The debate about decentralisation, and subsequent analyses of 
decentralisation, lack any maturity and sophistication. 
• Assumptions about the effects of decentralisation on a range of issues, 
including organisational performance, are incorporated into policy without 
reference to whether evidence or theory supports such an approach. 
Clarity of the concept 
Previous studies have tended to treat decentralisation as a uni-dimensional 
concept defined by concepts that lacked conceptual clarity, such as power and 
autonomy. Little attention was paid in the literature to adequately defining 
and measuring the where and what of decentralisation. In addition, analyses 
of decentralisation pay little attention to clearly defining what is being 
decentralised and our new Arrows Framework (see overleaf) provides a useful 
way of conceptualising this aspect of the process.
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The Arrows Framework 
Tier… 
 
Activity  
Global Europe UK England/Scotland/Wales/ 
Northern Ireland 
Region, 
e.g. 
SHA 
Organisation, 
e.g. PCT 
Subunit, e.g. 
locality/practice 
Individual 
Inputs  
Process  
Outcomes  
Arrows indicate the direction of movement. 
PCT, primary care trust; SHA, strategic health authority.
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Evidence on decentralisation and organisational 
performance 
Decentralisation is not a completely discrete area of research and more 
attention needs to be paid to how it is utilised as a concept in future practice, 
policy and research. The brief for this review identified two areas for analysis 
relating to relationships between organisations. In addition, the changing 
nature of the dynamics between parts of a system over time, resulting from 
the combination of multiple centres of direction and regulation (including 
financial, political and technical) and multiple strategies emerging among the 
regulated organisations (including collaboration, compliance and competition), 
was also identified as an area for investigation. There was little evidence in 
our review to be able to comment on these areas and further substantive 
reviews may be required. 
The key message from this review is that decentralisation is not a sufficiently 
strong individual factor to influence organisational performance as compared 
to other factors such as organisational culture, external environment, 
performance monitoring process, etc. Neither is there an optimal size/level 
that provides maximum organisational performance. Different functions and 
the achievement of different outcomes are related to different organisational 
sizes and levels. There are, therefore, trade-offs or compromises between 
different activities and outcomes; for example, different approaches to equity, 
responsiveness versus economies of scale and so forth. 
Key messages for policy and practice 
It is important that in making decisions policy-makers and managers 
recognise inter-relationships between inputs, processes and outcomes and 
levels in the sense that any organisation (or individual) can gain and lose. 
They also need to be aware that the evidence base for the impact of 
decentralisation on organisational performance is poor and that there is little 
substantive evidence to support the key assumptions made about 
decentralisation. 
It is also essential that decentralisation is seen as a process – one of a 
number of factors – that can be employed for achieving particular goals rather 
than as an end in its own right. This review has demonstrated that much 
discussion of decentralisation is based on assumptions that are not 
substantiated by theory or evidence. A key problem is that benefits in one 
context are incorporated into general assumptions and are often transferred 
to other contexts, despite the problems associated with doing this. Local and 
national health care organisations need to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of decentralisation processes and learn that simple 
assumptions about the benefits, or otherwise, should be avoided. Health care 
managers and practitioners should therefore give more explicit recognition to 
the compromises/trade-offs between performance criteria (e.g. equity versus 
efficiency versus responsiveness, etc.) when developing strategies. Policy-
makers and managers also need to understand that decentralisation is not a 
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panacea – it is a process which among other factors can have an impact on 
organisational performance – but which should not be seen as an end in itself. 
Areas for further research 
We were asked to specifically examine gaps in the current literature and 
knowledge base. In general we recommend that consideration is given to 
research that addresses the issue of context with the use of good-quality case 
studies and also to research that takes a longer time span than the normal 
3-year period, in order to capture change over a more realistic period. In 
addition, we believe that there is a need for research that examines 
specifically the relationships between and within levels by adopting studies 
that focus on health care economies rather than simply organisations. We 
suggest that in addition to these general comments future research is focused 
in two broad areas. 
Decentralisation as a concept 
Further research is needed on the development of conceptual models (and 
especially the Arrows Framework) for health services decentralisation and the 
way it is measured. The only dimension that is measured (albeit poorly) is 
fiscal decentralisation and further research is required to identify the key 
indicators for measuring decentralisation. 
Decentralisation and performance 
A relationship between decentralisation and organisational performance exists 
but it is often contextually specific or equivocal. Future research in this area 
should therefore incorporate decentralisation but should also address the 
different contexts of decentralisation. In particular, what function works best 
at what level and is there a specific receptive context for particular functions? 
In addition, research on decentralisation needs to move beyond a focus on 
single organisations to explore the extent to which local health economies or 
communities have autonomy. Particular areas of organisational performance 
might include exploring the relationships between decentralisation and 
accountability, human resources management and professional autonomy. 
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The Report 
Section 1  Background to the study 
1.1  Context to the study and to decentralisation 
The issue of a national, centralised versus a local, decentralised service was 
one of the major debates in the formation of the National Health Service 
(NHS) between the then Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, and the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, in the 1940s. Throughout the history of the 
NHS there has been a trend of thought advocating ‘democratising’ and/or 
decentralising the NHS (e.g. Powell, 1997; Hudson, 1999). There has been 
some reassessment of the Bevan orthodoxy (Szreter, 2002; White, 2004). 
Blunkett and Jackson (1987) termed nationalisation ‘Labour’s great mistake’ 
and ministers such as John Reid, Alan Milburn and David Blunkett have 
advocated different shades of ‘new localism’. Campbell (1987) writes that: 
all the fundamental criticisms of the NHS can be traced back to the decision not 
to base services on local authorities. The various medical services were 
fragmented instead of unified; the gulf between the GPs and the hospitals 
widened instead of closed; there was no provision for preventive medicine; 
there was inadequate financial discipline and no democratic control at local 
level. In retrospect the case for the local authorities can be made to look 
formidable, the decision to dispossess them a fateful mistake by a Minister 
ideologically disposed to centralisation and seduced by the claims of 
professional expertise. 
Campbell (1987: 177) 
Without doubt the NHS embodies diversity and uniformity. Within a national 
health service that is (notionally) committed to equity, the pressures for 
uniformity appear strong. The national (UK) character of the health service, 
financed from general taxation, provides reasonably equitable access to 
hospital-based and primary care services. However, a series of local health 
services, rather than a single national one, is evident (Mohan, 1995; 
Exworthy, 1998; Powell, 1998); this diversity might provide locally contingent 
services and local horizontal integration (Exworthy and Peckham, 1998) but it 
may also represent inequality and fragmentation (Peckham and Exworthy, 
2003). Butler (1992: 125) summarises the dichotomy: is the NHS a national 
service which is locally managed or a series of local services operating within 
national guidelines? Hunter and Wistow (1987) cite some other reasons for 
assuming uniformity across the UK: 
• historical commitments and limited increments in financial growth 
(limiting major change) 
• pressure-group activity from professional bodies (e.g. the British Medical 
Association and trade unions) 
• UK-wide agreements such as pay, terms and conditions 
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• the relative lack of policy-making resources in the territorial offices 
(compared with London). 
However, there are countervailing pressures encouraging diversity, including 
the forces for political devolution, territorial cultures and traditions, the way in 
different types of policy are implemented, the territorial regimes of 
governance and the restructuring of the state in the light of broader 
pressures. Therefore, many variations within UK health policy might relate as 
much to political and administrative factors as to health or health care factors. 
In a recent King’s Fund discussion paper (King’s Fund, 2002) two key 
problems were identified with the NHS: over politicisation and over 
centralisation. To address these, three strategies were suggested, involving 
(a) greater distance between the Government and the NHS, (b) separate 
providers from central control and (c) greater devolution from the centre. 
Central to these proposals are the concepts of decentralisation and 
devolution. Decentralisation is a complex concept that is utilised in a wide 
range of disciplinary contexts including political science, geography, 
management studies and organisational theory (Smith, 1985; Burns et al., 
1994; Exworthy, 1994; Pollitt et al., 1998). Whereas essentially the literature 
identifies two basic typologies relating to geography (spatial dimension) and 
level (organisational dimension), decentralisation remains a contested 
concept. Within the UK decentralisation has a long history embodied in 
debates between Bevan and Morrison about political and organisational 
decentralisation of the NHS in the 1940s (Nissel, 1980; Baggott, 2004). 
Current debates about the role of the centre, patient choice, primary care 
trusts (PCTs), practice-based commissioning and the creation of foundation 
trusts and new governance arrangements provide the context for the present 
wave of decentralisation in the NHS. Government proposals set out in the new 
NHS Five Year Plan emphasise shifting power from the centre, described by 
the Prime Minister as finding the balance between ’individual choice and 
central control’. In his speech to the NHS Confederation in June – following 
John Reid’s launch of the new NHS Five Year Plan – Sir Nigel Crisp, Chief 
Executive of the NHS, described the NHS as decentralizing, to move away 
from Bevan’s adage that ’the sound of a bedpan dropped in a distant hospital 
should reverberate through Whitehall’. In future, NHS organisations would be 
asked to set local targets according to five principles: identified gaps in 
services, the needs of the local population, an ‘equity audit’ – paying 
particular attention to the needs of black people and those from ethnic 
minorities, evidence-based interventions and, where possible, shared targets 
with other NHS bodies and local authorities. Instead of 80% of initiatives 
being dictated nationally, with 20% set locally, 80% of the NHS's priorities 
would be determined locally. But Crisp warned, ‘The journey will not be a 
straight line. There will be times when the centre seems to be too interfering 
and too controlling, and other times when everything will seem too 
decentralised, with accusations not just of postcode prescribing, but of 
“postcode healthcare”.’ 
Government policy is also committed to allowing patients a greater say in 
their own health care, for example by choosing or sharing in the decision 
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about where they should be treated, what kind of treatment to have or who 
should carry it out, decentralizing decisions further than simply to local NHS 
organizations and professionals. Not only is it seen as right that patients 
should have such involvement, but that such a policy has beneficial 
consequences, for instance making patients feel more satisfied because they 
get services which suit their needs better, or improving the general quality of 
health services because of competition between providers, or enhancing 
equity by giving more choice to those who have been disadvantaged in the 
past. The model endorsed by the later Labour government, based around 
individual patient choice, is perhaps the clearest attempt yet at ‘market 
consumerism’ (Greener, 2004). This model was outlined in The NHS Plan and 
in the policy documents Extending Patient Choice and Delivering the NHS Plan 
(Department of Health, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). Later came Building on 
the Best: choice, responsiveness and equity in the NHS and the establishment 
of the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (Department 
of Health, 2003). Government policy in these directions has also been 
supported by professional and consumer groups, supporting greater choice for 
consumers, though acknowledging that there are limits to, and adverse 
consequences of, choice (National Consumer Council, 2004). 
Current NHS policy sets out a number of broad themes that include 
organisational freedom from central control, patient empowerment and clinical 
empowerment, reflecting many of the assumptions made in the literature 
about the benefits of decentralisation. In policy usage – as evidenced by 
recent use in the NHS – decentralisation is seen as a good thing because it: 
• frees managers to manage 
• enables more responsive public services, attuned to local needs 
• contributes to economy by enabling organisations to shed unnecessary 
middle managers 
• promotes efficiency by shortening previously long bureaucratic 
hierarchies 
• produces contented and stimulated staff, with increased sense of room 
for manoeuvre 
• makes politicians more responsive and accountable to the ‘people’. 
The important link here is that decentralisation is seen as having the potential 
to improve organisational performance through localisation and organisational 
change, usually conceptualised as smaller independent organisations rather 
than simply as subunits of larger bureaucracies (e.g. PCTs rather than local 
offices of the NHS). Current government policy in relation to the NHS also 
promotes decentralisation as a way of releasing local health services from the 
constraint of central direction and thus underpins the drive towards 
improvements in health care (Department of Health, 2000, 2004; King’s Fund, 
2002). It is argued that decentralisation with devolved power creates 
autonomy to act and manage. This is clearly a key element of current policy 
rhetoric with regard to PCTs and foundation hospitals for example. 
Presumably the goal of decentralisation in health care systems is to increase 
performance and/or improve health outcomes and an analysis of 
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decentralisation must, therefore, relate to examining what is being 
decentralised and for what purpose. 
Thus it is essential to identify the theoretical underpinning of the concept of 
decentralisation before exploring its application in policy and practice. This 
review identifies, therefore, a number of key theoretical positions – such as 
public choice theory, democracy and organisational theory – and key concepts 
and measures relating to decentralisation to develop a typology of approaches 
to decentralisation drawing on existing empirical studies identified in the 
review. A secondary approach will be to identify frameworks for defining 
decentralisation/centralisation. In particular, implementation theory discusses 
the need to balance professional and organisational discretion (suggesting a 
devolved and decentralised organisational structure) and the need for central 
policy control to achieve policy delivery – the concept of professional 
discretion being particularly relevant in relation to delivery of health care 
services (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Hill, 1997). Capturing this individual 
context of health care delivery as well the shift towards patient autonomy are 
key issues that are addressed in the conceptual discussion of decentralisation 
found in this report. In relation to exploring the effectiveness of decentralist 
approaches we examine concepts of contingency, local responsiveness and 
the tensions between local responsiveness, innovation and opportunity 
(decentralist tendencies) as compared with central performance monitoring 
and control (centralist tendencies; Burns, 2000). In addition, the continued 
fragmentation of health services in England raises issues of vertical 
decentralisation and devolution between local agencies (such as PCTs, care 
trusts and NHS hospital and specialist trusts) and nationally (such as the 
Department of Health, Modernisation Agency and regulatory organisations 
such as the Commission for Health Care Audit and Inspection (CHAI), 
professional bodies, etc.). Thus for the NHS in England, the concept of 
decentralisation is also associated with centralisation in relation to the need to 
identify national standards and devolution in terms of devolved power. 
This undercurrent of centralisation is also evident in theoretical and 
conceptual approaches to decentralisation. This tension is based on different 
models that emphasise democracy, uniformity and equity (Newman, 2001). 
The tension between national standards, central performance monitoring, 
central accountability and regulatory approaches (CHAI, National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)) and encouraging local responsiveness, 
opportunity and innovation is an inherent element of public service delivery in 
the UK (Burns, 2000) and in the last 2 years the Government has been 
introducing policies explicitly aimed at decentralising and even devolving 
power, such as earned autonomy, devolution of budgets to PCTs and 
proposals to establish foundation hospitals while establishing central 
regulatory frameworks (CHAI, NICE) and national standards through the 
national service frameworks, national performance targets and the 
Modernisation Agency. Such policies need, however, to be set within the 
context of wider and longer-term developments in decentralisation and 
devolution in health care – such as the promotion of primary care and 
changes in local government and other public services from the 1970s 
onwards (Burns et al., 1994; Paton, 1996; Pollitt et al., 1998; Powell, 1998; 
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Boyne et al., 2003; Peckham and Exworthy, 2003). These developments have 
included administrative decentralisation, the internal market and, more 
recently, developing new devolved organisational structures with new 
governance arrangements (PCTs and foundation hospitals). Furthermore, 
current proposals for devolution to English regions provides a further context 
to this debate (Hunter et al., 2005). 
1.2  Aims and objectives 
The aim of this review is to examine the nature and application of 
decentralisation as an organisational model for health care in England. The 
study briefly reviews the relevant theoretical literature from a range of 
disciplines relating to different public and private contexts of decentralisation 
and centralisation. It examines empirical evidence about centralisation and 
decentralisation in public and private organisations and explores the 
relationship between decentralisation and different incentive structures, which 
in turn affect organisational performance. 
The research brief given by National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service 
Delivery and Organisation R & D (SDO) requested a study to inform policy and 
set the agenda for further empirical research in this area. The research brief 
required the review to address the following questions. 
1 What is meant by each of the terms centralisation, decentralisation and 
devolution and are there any ways to measure the extent to which each 
is occurring? 
2 In hierarchies what degree of decentralisation and devolution (or 
centralisation) in relationships between public service organisations is 
most effective in terms of the quality of those relationships, both 
vertically up and down the hierarchy and horizontally between 
organisations in the same tier in the hierarchy? 
3 In hierarchies what degree of decentralisation and devolution (or 
centralisation) in relationships between public service organisations is 
most effective in terms of enhancing the performance of those 
organisations? 
4 What are the implications of the foregoing issues for the organisation of 
health services in England? 
The brief identified the need for the literature review to include the relevant 
theoretical literature in a range of disciplines including organisational 
economics, political science, organizational studies, sociolegal studies, 
organisational sociology and organisational psychology. We were required to 
examine the theoretical literature relating to privately owned and run firms, 
but also that the extent to which it is relevant to public services should be 
discussed. Empirical evidence about centralisation and decentralisation in 
public and private organisations should also be summarised and discussed. 
We were required to examine whether there are relevant lessons from sectors 
other than health, and include evidence from countries outside the UK, where 
relevant. Differences between different sectors (i.e. the publicly owned sector, 
the for-profit sector and the voluntary sector) should be discussed. 
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Although the main theme of this review is centralisation, devolution and 
decentralisation, the SDO brief required us to take account of the different 
literatures in this area as it was likely that a more complex and dynamic 
relationship existed than perhaps the concepts of centralisation, 
decentralisation and devolution appear to indicate. These concern the 
changing nature of the dynamics between parts of a system over time 
resulting from the combination of multiple centres of direction and regulation 
(including financial, political and technical) and multiple strategies emerging 
among the regulated organisations (including collaboration, compliance and 
competition). 
In discussing these themes and undertaking an initial exploration of the 
literature the research team clarified the research questions in the research 
brief, identifying the purpose of the research project as being to examine the 
evidence from the UK (and elsewhere) to do the following. 
1 Define the terms centralisation, decentralisation and devolution and how 
these can be measured. 
2 Identify the relationship between the degree of decentralisation and 
devolution (or centralisation) in relationships between public service 
organisations and the effectiveness and quality of those relationships, 
both vertically up and down the hierarchy and horizontally between 
organisations in the same tier in the hierarchy. 
3 Identify what degree of decentralisation and devolution (or centralisation) 
in relationships between public service organisations is most effective in 
terms of enhancing the performance of those organisations. 
4 Identify key lessons for the organisation of health services in England. 
1.3  The literature review 
This study reviews the relevant theoretical literature and examines empirical 
evidence about centralisation and decentralisation in public and private 
organisations. In particular, it explores the relationship between 
decentralisation and different incentive structures, which in turn affect 
organisational performance. Three broad areas of performance were 
examined relating to producer quality (staff satisfaction, inter-organisational 
relationships, technical and allocative efficiency), user quality (outcomes for 
patients, equity) and accountability (local and central performance targets, 
national quality standards, national protocols and guidelines). In order to 
draw lessons for the NHS in England we examined UK literature and English-
language literature from countries where there are similar centralist and 
decentralist tensions. This is a multi-disciplinary review and a key goal has 
been to develop a framework drawing on different disciplines and theories, 
identifying the implications for different concepts and measures. 
The method adopted for this literature review followed methods used in 
previously successful studies (Robinson and Steiner, 1998; Exworthy et al., 
2001; Arksey and O’Malley, 2005). The main objectives of the review were: 
• to map the available literature 
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• to provide a critical overview of existing work in relation to appropriate 
themes 
• to identify areas where more research may be of use 
• to consult with users to complement and enhance overall findings. 
The review appraised empirical studies but it did not measure the 
effectiveness of particular interventions. It does, however, identify the effect 
of particular decentralised/devolved organisational, structural, procedural and 
accountability arrangements, and their relationship to performance, 
identifying lessons for the NHS in England. This approach reflected the 
expected large number of studies that could have potentially been studied. 
Unlike standard literature reviews, this study took into account recent and 
current policy contexts in the UK and elsewhere. The focus was primarily on 
health care systems and organisations but other spheres of the public sector 
and the private sector were also considered. Moreover, a significant grey 
literature was anticipated; this proved correct. Although each item in this 
literature was not examined in detail, it informed the study in terms of policy 
context and contemporary relevance. Thus the review modified the standard 
approach in order to accommodate the nature of the anticipated evidence and 
policy context. In summary, given the diversity and volume of literature 
available and following consultation with the SDO and our expert panel, 
attention was focused on evidence that contributed to the following. 
• Understanding of the UK policy context, including empirical studies as 
well as literature from political science, organisational studies and social 
policy. 
• Understanding of the organisational and performance impact of 
decentralised/devolved structures. 
• Relevant methodological issues that may be considered in commissioning 
future research. 
1.4  Review methods 
1.4.1  Search strategy 
Our initial strategy was to identify literature that examined the concept of 
decentralisation. This was mainly books and monographs. Each of the 
research team members read books to develop a clearer understanding of the 
conceptual and theoretical debates related to decentralisation. This initial 
review informed search strategy and this covered three key parameters. 
1 Key words: decentralization, centralization, devolution, organizational 
autonomy, subsidiarity, federal, localism, centralism, regionalization and 
central–local relations. Alternative spellings were also included (e.g. 
decentralisation). 
2 Time period: literature published since 1974 was sought on the 
assumption that more recent evidence would have greater applicability to 
the current context. 
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3 Coverage: for practical reasons, only English-language papers were 
identified (although the potential value of some evidence published in 
other languages was recognised). 
1.4.2  Data search 
The search strategy was applied to five sources of evidence (See Appendix 1 
for a summary of database search results). 
1 Electronic database searches including ASSIA, Business Source Premier, 
Medline, BIDS, HMIC, IBSS, Sociofile, King’s Fund library and SIGLE on 
grey literature in Europe. 
2 Electronic searches of current research (including the Department of 
Health National Research Register and ESRC) and manual searches 
(including reference lists and forthcoming reports). 
3 Manual and electronic search of grey literature (e.g. policy statements, 
reports, unpublished research) and ephemeral literature (e.g. pamphlets 
and newsletters). 
4 It was expected that health service/policy organisations would hold 
documents relating to decentralisation. We found further evidence via the 
King’s Fund and policy think-tanks such the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) and DEMOS. 
5 A cumulative search of references within retired articles identified further 
sources of evidence. 
1.4.3  Data categorization and appraisal 
An initial batch of 20 articles was analysed by all team members and 
summaries were compared. This ensured that consistency of terminology and 
approach was secured at the outset. Variance was discussed, and a common 
approach agreed. From an initial trawl of over 500 items of evidence, 205 
were deemed relevant in terms of quality of the evidence and relevant to 
contemporary English health care organisations. 
For each of the 205 items of evidence, a summary was produced (see 
Appendix 2) drawing on the analytical frameworks identified from theories of 
decentralisation and methodological appraisal. This summary differed from 
the research application to incorporate preliminary conceptual analysis. 
Summary of evidence according to: 
• Author(s) 
• Year of publication 
• Quality: peer reviewed; disciplinary field 
• Methods: quantitative/qualitative; brief description 
• Context: national system; sector (public/private; service field, e.g. 
health, education) 
• Year of study 
• Terms used: key words from search strategy (see Search strategy, 
above) 
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• Measurement: which variables of decentralisation were measured? 
• Functions: which service-related functions were studied? 
• Performance domain: which aspect of performance (from evaluative 
criteria) was studied? 
• Impact on organizational performance: what conclusions about 
organizational performance were drawn? 
• Other comments 
1.5  Analysis 
The summary of evidence provided the basis for in-depth analysis across each 
of the performance domains, required by the SDO Research Brief. Two other 
performance domains emerged from the literature and were included in the 
evidence summary and subsequent analysis. These included responsiveness 
and accountability. Analysis followed a template to ensure consistency within 
the project team and across each performance domain. This template 
comprised: 
• assumptions underlying the performance domain: the presumed 
relationship between decentralisation and that performance domain 
• caveats related to these assumptions 
• evidence in support of the main assumptions 
• evidence against the main assumptions 
• balance of evidence 
• relevance to the NHS. 
1.6  Involvement of experts 
From the outset of the project, experts from research, management and 
policy fields were involved with this review in three main ways. 
1 Expert panel: a panel of 12 experts was convened to provide insights and 
perspectives upon the project’s methods, findings and conclusions as well 
as contemporary policy context. The panel comprised academic 
researchers, NHS representatives (from the Department of Health, a 
strategic health authority, a PCT and an NHS trust provider), a researcher 
from a think-tank and a national journalist. The panel met three times 
(April, September and December 2004) in Oxford. Three experts joined 
the panel as so-called virtual members in the sense that they did not 
attend meetings but papers were sent to them and their comments were 
digested by the project team. 
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Membership of the expert panel  
Pauline Allen London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine/SDO 
Paul Anand Open University/SDO governance project 
team 
Anna Dixon Department of Health and London School of 
Economics 
Nigel Edwards NHS Confederation 
Nick Goodwin London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine/SDO 
Andrea Humphrey Department of Health 
Ed Macalister-Smith Nuffield Orthopaedic Hospital, Oxford 
Brian Mackness Thames Valley Strategic Health Authority 
Geoff Meads Warwick University 
Deborah Roche IPPR 
David Walker The Guardian 
Andrea Young Oxford city PCT 
Virtual members 
Ewan Ferlie Royal Holloway–University of London 
Richard Saltman European Observatory, Madrid 
Perri 6 University of Birmingham  
2 Open University/SDO governance project: from the beginning of the 
project close contact was kept with the partner SDO project on 
governance being undertaken by Professor Celia Davies and colleagues at 
the Open University. One of the governance project team members was a 
member of our expert panel and Dr Mark Exworthy attended the Open 
University project meeting of academic peers in September 2004. 
3 Research networks: contacts with leading policy-makers, researchers and 
commentators in the field were conducted throughout the project. This 
network provided additional sources for policy-relevant theoretical, 
unpublished and ongoing literature. These networks included the 
opportunity to discuss interim findings (especially of conceptual 
frameworks) with academic groups at seminars and conferences. 
1.7  The structure of the report 
The remainder of this report is divided into six sections. In Section 2 we 
examine the theoretical and conceptual literature on decentralisation. The 
section also presents a framework for conceptualising decentralisation that we 
use in this report in our assessment of the evidence. Sections 3 and 4 
examine the history and current policy context of decentralisation in the 
English NHS. Section 3 provides an overview of decentralist policies and 
organisational changes in the NHS and how these have been previously 
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assessed. In Section 4 we explore current policies in the NHS and examine 
their relationship to decentralisation. 
Section 5 uses the key performance criteria to discuss the literature on 
decentralisation and organisational performance. Key assumptions about each 
criterion are presented and then the extent to which these are supported by 
theory and evidence is examined. In Section 6 this review is then applied to 
the NHS, identifying the strength of evidence to support each of the individual 
performance criteria. 
In the final section we identify the implications for the English NHS that arise 
from this assessment in terms of policy and practice. We also identify where 
there are gaps in the evidence and highlight areas for further research. 
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Section 2  Understanding decentralisation 
2.1  Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on decentralisation, centralisation and 
devolution that covers a wide range of disciplines including politics, public 
administration, health services research, economics, management, sociology 
and organisational studies. The diversity of the literature and the use of a 
wide range of definitions creates problems for any analysis of decentralisation. 
In this section we examine some of the main definitions of decentralisation 
and briefly review the main frameworks that have been used in studies of 
decentralisation in the UK and abroad. Drawing on these frameworks we then 
present a new framework that is more appropriate for an analysis of 
decentralisation in the UK health care system. 
Central to how decentralisation is understood in this report is that fact that it 
is inappropriate to solely view decentralisation in terms of an organisational or 
geographical concept. Health and health care have an individual as well as an 
organisational context. No examination of the delivery of health care can be 
undertaken without reference to the roles of health care professionals and 
patients and the fact that much recent policy has focused on professional 
autonomy and regulation and patient involvement, self determination and 
choice. Thus, any discussion of decentralisation in the NHS must capture 
these elements as well as the more traditional spatial and organisational 
context. Therefore, in this section we present a new decentralisation 
framework that addresses this aspect. In addition, this review links 
decentralisation to performance and the new framework takes this aspect into 
account. 
2.2  Overview of academic disciplinary 
approaches to decentralisation 
There are two main problems associated with the breadth of the literature on 
decentralisation. First, many associated phenomena are examined using 
cognate terms rather than the term decentralisation. Second, the literature on 
decentralisation is found in a large range of disciplines and theories, often 
with few links between them. 
The main cognate terms appear to be autonomy (Brooke, 1984; Gurr and 
King, 1987; Boyne, 1993; Pratchett, 2004), discretion (Page and Goldsmith, 
1987; Page, 1991; Bossert, 1998) and localism (Page, 1991; Stoker, 2004), 
and tend to be found in the disciplines of political science and management. 
Page and Goldsmith (1987: 3) state that it is conventional for cross-national 
descriptions to use terms such as ’centralization’, ’decentralization’, ’central 
control’ and ’local autonomy’, but these terms do not on their own provide 
adequate concepts on which to base a comparative analysis. Terms do not 
clarify what particular aspect of the process of government is decentralized. 
Consequently, it is easy for studies to talk past each other. Some studies, 
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such as Page (1991), on localism tend to use other terms, like autonomy and 
discretion. However, it is unclear whether decentralisation equals autonomy 
(Brooke, 1984: 9) or whether the terms are simply related. Moreover, 
defining one problematic term by using another does not clarify analysis very 
far. 
According to Brooke (1984: 4), accountants, anthropologists, economists, 
historians, lawyers, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and theologians 
as well as administrative, management and political scientists have been 
called as expert witnesses. However, most reviews tend to focus on single 
disciplines or theoretical areas. One of the few accounts to stress the multi-
disciplinary nature of the literature is that by Bossert (1998), who reviews the 
four major analytical frameworks that have been used by authors to address 
problems of decentralisation in the health sector: public administration; local 
fiscal choice; social capital approach and principal/agent approach. Although 
this is a much cited typology, it appears to be not fully comprehensive or 
coherent. His public administration category is linked to the four-fold typology 
of Rondinelli (1981) of deconcentration, delegation, devolution and 
privatisation (see Frameworks of decentralisation, Section 2.5). However, 
public administration approaches are much wider than that of one writer, 
whose main contribution is in the field of development studies. Local fiscal 
choice is largely the contribution of economists writing about fiscal federalism, 
and is covered briefly below. Social capital is linked to the work of Putnam 
(1993), which suggests that localities with long and deep histories of strongly 
established civic organization will have better performing decentralized 
governments than localities which lack these networks of associations. This 
builds on the work of de Tocqueville and is linked to work on local democracy 
and democratic theory (below). Finally, Bossert’s favoured approach is 
principal/agent theory, which he develops into his concept of a decision space 
(Section 2.6). This draws largely on the work of economists who examine the 
relations between the principal, who has specified objectives (e.g. central 
government), and the agent, who achieves these objectives (e.g. local 
authorities or hospitals). Its essence focuses on the different ways (e.g. using 
hierarchical, market or network strategies), under conditions of information 
asymmetry, that objectives can be achieved. As Bossert’s framework is 
partial, we set out a very brief review of the main disciplinary approaches to 
decentralisation. 
Political science saw some of the earliest debates on decentralisation. In the 
nineteenth century, Chadwick and Toulmin Smith represented the polar 
extremes of the centralisation/decentralisation debate in local government. A 
long line of political philosophers, including Mill, Hobbes, De Toqueville, Burke, 
Cole and the Webbs have contributed to the debate. Defenders of localism 
such as W.A. Robson, D.N. Chester, George Jones and John Stewart have 
fought a rearguard action against the tide of centralism. This debate has been 
covered in fields such as local democracy and democratic theory (Hill, 1974; 
Burns et al., 1994) central control and the central domination thesis 
(Carmichael and Midwinter, 2003), central–local and intergovernmental 
relations (Griffith, 1966; Rhodes, 1981, 1988; Bulpitt, 1983). Very broadly, 
many political scientists believe that there has been too much centralisation in 
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the UK, and that a return to localism would be beneficial. This has prompted 
an emphasis on the so-called new localism (Stoker, 2004; but see Walker, 
2002). Other contributions have been in the field of federalism, which 
examines the division of functions between national and local states (Anton, 
1997; Palley, 1997), the politics of government grants (King, 1984; Newton 
and Karran, 1985; McConnell, 1999; Glennerster et al., 2000) and political 
devolution (Ross and Tomaney, 2001; Bradbury, 2003; Jervis and Plowden, 
2003). Finally, the work of Smith (1980, 1985) is a notable contribution to the 
study of decentralisation, as his 1980 article is one of the few that sets out 
possible measures of decentralisation, and his 1985 book was a relatively 
early and influential full-length treatment of the subject. 
The contribution of economics falls within two broad areas. Public choice 
theory (Niskanen, 1971) argues that efficiency is associated with competition, 
information on organizational performance and small organization size (Boyne 
et al., 2003). Fiscal federalism (Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972; Bennett, 
1980; Levaggi and Smith, 2004) is based on determining the optimum size 
for units carrying out the basic functions of public finance (Musgrave, 1959). 
This area is one of the few that has produced a clear – if heavily criticised – 
measurement of decentralisation: social expenditure at the local level as a 
percentage of national social expenditure. 
Historians have focused on local government, including the Chadwick/Toulmin 
Smith debate (above) and a stream of government reports on differentiating 
local from central functions in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (Smellie, 1968; 
Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978; Foster et al., 1980; Ashford, 1982, 1986) 
running to the report of the Layfield Committee (1976) and the current 
Balance of Funding Review (Stoker, 2004). There have also been 
contributions on central–local relations (Bellamy, 1988), grants (Foster et al., 
1980; Baugh, 1992) and urban history (Daunton, 2000). Unlike political 
science, few social administration texts focused on central–local relations (but 
see Simey, 1937). Contemporary historians (Szreter, 2002; White, 2004) 
have reassessed historical debates and attempted to determine whether 
history has lessons for current reforms. Journalists have entered the fray, 
with the battle of the broadsheets favouring (Jenkins, 1996; Marr, 1996; 
Freedland, 1998) or opposing (Walker, 2002) localism, while there has also 
been the tussle of the think-tanks (Mulgan and 6, 1996; Bankauskaite et al., 
2004). 
Development studies has seen a great deal of work on decentralisation 
(Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Conyers, 1984; Collins and Green, 1993, 
1994; Mills, 1994; Manor, 1999; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). The dominant 
conceptual framework was developed by Rondinelli (1981), with further 
frameworks by Bossert (1998) and Gershberg (1998). However, the very 
different context of developing countries means that the transferability of 
findings may be problematic (see Understanding and interpreting the 
evidence, Section 6). 
Contributions from management include Bourn and Ezzamel (1987), Brooke 
(1984), Bromwich and Lapsley (1997), Common et al. (1992), Hales (1999) 
and Pollitt et al. (1998). There is a large number of sub-areas within 
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management research, such as organization theory, quantitative approaches, 
political economy approaches and accounting approaches (Brooke, 1984: 
149–50). One of the few attempts to operationalise decentralisation involves 
the locus of decision-making: who is the last person whose assent must be 
obtained before legitimate action is taken? (Brooke, 1984). 
Finally, there are fewer – but equally diverse – contributions from geography 
(Paddison, 1983; Pinch, 1991; Atkinson, 1995). Although written by an author 
from a university geography department and published in a geography 
journal, Atkinson’s (1995) review on tracking the decentralisation debate 
focuses largely on development studies, cites few geographers and does not 
appear to offer any distinctive geographical point of view. Pinch (1991) 
compares service distribution in two Australian cities, but his claim that they 
represent different levels of decentralisation is not supported by any evidence. 
Paddison (1983), within a general text on political geography, provides a 
useful review of some of the decentralisation literature, including early 
definitions and measures. 
All this means that the vast literature on decentralisation and associated 
concepts, with differences in concepts, contexts, measures and findings, 
makes any attempt at summary and synthesis extremely difficult. In 
particular, decentralisation has been used as a comparative concept rather 
than as an absolute measurement. Decentralisation has been analysed 
primarily within historical and political contexts. Studies have sought to 
examine trends over time or within or between political structures and 
systems. The literature on decentralisation has tended to reflect these two 
contexts and frameworks developed to examine decentralisation reflect these 
contexts. These points are discussed later in this section. As this review 
demonstrates, application of decentralisation to the NHS also reflects these 
contexts. The political context of the NHS is, as identified in Section 1, one 
where political power is held centrally by Parliament with no sharing of 
political authority by the NHS. This situation has remained unchanged since 
the inception of the NHS in 1948, although outside of England there has been 
devolution to political assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
However, historically there has been a long-term interest in decentralisation 
and this context is discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
2.3  What is the purpose of decentralisation? 
Before examining what is meant by decentralisation it is worth exploring what 
decentralisation – or, for that matter, centralisation – is meant to achieve. 
This is a question about policy goals or ends. The research brief outlines two 
fundamental questions that relate to why services may be centralised or 
decentralised. 
1 In hierarchies what degree of decentralisation and devolution (or 
centralisation) in relationships between public service organisations is 
most effective in terms of the quality of those relationships, both 
vertically up and down the hierarchy and horizontally between 
organisations in the same tier in the hierarchy? 
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2 In hierarchies what degree of decentralisation and devolution (or 
centralisation) in relationships between public service organisations is 
most effective in terms of enhancing the performance of those 
organisations? 
At the heart of these questions are assumptions about the purpose of 
decentralisation. Specifically are there degrees of decentralisation that can 
improve relationships between organisations and improve organisational 
performance? As discussed above the literature on decentralisation is very 
broad but there is a predominant view that decentralisation is in itself a good 
thing, both in terms of the process and as an outcome, as demonstrated in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the measures of organisational performance 
defined by the SDO whereas Table 2 identifies two further performance 
criteria identified from the literature. The tables then outline the key 
assumptions that have been made about the outcomes of decentralisation 
that have been identified in the theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
literature. However, as Pollitt et al. (1998) have observed: 
In short, [decentralisation is] a miracle cure for a host of bureaucratic and 
political ills. Academics with a taste for post-modernism would no doubt refer to 
it as an attempt at a meta-narrative – a conceptual and linguistic project 
designed simultaneously to supersede (and therefore solve) a range of 
perceived ills within the previous discourse of public administration. 
(Pollitt et al., 1998: 1) 
The view that decentralisation is a good thing is not, though, universally 
shared and a number of commentators have identified that increasing 
decentralisation may in fact lead to adverse consequences. In particular, 
Walker (2002) has argued that increased decentralisation leads to 
inefficiencies of scale and increasing inequities, consequences that are 
identified in the broader theoretical literature (De Vries, 2000; Levaggi and 
Smith, 2004). Walker’s arguments go further though, as he argues that 
centralisation can produce many of the results claimed for decentralisation, 
such as innovation. The point being made here is that it is not the level (more 
or less centralised/decentralised) of organisation that is important. This raises 
a key question therefore about whether decentralisation can produce the 
benefits identified in Tables 1 and 2 and what arrangement of decentralisation 
– that is, what is decentralised to where – provide the maximum benefits. In 
order to do this it is necessary to clearly define decentralisation and the 
parameters that relate to it.  
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Table 1  Key assumptions about the impact of decentralisation on SDO-defined organisational performance criteria 
SDO criterion Assumptions about the benefits or otherwise of 
decentralisation  
Theoretical 
background 
Comments 
Outcomes (for 
patients/health 
outcomes) 
 
• Assuming decentralisation is linked to (professional) 
autonomy: advocates of professional autonomy claim that 
their discretion in responding to individual patient needs 
(diagnosis, treatment, prescription/referral) makes their 
(clinical) decision-making more effective in terms of patient 
outcomes. (Note: this conflicts with evidence-based 
medicine, assuming that the evidence is clear-cut in 
directing clinical decision-making.) (Friedson, 1994) 
• A decentralised and participative form of organisation is 
most conducive to effectiveness from an organisational 
perspective (Likert, 1967; Agyris, 1972). 
Professional 
autonomy 
Fiscal federalism 
Assumes that autonomous 
professionals make the best 
decisions for patients 
Assumes that improved 
effectiveness produces better 
outcomes 
Relates to effectiveness of 
services: see also allocative and 
technical efficiency 
Process measures 
 
• Reduces the decision load by sharing it with more people 
(De Vries, 2000) 
• Allows more organisational flexibility and enables quicker 
responses (De Vries, 2000) 
• Allows easier co-ordination between individuals; but overall 
co-ordination hampered (Carter, 1999) 
Intergovernmental 
relations 
Federalism 
Fiscal federalism 
Principal-agent theory 
Extends hierarchical lines of 
control – more stretched, more 
intrusive? 
Humanity • Being closer to the public makes agencies more conscious of 
their responsibility to and relationship with local 
communities (Hambleton et al., 1996). 
• Organisations and the people within them are more visible 
to local service users and communities, leading to a desire 
to be seen to do the right thing, be more open and be 
accountable locally (Burns et al., 1994; Hambleton et al., 
1996). 
New public 
management 
Democratic theory 
Assumes democratic 
organisations are more effective 
at meeting local needs and 
therefore outcomes are more 
effective 
Relates to staff 
morale/satisfaction and 
responsiveness 
Staff morale/ 
satisfaction 
• Develops staff: job satisfaction, loyalty (Burns et al., 1994) 
• Freedom to manage; managerial autonomy (DHSS, 1983) 
• Generates higher morale (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; see 
De Vries, 2000) 
Human resource-
management theories 
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• Recruitment of skilled officials more difficult at local level 
(De Vries, 2000) 
• Increases satisfaction, security and self-control (Pennings, 
1976) 
• Decentralised and participative form of organisation is most 
conducive to effectiveness from an employee perspective 
(Likert, 1967; Agyris, 1972) 
Equity: horizontal but 
not vertical 
 
• Increases equity by allowing services to meet better the 
needs of particular groups (argument against), possibly 
through targeted funding (Bossert, 1998). 
 
Intergovernmental 
relations (Rhodes, 
1997) 
 
Note the common assumption 
that decentralisation widens 
inequality as the potential for 
local variations is widened 
Efficiency (allocative) 
 
• Improvement in the quality of public services: more 
sensitive service delivery - achieves distribution aims: 
target resources to areas and groups (Burns et al., 1994) 
• Improves (allocative) efficiency as patient responsiveness 
and accountability improves (e.g. improved governance and 
public service delivery by increasing the allocative efficiency 
through better matching of public services to local 
preferences) (Saltman et al., 2003) 
• Is more likely to reflect local preferences (De Vries, 2000) 
Public choice theory 
Principal-agent theory 
Relates to effectiveness and 
responsiveness 
Efficiency (technical/ 
productive) 
• Improves as managers devote greater attention and are 
more responsive; fewer layers of bureaucracy*; better 
knowledge of costs (e.g. improves governance and public 
service delivery by increasing technical efficiency through 
fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local 
cost) (Saltman et al., 2003) 
• Experimentation and innovation (Oates, 1972) 
• Smaller organisations perform better (Bojke et al., 2001) 
• Increases technical efficiency through learning from 
diversity (De Vries, 2000) 
• Centralisation generates more waste: local people, local 
provision and local services are cheaper (De Vries, 2000) 
• Controls costs (Burns et al., 1994) 
Public choice theory 
Fiscal federalism 
Relates to effectiveness 
*Assumes some restructuring 
(e.g. delayering), especially at 
the centre and regional tiers 
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• Allows more organisational flexibility and enables quicker 
responses (De Vries, 2000) 
Adherence to 
performance targets 
and evidence-based 
protocols 
• Decentralisation strengthens the hierarchical chain of 
command between the centre and locality (the transmission 
belt) and thereby ensure that central targets are adhered 
through contractual relations (Hughes and Griffiths, 1999). 
 
Intergovernmental 
relations 
Principal-agent theory 
Literature on getting evidence 
into practice shows that 
independence of practitioners is a 
constraint (e.g. Harrison et al., 
1992). 
Table 2  Key assumptions about the impact of decentralisation on additional organisational performance criteria 
Additional 
criterion 
Assumptions about the benefits or otherwise of 
decentralisation  
Theory Comments 
Responsiveness 
 
• Is seen as a way of increasing responsiveness (Meads and Wild, 2003) 
• Enhances civic participation; neutralises entrenched local elites and 
increases political stability (De Vries, 2000) 
• Strengthening of local democracy: visibility, community development 
and encourages political awareness (Burns et al., 1994) 
• Is more likely to reflect local preferences (De Vries, 2000) 
Local democracy and 
democratic theory 
Also refers to responsibility and 
accountability to the 
patient/public 
Accountability • Enhances civic participation; neutralises entrenched local elites and 
increases political stability (De Vries, 2000) 
• Increases democracy and accountability to the local population (Burns 
et al., 1994; Bossert, 1998; Meads and Wild, 2003) 
• Makes agencies more conscious of their responsibility to and 
relationship with local communities (Hambleton et al., 1996) 
Democratic theory 
Participative democracy 
New public management 
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2.4  What is decentralisation? 
In a recent examination of decentralisation in health services Saltman et al. 
(2003) found that: 
According to widely accepted definitions, decentralization is the transfer of 
authority and power in planning, management and decision making from 
higher to lower levels of organizational control. 
(Saltman et al., 2003: 2) 
This immediately places decentralisation within an organisational and 
geographical context. This is a fairly consistent approach to defining 
decentralisation. For example, Smith (1985) argues that ‘Decentralization 
entails the subdivision of a state’s territory into smaller areas and the creation 
of political and administrative institutions in those areas’ (p.1). Burns et al. 
(1994), in their discussion of local government, distinguish two types of 
decentralisation: ’On the one hand, it is used to refer to the physical dispersal 
of operations to local offices. In a second sense, it is used to refer to the 
delegation or devolution of a greater degree of decision making authority to 
lower levels of administration or government. In common usage, these 
meanings are sometimes combined’ (p.6). Similarly, Levaggi and Smith 
(2004) suggest that ’in broad terms it entails the transfer of powers from a 
central authority (typically the national government) to more local institutions 
(p.3). Pollitt et al. (1998) identify a further dimension of decentralisation with 
the observation that ‘Common to most of these [academic] treatments is an 
underlying sense that decentralisation involves the spreading out of formal 
authority from a smaller to a larger number of actors’ (p.6). This definition 
draws together both vertical and horizontal concepts of decentralisation. 
Authority can be decentralised by authority being transferred to lower levels 
of an organisation (vertical decentralisation – delegating or devolving) and by 
the spreading out of authority from a central point (horizontal decentralisation 
– deconcentrating). These terms are those commonly used in definitions and 
descriptions of decentralisation and are discussed below. 
Boyne (1992) has further clarified the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
decentralisation, identifying the processes of concentration and 
fragmentation. Activities may be spread across (fragmented) the vertical and 
horizontal axes or concentrated at particular levels or in particular 
organisations. In health, for example, while there are a number of levels from 
the Department of Health to practitioners there is a concentration of functions 
in PCTs. In the local horizontal context we might also define PCTs as 
concentrating a number of local health functions. 
From this brief discussion it is clear that there are a number of concepts that 
are associated with decentralisation, including power, authority, delegation 
and devolution. This creates problems when defining decentralisation, 
although Deeming (2004) has argued that ’decentralization’ is a relatively 
straightforward concept to define, in that: 
A public service is more or less decentralized to the extent that significant 
decision-making discretion is available at lower hierarchical levels, with the 
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managers and staff who are closer to the people receiving services. In such 
circumstances substantial responsibilities for the control of budgets are at a 
level closer to the service user, allowing services to be responsive to individual 
need (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). For example, doctors and nurses in primary 
care controlling most of the NHS budget. 
(Deeming, 2004: 60). 
However, this definition incorporates a further concept – that of discretion. 
This points to the need to identify not only what is being decentralized to 
whom but what power or autonomy exists in terms of the freedom to make 
decisions. This will always be a balance in any large organization between 
individual discretion and the application of rules of behaviour (Hill, 1997). It 
also clear that any discussion of decentralisation in both a vertical and 
horizontal sense lead to questions about what the converse movement is; that 
is, centralisation. If decentralisation refers to a vertical shifting of power 
downwards or a deconcentration of power then centralisation must be the 
opposite of this. Decentralisation and centralisation are alternative modes of 
control (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Therefore, a public service is more or less 
centralized to the extent that significant decisions are taken upstream at the 
centre of government within a tighter system of control and accountability. It 
would mean politicians in government (through the channels of the 
Department of Health and NHS Executive) controlling important decisions 
about how the NHS budget is spent on local health care services (Deeming, 
2004: 60). Before examining these concepts in more detail it is important to 
examine the different ways that writers have classified decentralisation. 
2.5  Frameworks of decentralisation 
The concepts that emerge in this discussion of how decentralisation is defined 
are found in frameworks developed to describe decentralisation. However, 
much of the literature focuses on either local government or at least the 
organisation of public administration within a specific country. This has 
important implications for the conceptual frameworks that are drawn upon 
and the extent to which frameworks are relevant to health care services and 
the UK. Discussion of decentralisation has tended to be within a political 
context with assumptions about democratic frameworks and fundraising 
powers. Thus the transfer of political power from one level to another forms 
part of the context and conceptual framework for decentralisation. Devolution 
is the moving of democratic, governmental authority from higher to lower 
levels of the state, such as the shift of responsibility from the UK Parliament 
to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, which both have 
responsibility for health care in their respective countries. Clearly, within 
England there is no similar devolution and while it may be useful to examine 
the effect of such devolution on health care services it is not relevant in the 
current context of the English NHS. Whereas no political transfer of power 
occurs in England there is administrative decentralisation in the sense that 
local NHS organisations have responsibilities and exercise authority over 
many aspects of health care services. These points are reflected in the 
frameworks of decentralisation discussed in this section of the report. 
However, of particular importance is the fact that in filtering the evidence on 
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decentralisation later in this report this distinction becomes important in 
terms of selecting relevant evidence (see Sections 5 and 6). However, it is 
worth briefly examining some of the main frameworks that purport to define 
decentralisation. 
Many commentators agree that there are problems of defining 
decentralization. As Gershberg (1998: 405) put it, the concept of 
decentralisation is a slippery one: it is a term – like empowerment or 
sustainability – empty enough on its own that one can fill it with almost 
anything. Hales (1999: 832) claims that a review of the extant literature does 
little to dispel Mintzberg's (1979: 181) observation that decentralisation 
'remains probably the most confused topic in organization theory'. Page and 
Goldsmith (1987: 3) claim that it is conventional for cross-national 
descriptions to use terms such as centralisation, decentralisation, central 
control and local autonomy, but these terms do not on their own provide 
adequate concepts on which to base a comparative analysis. Terms do not 
clarify what particular aspect of the process of government is decentralised. 
Consequently, it is easy for studies to talk past each other. In order to make 
valid comparisons, it is necessary to have a framework for comparison that 
removes the ambiguity in existing terminology. 
The most commonly used framework is that developed by Rondinelli (1983), 
who identified four categories: 
1 de-concentration: a shift in authority to regional or district offices within 
the structure of government ministry 
2 delegation: semi-autonomous agencies are granted new powers 
3 devolution: a shift in authority to state, provincial or municipal 
governments 
4 privatisation: ownership is granted to private entities. 
This framework was developed from research in developing countries with a 
focus on the legal framework of decentralised organisations. Whereas this is 
the most widely quoted framework, there are some key problems. The first is 
that power and authority appear to be conflated. It is not entirely clear how 
delegation and devolution differ, for example, although in use devolution is 
generally referred to as a political decentralisation whereas delegation is seen 
as an administrative decentralisation. However, the categories are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. Despite Rondinelli’s claim for a radical 
category the inclusion of privatisation is also a problem, as not all 
privatisations are decentralisation. In fact privatisation may occur centrally or 
in decentralised units and it may or may not involve a transfer of power or 
authority, depending on the nature of the market or contractual relationship 
that is established (Bossert, 1998). Rondinelli’s framework has been most 
widely used as the basis for later analyses of decentralisation although a 
number of differing frameworks have been developed. 
For example, Burns et al. (1994), in the Politics of Decentralisation, identify 
five dimensions of decentralisation. These are: 
1 localisation: physical re-location to local offices away from a central point 
2 flexibility: multi-disciplinary teams and multi-skilling 
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3 devolution: decision-making powers delegated 
4 organisational: re-orientation of organisational values and culture 
5 democratisation: widening opportunities for public involvement. 
They argued that: 
It is helpful, in discussions about local government, to distinguish two types of 
decentralisation. On the one hand, it is used to refer to the physical dispersal of 
operations to local offices. In a second sense, it is used to refer to the delegation 
or devolution of a greater degree of decision making authority to lower levels of 
administration or government. In common usage, these meanings are 
sometimes combined. 
(Burns, et al., 1994: 6) 
This approach is very structured in terms of what the dimensions represent 
and are associated with a particular approach in local government to 
developing processes for achieving a different relationship between local 
people and their local government. In contrast, in a paper for the Local 
Government Management Board Hambleton et al. (1996) identified four broad 
categories:   
1 geography-based: physical dispersal 
2 power-based: decision-making authority 
3 managerial:  improving the quality of services 
4 political: enhancing local democracy. 
Here, however, there is a potential overlap between categories, for example 
between the power and political categories. Like Burns et al. (1994) the 
dimensions are also related specifically to local government in that it assumes 
that there are elected representatives. There is also some synergy with Burns 
et al. as both frameworks relate to geography, organisational change and a 
shift in power from a ventral or higher authority to a lower and or dispersed 
authority. These themes recur again in work by Pollitt et al. (1998) on 
decentralising public services management. They identify three categories but 
with binary options: 
1 politics: authority decentralised to elected representatives; 
administration: authority decentralised to managers or appointed bodies 
2 competitive: competitive tendering; non-competitive: agency given 
greater authority to manage its own budget 
3 internal: decentralisation within an organisation; devolution: 
decentralisation to a separate, legally established organisation. 
These frameworks still tend to focus on organisational and geographical 
decentralisation. They are concerned with describing the institutional 
framework of government or administrative systems. 
In contrast, in his paper Decentralisation: managerial ambiguity by design 
Vancil (1979) was more concerned with what was being decentralised. His 
view was that real decentralisation is marked by the degree of autonomy in 
organisations – the extent to which organisations have a high degree of 
authority over particular functions and activities with limited responsibility (or 
accountability) to others. In respect to health we can also see how this relates 
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to individuals as well (clinicians and potentially patients). Clearly most writers 
make some reference to power but it is not explicit within the frameworks. 
In many of the articles the application of decentralisation is mainly focused at 
a macro level, using the three elements of fiscal, administrative and political 
(authority) decentralisation. These are broad categories and clearly contain a 
wide range of sub-categorisation that is rarely referred to in the literature. 
How useful then is decentralisation as a concept? There is: 
…the danger of being deceived by the disarming familiarity of a word which 
our experience suggested usually masked a multiplicity of prescriptions 
addressed to different symptoms. There is a sense in which decentralisation is 
almost an empty term, a kind of camouflage behind which a diverse range of 
(often incompatible) political and organisational strategies find cover. 
(Hoggett, in Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987: 215) 
In summary then, there is limited applicability of any single framework that 
can be applied in all circumstances. With respect to health and health care it 
is also important that any framework can capture not just organisational 
contexts but also the place of the individual within the health care system as 
clinician, health care practitioner or patient. Another factor in relation to 
health care is to capture the role of central governments as funder, regulator 
and steward (Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis, 2000) of health, increasing 
international contexts of health and the important role of central professional 
and regulatory bodies. This does raise the question as to whether it is feasible 
to look for a meta-framework. The where (from where and to where?) and 
what (what is being decentralised?) of decentralisation are both problematic. 
Vancil’s (1979) ‘autonomy’ framework has the potential to provide most 
applicability because it defines the relationship between different 
organisations and considers the extent to which organisations need power 
(authority) over an activity. However, there is still a question of applying this 
in practice. What is meant by responsibility and for what? Does responsibility 
simply equate to accountability? In a health care system there are a number 
of cross-cutting accountabilities to central government, professional bodies 
and the patient. Also we need to consider what an organisation or individual 
has autonomy over. Is it over a major area of work or a minor area? What 
other constraints are there on autonomy? For example, a PCT has 75% of the 
NHS budget but its autonomy over the allocation of that resource is limited by 
a range of factors including historical spending patterns, the shape of the local 
health economy, performance targets and local need. In this sense we would 
want to identify the extent of autonomy, and what area of activity or 
responsibility that autonomy relates to. 
Another problem with the dominant focus of frameworks on organisational 
decentralisation is how to accommodate policies such as patient choice. 
Drawing on Rondinelli’s framework, patient choice combines elements of 
devolution, delegation and privatisation and, potentially, autonomy for 
patients, which does not form part of this framework. Here current UK health 
policy demonstrates not only that the categories are problematic but also that 
you need to draw on other concepts from other frameworks including, for 
example, the concept of autonomy (in this case applied to individual patients) 
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and problems of transaction costs, information asymmetry and spill-over 
effects (Vancil, 1979; Levaggi and Smith, 2004) 
Furthermore, we need to address the role of the centre and the relationships 
between the different levels of decentralisation–centralisation continuum. 
Central agencies, particularly in the UK, have roles as funders, regulators and 
stewards. Following Klein and Day (1997), if the government is 
‘decentralising’, is it pertinent to ask how they are ’steering’ local 
organisations/networks, and not simply what is being decentralised to which 
’level’. Incentives and steering mechanisms might be different for each policy. 
Bossert (1998) has also argued that it is important to examine what space 
central agencies allow subordinate agencies or those with delegated or 
devolved powers. Drawing on principal/agent theory provides one approach to 
examining these relationships (Bossert, 1998, 2000). Bossert argues that it is 
not simply that the centre might steer a local agency but that it also defines 
the parameters – the space – within which the agency operates. Applying the 
concept of decentralisation to health is further complicated by the fact that in 
the literature decentralisation is associated with local resource raising. This 
reflects, perhaps, the focus on local government in the UK literature. The NHS 
has a centralised funding structure (with global budgets) and a decentralised 
provision structure – traditionally operating through regions, districts, 
hospitals and professional autonomy (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Mohan, 
1995). This has implications given the UK’s (centralised) ability to contain 
overall costs through the global budget. It also means that decentralised 
organisations cannot raise funds from other sources and they will always be 
reliant on funds from central government. In much of the literature on 
decentralisation the presumption is that decentralised agencies will have 
income-raising potential (explicitly so in the fiscal literature; Tiebout, 1956; 
Oates, 1972). Whereas local health agencies in the UK do not have such 
revenue-raising power they can affect overall revenue use as they have the 
ability to cut costs and/or make savings and thus for local decentralised units 
there is an incentive to consider revenue maximisation. This was an important 
element in the development of policy on foundation hospitals but is also an 
element in the development of primary-care-led commissioning in terms of 
improving allocative efficiency (Le Grand et al., 1998). Finally, Atkinson 
(1995: 488) citing Conyers (1986) has argued that different parts of the 
system need to be identified by the functional activities transferred, the 
authority and power transferred for each, the level of area to which each is 
transferred, and the legal and administrative means by which each is 
transferred. The where (from where and to where?), the what (what is being 
decentralised?) of decentralisation, and the nature of the relationships 
between levels are all problematic. Also, while concepts of power, authority 
and autonomy are useful they lack a preciseness for measurement and they 
do not articulate the functions that are associated with, for example, health 
care. 
Two issues arise from this discussion about the nature of decentralisation. The 
first is the extent to which decentralisation as a process impinges on 
performance and, given the breadth of decentralisation, what approach or 
functions, processes, etc. produce better or worse outcomes. These reflect 
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Bossert’s (1996) view that there are two key questions that need to be asked 
about decentralisation (p.150). 
1 Does decentralization improve equity, efficiency, quality of services, 
health outcomes and democratic processes? 
2 And, if it does, which forms, mechanisms and processes of 
decentralization are most effective in achieving these outcome and output 
objectives? 
Similarly Saltman et al. (2003) identify that: 
It has not been customary to assess the outcome of decentralization in the light 
of health gain, equity, quality of care and consumer choice. 
(p3) 
However, their discussion is still contained primarily at an organisational level, 
reviewing changes in health care systems and drawing on what is primarily 
the fiscal, administrative and political dimensions framework with particular 
reference to Rondinelli’s framework. In their review of decentralisation in 
European health care systems (Bankauskaite et al., 2004) drew on 
Rondinelli’s framework but identified that a number of frameworks may be 
pertinent, including a principal/agent approach, local fiscal choice and social 
capital (Bossert, 1998). However, they focused their analysis on three main 
questions: 
• decentralisation to whom? 
• what is decentralised? 
• with what regulatory controls? 
Their review considered system-wide effects only and focused, like many 
previous reviews, on the organisational and geographical aspects of 
decentralisation. However, a key finding of their review was that 
decentralisation can only be seen as ’…a first step in a series of choices 
among complex policy options, and contingent on an equally complex set of 
external and internal contexts’. (Bankauskaite et al., 2004: 25). 
In relation to health care and public health the debate is further complicated 
as it moves beyond a simple organisational context to include issues relating 
to professionalism, patient care, etc. We therefore need to look for a way of 
conceptualising decentralisation/centralisation in health in such a way as to 
not get caught up in simple geography/levels discussions or tied to an 
organisational context. Any definition needs to be able to capture the 
dimensions set out above. 
A number of points can be made about the frameworks, particularly applied to 
a health care context. First, there is a high degree of ambiguity in definitions 
used. Some terms are not defined in sufficient detail. Some frameworks 
appear to use different terms for similar phenomena (e.g. Burns et al.'s 
localisation and Hambleton's et al.'s geographical basis). Others use the same 
terms with different meanings. For Burns et al., devolution is the delegation of 
decision-making powers; for Pollitt et al., it is decentralisation to a separate, 
legally established organisation, while for Rondinelli, it represents a shift in 
authority to state, provincial or municipal governments. Saltman et al. (2003) 
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point out that, illustrating the complexity of decentralization concepts, some 
commentators do not consider the devolution and privatization elements of 
Rondinelli to be types of decentralization. There is little cross-referencing 
between the accounts, although Bossert (1998) does cite Rondinelli (1981). 
Second, most frameworks are highly contextual in terms of time and place; 
transferability and generalisability are thus limited. For example, many are 
based on developing countries. There is often an implicit or explicit 
assumption of a setting within an elected local government system. Whereas 
this is relevant for systems such as those in the Nordic countries, it may be 
more problematic for systems based on social insurance or a national health 
basis. Third, emphasis tends to be placed on decentralisation from national 
government to provincial/regional/local government, and tends to overlook 
the potential for decentralisation to individuals and/or centralisation beyond 
the nation state. In other words, only a limited part of the centralization–
decentralization spectrum tends to be used. Finally, there is little indication of 
how to operationalise decentralisation (see below). Most frameworks are 
typologies or lists, and do not give much assistance in comparing 
decentralisation beyond nominal categories. With the exception of some 
dimensions in Bossert (1998), it is difficult to see how the frameworks might 
be operationalised. Indeed, Gershberg (1998) advocates using the word 
decentralisation as little as possible and instead suggests focusing on the 
important dimensions of the reform. 
In short, the frameworks appear to have been little used. Rondinelli’s is 
classified a public administration approach (Bossert, 1998; Saltman et al., 
2003), and is regarded as the most commonly used definition of 
decentralisation (Atkinson, 1995: 487) or the predominant framework 
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). However, as Bossert (1998: 1513) points out, 
'A comparative analytical framework should provide a consistent means of 
defining and measuring decentralisation in different national systems.' 
Similarly, Gershberg (1998: 405) claims that to be operationally useful, 
unravelling of the definitions must go further than the four-part dissection by 
Rondinelli (1989). Atkinson (1995: 488) suggests that there has been a 
'somewhat sterile debate in classifying and valuing governments or public 
sectors as one typology or another'. Bossert and Beauvais (2002) claim that 
the predominant framework pioneered by Rondinelli (1981) and applied to the 
health sector in developing countries by Mills (1994) contributes to the 
simplistic view of decentralization, and tells us little about the crucial aspect of 
decentralisation, namely the range of choice that is granted to the decision-
maker at the decentralized level. As Hales (1999: 832) puts it, there is 
considerable ambiguity and disagreement about what is devolved and to 
whom. Similarly, Mills (1994) points to three crucial questions: 
decentralisation to what level, to whom and what tasks? 
2.6  Measurement issues 
Whereas these frameworks provide a way of describing decentralisation they 
do not constitute criteria by which decentralisation, or centralisation, can be 
measured. The criteria presented in most frameworks are broad concepts that 
require clarification in themselves, such as power, autonomy and geography. 
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These lack clarity and definition and it is not possible to apply measurements 
to them directly. 
What is clear is that we need to measure both the extent of decentralisation 
and its achievements. The extent of decentralisation relates to spatial and 
organisational criteria that are effectively vertical in terms of levels of 
organisation. Within the NHS spatial and organisational aspects interrelate 
along the central–local dimension. However, it is important to recognise 
within a health context that this does not simply equate to organisations but 
also needs to include individuals as health care relates to patients and the 
public. Thus it is critical that individuals comprise one end of the spectrum of 
decentralisation. This point has been made by a number of commentators in 
relation to health (see Bossert, 1996; Levaggi and Smith, 2004) but does not 
feature in any decentralisation framework. For the NHS the parameter will be 
the individual, which can be seen as maximum decentralisation, where 
patients have total autonomy over their health care and how they meet their 
health care needs. This equates with a market model of health but also refers 
to individual patient–professional interactions and ideas of choice, patient 
autonomy, etc. In contrast to the individual would be a population 
perspective; whether this is a general practice and its patient list, a primary 
care organisation focusing on its local population, central government making 
decisions about the NHS or at the European or world health level. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has developed a framework for assessing health 
systems that focuses on measuring health outcomes and equity, the fairness 
and equity of financing systems and the responsiveness of health systems to 
patients and populations in terms of the level of achievement (average over 
the whole population) and the distribution (equitable spread of this 
achievement) to all segments of the population (De Silva, 2001). 
Bossert (1998) in particular has been critical of the fact that there is a lack of 
an analytical framework to study how decentralisation can achieve goals. In 
the organisational and management literature conceptual frameworks have 
tended to relate to structure, process and outcome (see Sheaff et al., 2004a 
and Donabedian, 1980) or input, process and outcome (Hales, 1999). What 
these frameworks do is allow an analysis of the factors that relate to 
organisations. It is useful, therefore, to draw on these frameworks to help 
identify what is being decentralised. For example, it is possible to see finance 
as an input and commissioning as a process. The efficient use of resources 
and effective commissioning should produce better health outcomes. While 
such a conceptual framework is also not without problems it does provide a 
way of separating out different activities and policies. However, we also need 
to develop a framework that provides for an analysis of decentralisation and 
centralisation simultaneously; that is, to track movements in both directions. 
This is complex but a key benefit of such a framework will be to demonstrate 
that decentralisation is not simply a one-off process and that policy 
environments are highly complicated with a range of interactions between 
policies. There may in some cases be an overlap where policy, in particular, 
sees something as a means (or process) and an end (or outcome). For 
example, patient choice is a means towards reorganisation of health care and 
to achieve increased responsiveness but is also an end or a desired outcome. 
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The need to develop more clarity in the use of decentralisation as a variable 
for analysis is supported by the findings of a recent study on organisational 
performance that concludes: 
There is no consistent or strong relationship between organisational size, 
ownership, leadership style, contractual arrangements for staff or economic 
environment (competition, performance management) and performance. 
(Sheaff et al., 2004a: 6) 
Similarly, Anell (2000), who examined decentralised structures in Sweden, 
argues that it is difficult to isolate single decentralisation measures and their 
effects on performance domains. He suggests that decentralisation is not a 
solution to organisational or service problems. This conclusion is also made in 
other studies exploring aspects of decentralisation and performance 
(Atkinson, 1995; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002). 
Conversely, there is some literature that does attempt to analyse micro 
dimensions of decentralisation. With a focus on localisation the public welfare 
economic literature derived from the Tiebout principal (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 
1972, 1999) explores fiscal federalism. This attempts to quantify fiscal (and 
other) gains relating to decentralisation. The decentralisation theorem of 
Oates (1972) states that in the absence of economies of scale and inter-
regional spillovers, welfare maximising local authorities may tailor the supply 
of local public services to local tastes and thereby achieve a solution that in 
welfare terms is superior to the solution provided by central government. 
Indeed ‘The tailoring of outputs to local circumstances will, in general, 
produce higher levels of well-being than a centralized decision to provide 
some uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. Such gains do not 
depend upon any mobility across jurisdictional boundaries’ (Oates, 1994: 
130). As discussed in later sections there are some studies that support the 
view that decentralisation of certain services is beneficial as they are closer or 
more responsive to local populations or patients. However, many of these 
papers refer to decentralisation of community services (such as family 
planning, child health) in developing countries and most of these types of 
service are already locally based in the UK. Also, more recent Swedish 
research suggests that fragmentation of providers can lead to more culturally 
and group-specific services that might be construed as meeting people’s 
needs more effectively than uniform services (Blomqvist, 2004). 
Thus it seems right that some concept of the individual patient or, in a public 
context, members of local communities (citizens, patients, households) should 
be at one end of the scale and that collections of patients or the population 
should be at the other end. The goal will be to identify at what distance from 
the patient/population best or maximum use is made of any resource 
(finance, clinical skill, physical resource, staff, etc.). Similarly, frameworks for 
decentralisation need to capture the actions of individuals. This is one of the 
strengths of Vancil’s (1979) framework and its reference to autonomy. For 
example, clinical autonomy and the individual freedom of a doctor to practice 
medicine in the best interests of the patient are key concepts in health care. 
Professional autonomy is clearly an important aspect of health care that 
directly relates to decentralisation, particularly with recent policy emphases 
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on moving decision-making closer to the patient and empowering front-line 
workers. There is an extensive literature on professional autonomy but this is 
rarely discussed in relation to decentralisation in health care services. 
However, changes in professional autonomy have direct relevance to our 
understanding of how far health care services are decentralised in terms of 
devolved decision-making and service delivery (Harrison and Ahmad, 2000). 
Many discussions of decentralisation do not operate at such an individualised 
level given their organisational focus. Bossert (1996) has argued that 
decentralisation needs to be seen primarily in relation to health care quality 
and that most studies of decentralisation fail to do this. Bossert has also 
developed an approach to analysing decentralisation based on the idea of 
decision space (Bossert, 1998; Bossert et al., 2003). Bossert sees the 
interaction of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of decentralisation as key 
to developing an assessment of the degree of decentralisation. This can 
perhaps be best understood drawing on Boyne’s concepts of fragmentation 
and concentration and the relationships between agencies or actors on the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Thus while an agent or agency may have 
been given power to make decisions on the vertical dimension their ability to 
act depends on the network of relationships at the horizontal level, such as 
the need to work in partnership with other agencies or having to operate 
within existing relationships such as local contracts for services with provider 
agencies. 
2.7  Summary of the shortcomings of frameworks 
and development of the Arrows Framework 
From the above brief analysis of decentralisation it is clear that the 
decentralisation literature provides a clear conceptual framework for looking 
at where decentralisation occurs – where it is from and to – but lacks clarity 
about what is being decentralised. The frameworks tend to be muddled about 
important concepts such as power, authority, responsibility and what in fact 
decentralisation achieves. The exceptions are Vancil’s approach to the notion 
of autonomy and perhaps Bossert’s notion of decision space – the room for 
manoeuvre that helps develop the concept of autonomy to something that can 
be more usefully applied and tested. However, to examine decentralisation it 
is important to think about what is being decentralised. While concepts of 
power, authority and autonomy are useful they lack a preciseness for 
measurement. Neither do they articulate the functions that are associated 
with, for example, health care. 
The first problem is how to define the outer limits of the from where and to 
where dimension that is intrinsic to all frameworks of decentralisation. One 
possible way of applying these concepts to health is to set them in population 
terms, such that: 
• decentralisation means nearer/closer/related to the 
patient/individual/community (or unit of health outcome, usually 
individuals) 
• centralisation means further away from the individual and is represented 
by the global population (citizens of a country, the world, etc.). 
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This represents the hierarchical scale (spatial and institutional) that forms the 
lateral or horizontal axis of the framework. In the English context this would 
see the UK, Europe (e.g. European Union), world (WHO, United Nations) 
spreading one way and then sub-levels such as regional structures (e.g. 
strategic health authorities), local organisations (such as PCTs, hospital 
trusts), sub-local/neighbourhood level (such as general practices or locality 
services), individual practitioners and then patients spreading the other. 
Movement towards the world would signify concern with larger populations 
and increasing centralisation and movement towards the patient would be 
decentralisation. However, key to an analysis of 
centralisation/decentralisation is the consideration of what is being moved 
between levels. How, therefore, is it possible to provide a contextual 
framework that can address the what of decentralisation? Our suggestion is 
that given that the performance literature uses the concepts of inputs, 
process and outcomes (such as performance targets), that it is useful to apply 
these as the second (vertical axis) dimension of the framework. The role of 
the framework is to first plot movements and directions along the horizontal 
dimension. The vertical dimension allows the refining of the components of 
decentralisation – the what meaning functions or policy. The framework, in 
itself, does not say whether such movements increase or decrease 
performance; however, it does provide a way of identifying the pattern of 
movement – centralising or decentralising – and sets a framework for 
examining interrelationships between such movements. Thus a simple two-
dimensional framework would look like the following, which we are calling the 
Arrows Framework (Figure 1). 
This input/process/outcome approach within the Arrows Framework 
overcomes questions about from where and to where, including the individual 
perspective, and is more specific in categorising the what question. In this 
review we are mainly discussing the issues of democratisation and 
participation in the NHS and the framework will be used to show why it is 
important to be much clearer in terms of the analysis of policy and action in 
relation to decentralisation. It also includes the individual–global focus, giving 
it an advantage over frameworks from other studies that tend to consider the 
organisational dimension only (central government to local agencies) without 
recognising supra-national bodies or an individual perspective. 
What is still missing is some assessment of the extent of what any 
decentralisation or centralisation gives to an organisation or individual. This is 
where Vancil’s and Bossert’s work becomes important in terms of examining 
and defining the extent of autonomy. Using examples of inputs, processes and 
outputs it is possible to plot movements of decentralisation/centralisation. 
This structure provides a way of plotting both the direction of transfer and 
different functions that can be actions or policies. To use the Arrows 
Framework effectively the start and end points of each arrow are significant 
for each component (inputs, process and outcomes). Each table can be read 
vertically; for example, the arrows demonstrate the effect on each 
hierarchical level (e.g. region, PCT) as well movements 
(centralisation/decentralisation) within particular functions or polices. This 
allows comparison between levels and components and demonstrates that 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 42 
centralisation and decentralisation can occur simultaneously. The framework 
also provides a way of comparing different polices and actions in any 
particular instance, demonstrating both direction of travel 
(centralisation/decentralisation) and the impact on a particular organisational 
level (see Sections 3 and 4). The framework can also be utilised to compare 
similar policies and actions over time. 
2.8  Conclusion 
This section has provided an overview of the main conceptual and definitional 
debates about decentralisation. From our analysis of this literature it was 
clear that previous discussions of decentralisation lack sufficient clarity to 
apply the frameworks to our analysis of decentralisation in health care 
services. Two principle problems arise from the literature. The first is the lack 
of conceptual clarity of the criteria that have been identified as characteristics 
of decentralisation. In practice many of the criteria are themselves contested 
concepts. Second, most studies of decentralisation focus on the interaction of 
the level of organisation and geographical coverage. Again, given the 
emphasis within health care on individuals and populations and that it is 
important to examine what is being decentralised rather than just where, 
existing discussions have only limited relevance to health care. In order to 
develop a more useful approach to our analysis of decentralisation we have 
therefore developed a new framework that focuses more on what and where, 
which will allow a clearer comparison of the evidence and its implications for 
policy and practice in the UK health care system. 
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Figure 1  Decentralisation – the Arrows Framework 
Tier… 
 
Activity  
Global Europe UK England/Scotland/Wales/ 
Northern Ireland 
Region, 
e.g. 
SHA 
Organisation, 
e.g. PCT 
Subunit, e.g. 
locality/practice 
Individual 
Inputs  
Process  
Outcomes  
Arrows indicate the direction of movement. 
SHA, strategic health authority.
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Section 3  A history of decentralisation policies in 
the NHS 
3.1  Introduction 
This section examines decentralisation, centralisation and devolution in the NHS 
between 1948 and 1997. It presents the accounts of decentralisation given by 
articles in our search as well as a sample of key books on health policy. This 
indicates that the extant accounts of decentralisation in the NHS are unclear. The 
term is rarely defined or operationalised, and little reference is made to the 
conceptual literature. Moreover, some of the conclusions are conflicting, with 
some commentators arguing that certain periods and policies tend to be 
decentralising while others claim that they are centralising. We attempt to 
resolve some of these contradictions by applying our conceptual framework that 
was introduced in Section 2.7. 
Many British governments have claimed that they wish to decentralise the NHS. 
Indeed, there have been few claims to centralise the NHS or arguments favouring 
’command and control’. Klein (2001) argues that the cycle of experiments with 
delegation quickly followed by reversions to centralisation is one of the themes 
running through the history of the NHS (see also Paton, 1993; Kewell et al., 
2002). Nevertheless, decentralisation in the NHS is a problematic concept. First, 
as we saw earlier, there are significant problems of definition. Some writers tend 
to use cognate terms such as autonomy and localism which themselves are 
problematic. Second, much of the literature refers to elected local government 
with revenue-raising powers. Application to a national health service which is 
appointed and receives its revenue from central grants is problematic. As Klein 
(2001: 106) puts it, ‘everybody paid verbal homage to the principle of 
decentralisation, but how was this going to be achieved in a nationally-financed 
service?’ Similarly, Butler (1992: 125) writes that it is unclear whether the NHS is 
a central service that is locally managed or a local service operating within 
central guidelines. Governments have tended to claim the latter, while actually 
willing the former. 
All this means that assessing the level of decentralisation is the NHS is difficult. 
Different ministers have held conflicting views. Enoch Powell argued that the 
centre had almost total control. Richard Crossman maintained that the centre 
was weak. Barbara Castle argued that the regional health authorities (RHAs) 
were ’pretty subservient’ (Ham, 2004: 174–5). Commentators also present 
different views. For example, during the last Conservative period of office it 
appears that the NHS was moving in two different directions at once (Powell, 
1998). Some commentators claimed that the national character of the health 
service was undermined (e.g. Mohan, 1995); others argued that the NHS was 
effectively nationalised (e.g. Klein, 2001; Jenkins, 1996). 
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3.2  The classic NHS (1948–79) 
Our search found only two articles that addressed decentralisation in the ‘classic 
NHS’. Powell (1998) argues that the NHS was a national service, as compared 
with the local service that it replaced, for three main reasons. First, it was set up 
as a national service, operating on an agency basis. The Minister of Health in the 
1945 Labour Government, Aneurin Bevan, stressed central Parliamentary 
accountability for the NHS: ’when a bedpan is dropped on a hospital floor its 
noise should resound in the Palace of Westminster’ (Jenkins, 1996: 65). Bevan 
(quoted in Hansard, 1946, cols 48–9) stated that the appointed NHS boards ‘will 
be and they must be the instruments of the Ministry’. Second, there should be 
national as opposed to local funding. but Bevan decided to centralise the whole 
finance of the country’s hospital system, taking it right out of local rating and 
local government because in any local government system ’there will tend to be a 
better service in the richer areas, a worse service in the poorer’ (in Klein, 2001). 
Third, central control and funding should lead to provision which is equitable 
according to centrally determined standards. Bevan argued that his scheme was 
the only way of achieving ’as nearly as possible a uniform standard of service for 
all’. His aim was to ’provide the people of Great Britain, no matter where they 
may be, with the same level of service’, to ’universalise the best’ (in Klein, 2001). 
Exworthy et al. (1999) point out that the so-called hierarchy in the classic NHS 
might be better termed a ’quasi-hierarchy’ as it could not fully ‘command and 
control’, and the period was also characterized by strong professional networks. 
They suggest that hierarchy became stronger after 1974 when ‘authority’ was 
introduced into the NHS when regional and area health ‘authorities’ replaced the 
existing regional hospital boards and hospital management committees. 
Turning to the texts, although the early NHS is often seen as a model of 
command and control (‘everybody’s favourite example of a command and control 
health care system’; Moran, 1994), the situation was more complex (e.g. 
Exworthy et al., 1999). Whereas Bevan often stressed the ’national’ elements 
(see the previous paragraph), he also claimed that he wished to see maximum 
delegation to local bodies (e.g. Webster, 2002: 19). Although he saw local bodies 
as his ’agents’, he hoped to give members ’substantial executive powers’ (Allsop, 
1995: 44). Klein (2001: 37) views the NHS as attempting to reconcile national 
accountability and local autonomy, but concludes that ’the circle refuses to be 
squared’. A 1950 report by civil servant Sir Cyril Jones identified ‘the fundamental 
incompatibility between central control and local autonomy’. Bevan responded 
that ’in framing the service we did deliberately come down in favour of a 
maximum of decentralisation to local bodies, a minimum of itemised central 
approval, and the exercise of financial control through global budgets’ (Klein 
2001: 38). 
Commentators such as Klein (2001) claim that in the 1950s the balance had 
swung towards local autonomy. Local bodies were more independent than the 
term agent implies. The hallmark of Ministry of Health policy-making in the 1950s 
was ‘policy making through exhortation’ (Klein, 2001: 39–40). Ham (2004: 22) 
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writes that the bodies that were responsible for the administration of health 
services were not just ciphers through which national policies were implemented. 
They had their own aims and objectives, and, equally significant, they were 
responsible for providing services where professional involvement was strong. On 
the other hand, Allsop (1995: 39–40) writes that after an initial phase of laissez-
faire, the tendency was towards increasing central control. 
Klein examines the 1962 Hospital Plan as a central–local relationship. On the face 
of it, this appeared to be the assertion of central authority designed to bring 
about national standards throughout the country. In the event, it set the pattern 
for subsequent attempts in the 1970s to introduce national norms of provision in 
the two priorities documents published in the mid-1970s. Its neat package of 
norms was subverted by two principles: infinite diversity (national norms have to 
be adapted to local circumstances) and infinite indeterminacy (national norms 
have to be interpreted and adapted flexibly as the future unfolds). In practice, 
the command structure became a negotiated order, with power at the periphery. 
As Secretary of State, Richard Crossman put it that there were ‘powerful, semi-
autonomous Boards whose relation to me was much more like the relations of a 
Persian Satrap to a weak Persian Emperor’ (Klein, 2001: 61). Klein (2001: 64–
66) claims that financial power was concentrated at the centre; clinical power 
was located at the periphery, but there was a complex and subtle relationship 
between central policy-makers and clinical decision-makers at the periphery. 
The 1974 reorganisation was based on the phrase used in Keith Joseph’s 
consultative document on NHS reorganisation, ’maximum delegation downwards, 
matched by accountability upwards’. As Webster (2002: 101) puts it, ’This 
scheme may have been redolent with meaning for the expert, but it was opaque 
to the public’. Allsop (1995: 59) argues that despite its faults, the 1974 
reorganisation began the transformation of the NHS into a national service with 
national standards. The more lassisez-faire period of the 1960s was replaced by a 
planning system which identified national priorities even though local strategies 
were often inadequate. The RHAs in the 1974 reorganisation were the links 
between the DHSS and the area health authorities (AHAs) in the chain of 
command (Klein, 2001: 72–3). In theory, the centre would lay down policy 
objectives and the periphery would implement them; in practice, it was more 
complex. For example, the centre set priorities, but accepted that local plans 
would not often correspond to the order of national priorities proposed, and 
expenditure objectives were not specific targets to be reached by declared dates 
in any locality. In practice the language of norms and objectives turned out to be 
merely a vocabulary of exhortation (Klein, 2001: 96–8). 
Table 3 gives a very basic summary of the accounts of decentralisation. Unlike 
later periods, it focuses on broad periods as the accounts give insufficient 
information to evaluate individual policies. Two points emerge. First, there are 
many empty cells, implying that we lack information about many periods and 
policies. Second, there is some degree of disagreement between accounts. For 
example, whereas Ham and Klein see the 1950s as tending towards 
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decentralisation, Allsop views this period as moving towards centralisation. It is 
difficult to adjudicate between these accounts as definitions and measures tend 
to be absent or at least implicit. 
Table 3  Accounts of decentralisation in the NHS over time 
 Allsop 
(1995) 
Baggott 
(2004) 
Boyne 
(1998) 
Ham 
(2004) 
Klein 
(2001) 
Paton 
(1993) 
Powell 
(1998) 
Webster 
(2002) 
1948 C    C    
1950s C   D D    
1960s D        
1974 C        
C, centralisation; D, decentralisation. 
3.3  The Conservative Government (1979–97) 
The 1979 Conservative manifesto stated that ’We will simplify and decentralise 
the service and cut back bureaucracy’, and most commentators agree that the 
1979 consultation document Patients First (DHSS, 1979) and the resulting 1982 
reorganisation stressed decentralisation, with decisions at local level and the 
minimum of central interference. Allsop (1995: 56) writes that with Patients First 
decisions moved closer to the locality, and that the locus of decision-making 
would move downwards. Baggott (2004: 100) considers that the 1982 
reorganisation approach was ‘decentralist rather than directive’. However, Ham 
(2004: 174) points out that the Secretary of State suspended the Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham AHA in 1979. 
There is less consensus on the implications of the 1983 Griffiths Report (DHSS, 
1983), which recommended that general managers would be introduced at all 
levels in the NHS. Griffiths (DHSS, 1983: 12) argued that the centre ‘is still too 
much involved in too many of the wrong things and too little involved in some 
that really matter’. On the one hand, Griffiths stressed the freedom to manage, 
noting that the ’process of devolution of responsibility, including discharging 
responsibility to the Units, is far too slow’ (DHSS, 1983: 12). According to 
Webster (2002), in its origins the Griffiths initiative was more integrally related to 
preceding developments than seems evident at first sight. Patrick Jenkin 
(Secretary of State at the time of the 1982 reorganisation) reported the words of 
a ’shrewd hospital head porter’ that there was ’too much administration and not 
enough management’ in the NHS. Allsop (1995: 158) writes that the Griffiths 
Report was concerned with freeing managers at the centre and periphery. 
However, Klein (2001: 111) writes that from the Griffiths Report onwards the 
main priority was value for money: if that meant reversing the previous drift to 
decentralisation then so be it. Baggott (2004) sees the general managers 
suggested by Griffiths as instrumental in the increasing central direction of the 
planning and review process during the 1980s and 1990s. Baggott (2004) asks 
whether Griffiths was centralising or decentralising. On the one hand, managers 
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were meant to be responsive to consumers, and once objectives were set then 
managers should be given the freedom to achieve them. On the other hand, 
there was performance management and lines of accountability and authority to 
the centre. 
There is general agreement that performance management increased 
centralisation with the centre or the regions pulling the strings. Klein (2001: 121–
3) states that the system of performance reviews designed to monitor progress 
towards very specific targets were associated with a tighter system of control and 
accountability than had ever existed in the previous history of the NHS. However, 
the centralisation of 1980s spoke a different language, with the accent on 
outputs. In the 1970s priorities were in terms of inputs, but in the 1980s activity 
was the priority. The Trent Region was set a target of 2250 extra maternity 
patients, provoking somewhat ribald questions about who was to be responsible 
for increasing the birth rate (Klein, 2001: 121–3). 
The white paper Working for Patients (Department of Health, 1989) and the 1990 
NHS and Community Care Act suggested a purchaser/provider split, with 
decentralised institutions of self-governing NHS trusts and general practitioner 
fundholders (GPFHs). Although much of the rhetoric was decentralist, with the 
exception of local pay bargaining (Klein, 2001), it is broadly agreed that the 
implications were centralist (Allsop, 1995: 188). This is largely associated with a 
clear line-management system that Stalin himself would have envied (Timmins, 
1996: 511, in Powell, 1997: 80–1). Klein (2001: 167, 182–3) states that in the 
case of health authorities and NHS trusts there was no longer any doubt about 
accountability to the Secretary of State: the reforms represented the ultimate 
logic of Bevan’s principle that health authority members were the agents (or in 
Morrison’s words, creatures) of the Minister for Health. He continues that, almost 
50 years after the NHS was first created, in the second half of the 1990s it 
became a national service, with one unified structure and lines of accountability 
running clearly to the centre. Paton (1998: 151–2) writes that although the NHS 
is sometimes characterised as ‘command and control’, it is the new NHS which 
has really seen central diktat. According to Jenkins (1996), Margaret Thatcher 
’completed what Bevan began: the nationalisation of the health service’. Whereas 
Bevan’s falling bedpans were intended to be heard in Westminster, Thatcher’s 
were ’picked up, emptied, cleaned, counted and given a numbered place on the 
Whitehall shelf’. 
Like Working for Patients, despite the decentralist rhetoric, most commentators 
agree that the move from regional health authorities to regional offices of the 
NHS Executive were centralist, as regional staff became classified as national 
’civil servants’ rather than as ‘local’ NHS personnel. Ham (2004: 164) writes that 
the effect was to strengthen the grip of the centre over local management by 
moving towards the single chain of command for the NHS proposed in Working 
for Patients, setting targets and monitoring performance. Similarly, according to 
Baggott (2004), the NHS regional offices were expected to be less independent 
than the bodies they replaced. The move from RHAs to regional offices 
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compounded this process of centralisation. Webster (2002) claims that this 
resulted in the centre of gravity of power and initiative firmly shifting to the NHS 
Executive and its eight regional offices. 
With two exceptions, the books pay little attention to the Patient’s Charter 
(Department of Health, 1991) and to Local Voices (National Health Service 
Management Executive, 1992). Klein (2001: 180–1) argues that the Patient’s 
Charter represented a ‘mimic consumerism’, or ‘top down consumerism’ – a new 
hierarchy of command. Paton (1998: 159) writes that encouraging Local Voices 
can become a bit of a joke. In other words, it appears that one consequence of 
increasing (upwards) centralisation was a corresponding decrease in downwards 
accountability. 
In short, the Conservative period saw decentralist rhetoric and decentralisation in 
some spheres, such as devolution of actual purchasing budgets (if not of real 
power in determining priorities) and of local pay (Paton, 1998: 138–9). Klein 
(2001: 182–3, footnote 188) notes the differences between decentralised and 
centralised spheres. The attempt to decentralise pay bargaining – ‘one of the 
most contentious issues by the mid-1990s’ – contrasted with the centre’s refusal 
to offer a standard NHS menu of services. Many commentators contrast 
operational devolution with increased central strategic control. For example, 
Paton (1998: 54) points to the ‘centralisation of objectives’ in the NHS market. 
Rhetoric about decentralisation and local control has masked the reality of market 
forces combined with central control. On balance, the clear consensus is that the 
period saw increased centralisation (see Table 4). 
There are fewer, but still many, empty cells in Table 4. There is also more 
consensus: that Patients First (DHSS, 1979) represents decentralisation, while 
performance management, Working for Patients, regional offices and the overall 
trend suggest centralisation. The only policy area characterised by a lack of 
consensus is the Griffiths Report (DHSS, 1983). 
The articles covering this period focus on different periods and policies. Exworthy 
(1998) focuses on localism, claiming that some commentators have viewed the 
organisation of the NHS as a series of local health services which operate within a 
hierarchical framework of the NHS. Over the past 20 years central–local relations 
in the NHS have been characterised by the implementation of decentralisation 
policies, with the devolution of administrative and financial responsibilities to 
lower organisational levels and most of these management appointments were at 
district level or below and hence reinforced the notion of a localised health 
system. Exworthy (1994) argues that decentralisation in community health 
services only really emerged following two key policy shifts in the 1980s: the 
1982 creation of district health authorities (DHAs) and the formation of discrete 
management units such as community health services, and the 1983 Griffiths 
Report. Exworthy views Griffiths as the ‘right to manage’, free from ‘external 
interference’, and this has been promoted by various decentralisation policies, 
but in practice resulted in a compromise ‘partial decentralisation’. In Exworthy’s 
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case-study areas the decentralisation policy was shelved 18 months after it had 
begun. 
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Table 4  Accounts of decentralisation in the NHS – analysis of policy documents 
 Allsop 
(1994) 
Baggott 
(2004) 
Boyne 
(1998) 
Ham 
(2004) 
Klein 
(2001) 
Paton 
(1993) 
Powell 
(1998) 
Webster 
(2002) 
Patients First 
(DHSS, 1979) 
D D   D  D D 
Griffiths 
Report 
(DHSS, 1983) 
 CC/D ?  C?   D? 
Performance 
indicators 
  C  CC CC C C 
Working for 
Patients 
(Department 
of Health, 
1989) 
C  C C CC CC C C 
Patient’s 
Charter 
(Department 
of Health, 
1991) 
    C?  ?  
Local Voices 
(National 
Health 
Service 
Management 
Executive, 
1992) 
      ?  
Regional 
offices 
(DHSS, 1979) 
 C C C    C 
Summary of 
the period 
 C C C CC CC C CC 
C, centralisation; CC, a higher degree of centralisation; D, decentralisation; DD, a higher 
degree of decentralisation. 
Writing on locality planning, Balogh (1996) points to a wide variety of 
experimental schemes for locality-based commissioning in the internal market. 
She writes of ‘the impetus towards decentralisation’ and stresses the move to 
decentralisation of certain functions contained in the Griffiths Report and Working 
for Patients. Decentralisation is the central feature in the Financial Management 
Initiative, but the nature of decentralisation within the initiative was far from 
straightforward, and early critics drew attention to its ‘top-down’ character. 
Following Hoggett (1990), Balogh suggests that whereas operational matters 
may be devolved, strategic control has remained centralized. Rowe and Shepherd 
(2002) focus on the element of new public management identified by Barberis 
(1998) as ‘controlled delegation’. They claim that new public management was 
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first introduced into the NHS in the 1980s following publication of the Griffiths 
Report. The task of the Griffiths general managers was to achieve the central 
governmental goals of financial restraint through modern management tools such 
as programme budgeting and performance monitoring. Rowe and Shepherd 
follow Hoggett (1996) by stating that that this restructuring enabled 
administrative decentralisation and managerial devolution at the same time as 
further reinforcement of centralized budgetary and strategic control. 
Some writers, from a tradition of human resources management, point to 
decentralisation in Working for Patients. According to Thornley (1998) the key 
aim of the reforms embodied in the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act was to 
encourage trusts to determine pay locally. She adds that there was 
decentralisation of collective bargaining in the NHS before 1990 which is 
described as the ‘drive to decentralisation’. Similarly, Lloyd (1997) writes that 
decentralisation (in the form of decentralized collective bargaining) within the 
NHS stems primarily from the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. 
However, most writers claim that Working for Patients was associated with 
centralisation. The most extensive and most quoted treatment of devolution is 
the discussion by Paton (1993) of Working for Patients. According to Paton 
Working for Patients was presented as promoting devolution, taking decisions at 
the lowest possible level. However, it is a ‘mixed bag’ (Paton, 1993: 87). He 
defines devolution as the handing down of responsibility from the centre for 
determining local health objectives (to purchasers) or for defining key aspects of 
business (to providers). While it is a truism that various operational 
responsibilities have been ‘devolved’ in recent years, Paton emphasises the 
difference between responsibility and power, concluding that ‘in certain instances 
responsibility but not power has been devolved’ (see also Day and Klein, 1987). 
In the NHS, the delegation of responsibility without power would in essence mean 
that general managers are really only administrators. On this interpretation, 
devolution is passing the buck. Paton continues that if political control for health 
boards becomes more blatant – as it did unequivocally throughout the 1980s – 
then supposedly devolved responsibilities (whether or not power accompanies 
them) are increasingly seen as having a central mandate. Devolution of 
management responsibilities to self-governing trusts removes local control of 
such providers and instead makes them responsible to the Department of Health 
directly. Devolution allows them to set their own priorities (within limits); raise 
capital and set prices more freely than directly managed units and – most 
importantly in practice – to ‘reprofile their workforces’; that is, hire and fire more 
easily. However, this is not devolution in the political sense. 
The introduction of a market to a service previously operating through planned 
provision in fact requires a heavy dose of centralism, as the new economies of 
the old Eastern Europe are finding. Paton (1993) discusses three models of 
clinical directorate – full devolution, managed devolution and central control – 
and views medical audit as centralism. However, an area where there has 
seemingly been a large shift in policy from centralism to devolution has been in 
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the management of human resources and industrial relations generally. However, 
in practice, devolution may not be all that it seems. The Patient’s Charter perhaps 
provides a clear example of the tension between centralism and devolution. In 
practice, central regulation to achieve central mandates means that not only is 
centralism asserted over devolved responsibility for the setting of priorities, but 
that the alleged philosophy of Working for Patients is in fact undermined. Paton 
concludes it might be argued that the whole structure of the post-1989 NHS 
represented devolution, in practice; however, it was easy to interpret this as 
central control under the guise of local ownership: the Conservatives pursuing 
central objectives through local placemen. In short, while there was significant 
operational decentralisation, centralism increased. 
This is similar to Exworthy’s (1994) view that central government has recently 
espoused ostensibly decentralist policy goals, claiming that decisions should be 
taken as close to the patient as possible (Department of Health, 1989). However, 
decentralisation in the NHS generally and community health services in particular 
is increasingly being associated with mangerialism to the extent that these 
developments are almost synonymous. Though decentralist in rhetoric, there is 
an undercurrent of centralisation. Local managers manage within closely defined 
central terms. Such is the ‘familiar organisational paradox, that to decentralise, it 
is necessary to centralise’ (Carter, 1989: 131). Exworthy (1994) concludes that 
decentralisation is a misnomer in that it implies a changed relationship between 
the centre and the locality of an organisation and the term fails to recognise the 
significant undercurrent of power towards the centre. Seeing decentralisation in 
terms of central–local relations helps to interpret the motives, meanings and 
implications of the government’s policy of decentralisation. 
Hardy et al. (1999) argue that the Secretary of State for Health has direct 
strategic and operational management responsibilities for the NHS. Although 
many responsibilities are delegated to health authorities, these have been 
dominated by government appointees and the effect of reforms to NHS 
management during the last few decades has been to strengthen the powers of 
the centre by ‘introducing for the first time a clear and effective chain of 
management command running from districts to the Secretary of State’ 
(Department of Health, 1989). 
Moon and Brown (2000) examine shifting constructions of the local and place and 
space signifiers such as community, proximity, local and decentralized. By 1993 
Department of Health press releases were placing a clear emphasis on assertions 
that health care policy had increased responsiveness at the local level, such as 
trusts being better able to respond to patients’ needs through greater freedoms, 
flexibility and local involvement. Greater local responsibility encourages efficiency 
and even more importantly an increasing sense of pride and job satisfaction. 
According to Secretary of State Virginia Bottomley this strategy would uphold and 
strengthen national accountability yet would be geared to respecting local 
freedoms. Merged DHAs and family health services authorities would be 
‘champions of local people’ and the reorganised NHS Executive was to offer a 
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‘light touch’ management style through its regional offices, allowing ‘more 
effective support to the development of local policies’. The Department of Health 
claimed that ‘the old hands-on style of the regions is, however, no longer 
appropriate’, with the new outposts presented as planned elements of a 
decentralized NHS Executive in which a monolithic single entity was fragmented 
to enable greater local sensitivity. According to Virginia Bottomley, the whole 
purpose of the change was precisely to devolve responsibility to DHAs who 
champion the interests of local people. She continued that prior to 1989 
management was exercised through a cumbersome, command-and-control 
bureaucracy, but we have passed responsibility down to local level. The result 
has been a fundamental shift of power towards the patient. 
The successful devolution of responsibility to local level inevitably meant that the 
role of RHAs would reduce: they were the last bastions of the old command-and-
control system from which we have now escaped. This was criticised by Labour’s 
Health spokesperson, Margaret Beckett, who stated that Bottomley was not 
devolving power. Rendering power and responsibility more diffuse shifts blame 
and disperses responsibility. As Moon and Brown (2000) put it, the regional 
offices were to be in the regions but not of the regions, a part of central 
government rather than regulated but semi-independent fiefdoms (see 
Crossman, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). They quote Alan Maynard that Whitehall and 
its organ of Stalinist control, the NHS Executive, shower managers in the NHS 
with instructions and inform them, ever so nicely, that if they do not dance to 
their tune they will be removed from the dance floor. 
Kewell et al. (2002) focus on the NHS creating networks in the 1990s, but stress 
that the term ‘network’ is being used in a very particular manner: managed 
networks which can deliver national targets, which are radically different from the 
concept of a ‘policy network’ (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). Within the managed 
network, government retains a directive role, with network structures mandated 
from above. The NHS is a ‘reforming’ bureaucracy which is continually balancing 
the twin principles of hierarchy and decentralisation. At one level, the internal 
market opened the way for more decentralized and ‘entrepreneurial’ styles of 
management, at least within the devolved provider units. Progressively, however, 
the internal market changed into a ‘managed market’, subject to ever-increasing 
political direction and top-down regulation. Lines of command between the 
executive and the field were reinforced by the introduction of performance 
management. They then move to discuss ‘the birth, decline and rebirth of the 
regional offices?’ In the Conservative period of office, new regional offices were 
created to act as civil service outposts of the NHS Executive, and they were given 
a mandate to implement national policy. 
In general terms, the articles discussed here (see also Table 5) argue that 
despite devolutionary rhetoric and some devolutionary elements (e.g. local pay), 
the balance of the period was clearly centralist in nature. However, there are no 
clear verdicts on many policies, and no clear consensus on policy initiatives such 
as the Griffiths Report. 
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This brief review of decentralisation in the NHS has shown that there are many 
gaps in our knowledge and that there are some conflicts in judgement, partly 
because accounts tend not to link to the conceptual literature or provide clear 
definitions of terms or rationales for their decisions. The next section examines 
decentralisation in the NHS with reference to our conceptual framework to see 
whether it can sharpen up the picture of decentralisation in the NHS. 
 
Table 5  Empirical accounts of decentralisation in the NHS by policy document 
 Balogh 
(1996
) 
Exworth
y (1994) 
Exworth
y (1998) 
Hardy 
et al. 
(1999
) 
Kewell 
et al. 
(2002
) 
Lloyd 
(1997
) 
Moon 
and 
Brown 
(2000
) 
Paton 
(1993
) 
Patients 
First (DHSS, 
1979) 
 D       
Griffiths 
Report 
(DHSS, 
1983) 
D/C D/C       
Performance 
indicators 
       CC 
Working for 
Patients 
(Department 
of Health, 
1989) 
D/C     D  CC 
Patient’s 
Charter 
(Department 
of Health, 
1991) 
       D/C 
Local Voices 
(National 
Health 
Service 
Managemen
t Executive, 
1992) 
        
Regional 
offices 
(DHSS, 
1979) 
    CC  CC  
Summary  D/C D? C CC  CC CC 
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C, centralisation; CC, a higher degree of centralisation; D, decentralisation; DD, a higher 
degree of decentralisation. 
3.4  The Arrows Framework 
This section aims to illustrate the utility of our conceptual framework, which was 
introduced in Section 2. This presents information on the what and where 
questions of decentralisation. First, in the vertical axis decentralisation may be 
seen in terms of inputs, processes and outcomes. Second, the horizontal axis 
shows the origin and destination of decentralisation. This indicates direction 
(centralisation and decentralisation) and strength as, ceteris paribus, a longer 
line suggests more decentralisation. For example, decentralisation from the 
nation state to the organisation is greater than decentralisation from the nation 
state to the region. 
The maximum degree of decentralisation within the UK would be represented by 
decentralisation on all three dimensions from the state to the individual. In the 
period covered, there are – unsurprisingly – no examples of this type. The 1979 
consultation paper Patients First and the resulting 1982 reorganisation perhaps 
give the clearest example of decentralisation (see Figure 2). In terms of inputs, 
they reduced the size of the main organisational unit in the NHS from AHAs to 
DHAs. Turning to process, the rhetoric stressed a significant degree of autonomy 
for the districts, although the regime was not in operation for sufficient time to 
determine this before centralisation associated with performance management. 
Finally, for the brief period between 1982 and 1983 there was no strong national 
performance-management system imposing outcome targets on local agencies. 
Despite the rhetoric, most commentators regard Working for Patients and the 
resulting 1990 NHS and Community Care Act as centralising (see Figure 3). The 
main reason for this appears to be associated with the strong chain of command 
from national to local, with local managers having to respond to centrally 
determined targets. More arguably, there was some centralisation of processes 
with the introduction of medical audit, and more generally the guidelines and 
evidence-based medicine movements. However, it can be argued that Working 
for Patients contained some decentralising measures, notably local pay and 
GPFH. Local pay represents an input decentralisation, taking pay determination 
from national scales to the local level. GPFH appears to decentralise inputs, by 
reducing the organisational size from health authorities to practices and 
devolving budgets to practice level. It may also be associated with decentralising 
processes as practices had autonomy to spend this money. This resulted in 
greater use of complementary therapies, consultant clinics at the practice, and 
the use of extra-contractual referrals rather than block contracts. Many 
commentators illustrated their view of power moving to practice level by the 
anecdote that while general practitioners (GPs) used to send christmas cards to 
consultants, in GPFH the reverse sometimes occurred. 
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The fact that policies can have elements of both centralisation and 
decentralisation squares with the views of writers such as Hoggett (1996), who 
attempts to explain some of the apparent paradoxes of decentralisation. For 
example, Hoggett (1996) views the Conservative internal market of competition 
between decentralized units as an attempt to decentralise operations while 
centralising strategic command. This may be compared with Paton’s (1993) claim 
of operational decentralisation and central strategic control, and with the view of 
Glennerster and Matsaganis (1993) of top-down versus bottom-up approaches to 
decentralisation). Hoggett continues that we have simultaneous centralisation 
and decentralisation, and that the concept of centralized/decentralisation has 
become an established part of the new organizational literature. He follows 
Kikert’s (1995) paradigm shift in control strategies from ex-post (input) to 
ex-ante (output) control; indicators of results rather than inputs or processes or 
‘control at a distance’. In other words, it reflects Thomas and Levacic’s (1991) 
centralizing in order to decentralise. From a different perspective, Peters and 
Waterman (1982: 15, 318) write that the excellent companies are both 
centralized and decentralized or loose–tight. It is in essence the co-existence of 
firm central direction and maximum individual autonomy: what we have called 
having one’s cake and eating it. 
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Figure 2  The Arrows Framework applied to Patients First (DHSS, 1979) 
Tier… 
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Figure 3  The Arrows Framework applied to Working for Patients (Department of Health, 1989) 
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3.5  Conclusion 
It has been shown that not only has the direction of change – decentralisation 
against centralisation – varied over time, so too have the content and scope of 
decentralisation. Our framework allows a more fine-grained examination of 
decentralisation. 
Many of the problems surrounding decentralisation in the NHS stem from the 
perennial question of attempting to reconcile national priorities and uniform 
services with local freedoms (Paton 1998: 177; see also Klein, 2001). The NHS 
has never approached either extreme ideal type. According to Klein (2001: 216) 
there will be ‘no return to “command and control”, but such a system had never 
existed’ (see also Exworthy et al., 1999). The first few decades can be more 
accurately described as one of ‘exhort and influence’. The system gradually 
evolved and tightened with the introduction of performance indicators in the 
1980s and the creation of a more hierarchical managerial system in the 1990s. 
Webster (2002: 258) argues that it is entirely misleading to caricature Bevan’s 
health service as some kind of obsolete Soviet-style command-and-control 
system. 
Equally, however, compared with local government, the potential for 
decentralisation in the NHS remains limited. Ham (2004: 170) argues that 
although NHS bodies are part of an NHS for which the Secretary of State is 
accountable to Parliament, they do not simply carry out central wishes. They are 
the Secretary of State’s agents, but the agency role does not involve merely 
implementing instructions received from above. These bodies are 
semi-autonomous organisations which themselves engage in policy-making and 
as such exercise some influence over the implementation of central policies. 
There is a complex series of interactions between the centre and the periphery. 
Whereas the existence of parliamentary accountability gives the appearance of 
centralisation in the NHS, the reality is rather different. The Department of Health 
is able to exercise control over total spending and its distribution, but has less 
control over the uses to which funds are put (Ham, 2004: 185). Baggott (2004: 
186–7) concludes that there are problems with devolution in the NHS: as long as 
the NHS continues to be perceived as a national service, is funded out of taxation 
and remains high on the political agenda, ultimate responsibility for the service 
will remain focused at the centre. Paton (1998: 116–7) argues that if the concept 
of a NHS is to retain legitimacy, there must be national decisions as to priorities. 
The long-term consequences of genuinely local choice could be the demise of 
central funding and central resource allocation, as ‘local choice implies local 
revenue generation’. 
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Section 4  Decentralisation under New Labour: 
policy since 1997 
4.1  Introduction 
This section of the report brings our account of decentralisation in NHS policy up 
to date, starting in 1997 and considering New Labour’s reforms in the context of 
the material suggested by our review, but also examining the literature based 
specifically around the public sector reforms that have occurred in that time 
period. 
Following the analysis of Section 3, this section explores what five commentators 
have said about the centralising and decentralising tendencies of New Labour 
policy. Necessarily, there are fewer accounts from which to draw than in Section 
3 because of the relative recency of the events concerned, and to the four 
authors considered above we add the account of Glennerster (2000). 
4.2  Labour and the NHS 
In 1997 Labour came to power with explicit targets for the reduction of waiting 
lists, but relatively little in terms of other commitments for the NHS. A new white 
paper appeared quickly, 1997’s New NHS, Modern, Dependable (Secretary of 
State for Health, 1997). Baggott (2004) considers this to be a statement that 
promised increased localism for health services, but which resulted instead, 
because of the creation of centralising organisations such as NICE and the 
Commission for Health Improvement, in the opposite. The focus on waiting times 
and the attempts to reduce them because of the Labour manifesto commitment 
of 1997 also led to strong central pressure. Ham (2004) appears to broadly agree 
with this analysis, noting that there were claims of decentralisation of operational 
management to NHS trusts, but a focus on the reduction of variations in health 
policy – a restatement of the national in the National Health Service, again 
through organisations such as NICE and through the introduction of national 
service frameworks. Klein (2001) notes the pragmatism of New Labour policy 
upon returning to office, and confirms both Baggott’s and Ham’s view that, 
whereas much of the language upon assuming office was exemplified by the 
language of decentralisation and devolution, the modernisation agenda pushed 
policy in the opposite direction, requiring a greater role for the centre. Klein, 
building on Ham’s argument in many ways, suggests that the centre became 
more involved as a consequence of the perceived failure of the local, both in 
order to reduce health variations, as well as to correct local management failures 
where they were occurring. New Labour were perceived to be an active 
government, straining between their apparent wish for greater responsiveness 
and democracy on one hand, and a need to be more involved with greater central 
control on the other. 
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Webster (2002) is rather less explicit about centralisation and decentralisation in 
his account of New Labour policy until 2002, focusing instead upon the welcome 
(in his view) long-termism of Labour’s policy after 2000, and the focus upon 
primary care, where significant structural changes are noted as taking place. 
Webster notes a new emphasis on prevention and public health, especially clear 
in Labour’s use of Health Action Zones, but concludes by saying it is not clear 
what direction future policy will take. Finally, Glennerster (2000) apparently 
presents a view in common with many of the points raised by Baggott, Ham and 
Klein on one hand, and Webster on the other, by suggesting that New Labour’s 
approach represents a political break with the old method of central planning 
present in social policy, which was abandoned because of it was perceived to be 
no longer delivering. He perceives social policy, including the NHS, as moving 
towards a goal-centred approach in which social justice and equal opportunities 
are emphasised instead. NICE and the Commission for Health Improvement are 
perceived to be agencies kept at arm’s length for the delivery of policy, but not 
especially centralising. 
Overall New Labour’s policy upon returning to office, certainly between 1997 and 
2000, can perhaps be categorised by the majority of authors as at least having 
centralising tendencies, justified by the need to correct either organisational 
failures or health inequalities. At the same time, however, many of the 
mechanisms through which these policies operated (such as Health Action Zones) 
allowed considerable local discretion. This was achieved by the centre laying 
down the result it expected, and requiring local co-operation with these targets, 
but allowing local choice in how they were to be obtained. It is difficult, however, 
to interpret this as an unqualifiedly decentralised use of health policy, with 
perhaps most commentators agreeing that at least some centralisation occurred 
as a result. 
By the end of 2000, The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) had become 
perhaps the most important health policy document released in a generation. 
Baggott explains the release of The NHS Plan in relation to increased media 
pressure in 1998 and 1999, which focused on medical failures of governance and 
difficulties in providing care because of Labour’s pledges to remain within 
Conservative spending limits in their first 2 years of power. The NHS Plan is seen 
by Baggott as having centralising tendencies, continuing from earlier policy, but 
also in allowing a substantially larger role for the private sector, and so increasing 
reliance upon non-public sector organisations in the delivery of health, which is 
decentralising in entirely another way. The Wanless Report (Wanless, 2002) is 
seen as a continuity in the pledges made in The NHS Plan for greater funding for 
health care, but also has a strong centralising overtone because of the demands 
for reform, inevitably driven from the centre, that came as a consequence of this. 
Ham confirms Baggott’s explanation for the timing of The NHS Plan, and suggests 
it was a new delivery model for an NHS framework to support delivery, putting in 
place arrangements for the inspection and performance measurement of health 
organisations that are strongly centralising. High-performing organisations could 
gain autonomy, greater control over their own affairs, whereas low-performing 
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organisations receive greater intervention instead. Klein’s account does not take 
account of The NHS Plan, but does make a number of relevant points, suggesting 
that greater responsiveness and local autonomy from health services might result 
in an increase in national health inequalities, against the wishes of the Labour 
government. Klein is also rather cynical about the possibility of organising health 
services to achieve greater local responsiveness and autonomy, however, noting 
that the reorganisation of the NHS has been attempted several times with these 
goals in mind, but never successfully (see Section 3). 
Webster, as noted, welcomes the long-term aspects of the NHS, but appears 
rather uncertain that they will be carried through because of his claim that the 
future of health services is so uncertain. Webster also welcomes the additional 
resources coming from The NHS Plan and Wanless Report, but criticises NICE 
because, he claims, it has become compromised because of its political 
significance in the NHS, and has become perceived to be a blocking device rather 
than meeting its wider brief. 
The NHS Plan, then, is generally perceived by these authors to be a centralising 
policy statement, but allowing some potential for greater autonomy for high-
performing organisations. The definition of high-performing, however, is very 
much decided by the centre, and so this might be perceived as a continuity of 
earlier policy in allowing greater local autonomy, but only so long as very 
prescribed national targets are first met. 
Finally, we can find commentary on a further policy document, Shifting the 
Balance of Power (Department of Health. 2001c), that appeared a year after The 
NHS Plan. Baggott, perhaps in contrast to his earlier analysis, suggests that this 
is a move from top-down approaches to policy to local leadership, decision-
making and accountability, and the introduction of a more ‘light touch’ system for 
the governance of health care. He does, however, note that many of the 
centralising tendencies previously noted remained very much in place, and so the 
effect of the new document were very much tempered by these, and so the 
overall effect of the ‘modernisation’ of health services remained centralist. We 
can perhaps discern, however, that Shifting the Balance of Power was an attempt 
to begin to reverse policy towards a more decentralising direction. Ham appears 
to agree with this, emphasising again the key role of primary care in New 
Labour’s health organisation with 75% of the NHS’s budget controlled by PCTs by 
2004, and the potential for greater decentralisation that this entails. Ham, 
however, also suggests that the structural upheaval that the changes will result 
in will reduce the effect of the policy. 
Table 6 attempts to summarise the account presented above. 
4.3  Considering New Labour policy thematically 
Since 1997, we can perhaps discern three specific periods of health policy 
(Greener, 2004, 2005). In the period leading up to 2000 Labour were effectively 
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constrained in their expenditure decisions by the pre-election decision to comply 
with the outgoing Conservative Government’s expenditure plans. This  
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Table 6  Five views of policy post-1997 
 Baggott 
(2004) 
Ham 
(2004) 
Klein 
(2001) 
Webster 
(2002) 
Glennerster 
(2000) 
The New NHS: modern, 
dependable (Secretary of State 
for Health, 1997) 
CC CC C C C 
The NHS Plan (Department of 
Health, 2000) 
CC C – C  
Shifting the Balance of Power 
(Department of Health, 2001c) 
D D – –  
C, centralisation; CC, a higher degree of centralisation; D, decentralisation. 
made radical reform (unless it could be made cost-neutral) remarkably difficult. 
There are a number of characteristics of Labour’s policy between 1997 and 1999. 
First, there is a continuation of the Conservative’s emphasis on primary care. The 
1996 white paper A Service with Ambitions (Secretary of State for Health, 1996) 
is an odd document, perhaps an attempt to demonstrate the potential for inter-
agency working, but also how primary care could be the hub around which health 
services could be organised. As the 1990s went on, there were continuing 
references to the future being one in which we would have ‘primary-care-led 
NHS’, in which case there would be appear to be a clear trend towards using 
organisations ‘closer’ to the patient, which would also be a form of 
decentralisation. 
Labour’s particular approach to primary care led to the abolition of GPFHs set up 
in the 1990-model internal market, replacing them instead with primary care 
groups (PCGs). This was meant to lead to a number of changes (Secretary of 
State for Health, 1997). However, it appeared to be a part of the replacement of 
the internal market with longer-term contracting and a concentration of 
purchasing away from individual contractors towards a more grouped approach. 
As such, the purchaser/provider split remained, but was rationalised and 
remoulded. The new model was one in which PCGs appeared as the most 
significant change of the early period of Labour policy. This reform of primary 
care illustrates the difficulties of attempting to specify whether reforms have 
been centralising or decentralising: from the perspective of the movement from 
GPFHs to PCGs, we have a centralisation. From the perspective of the state the 
changes were centralising in that they incorporated GPs (both fundholders and 
non-fundholders) in PCGs, and so into the NHS, in a way that had never been 
realised before (Peckham and Exworthy, 2003). But the movement can also be 
seen as decentralising from a health authority perspective, moving purchasing (or 
initially advice about purchasing) to smaller units in the name of greater local 
responsiveness. 
The second aspect of Labour’s policy before 2000 was its extraordinarily 
conciliatory tone. The white paper The New NHS: modern, dependable (Secretary 
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of State for Health, 1997) appears to suggest that by allowing health 
professionals the autonomy they need, the NHS will get better. The blame for the 
decline of the health service is laid firmly on the door of the command-and-
control and market systems that the document suggests have been present in 
the past, both of which led to bureaucratisation and meant that clinicians and 
other health professionals were prevented, through a series of perverse 
incentives, from doing their jobs as they wished. The Government was now going 
to allow them these freedoms. This sounds a great deal like decentralisation 
borne out of a hark back to the Fabian principles upon which the health service 
was founded, principles upon which health professionals were afforded 
considerable autonomy by the state (Klein, 2001). However, at the same time as 
this early commentators noted the potential need for very strong central 
involvement to manage the changes to primary care that were proposed in the 
name of greater autonomy (Klein and Maynard, 1998). 
A third element of Labour’s policy is in relation to funding. In 1997 Labour 
continued with the discourse of their predecessors in claiming that the problems 
of the NHS had organisational rather than financial solutions. Indeed the 
difficulties of the NHS had been ‘exaggerated’ in the past (Secretary of State for 
Health, 1997: section 1.19). There appears to have been considerable confidence 
that the combination of a push towards primary care and the renewal of clinical 
team-working coming from the alleged removal of the internal market would be 
enough to improve the NHS. There was no mention of ‘reform’ in the first few 
years of the Labour Government – instead ‘quality’ and ‘improvement’ appears to 
be more focal points. Retaining the same levels of budget can be seen as largely 
neutral on our decentralisation/centralisation scale in terms of input, with the 
reforms of the internal market (though the movement to PCGs) being rather 
complex in terms of its effects on processes (see above). 
In terms of public health, the 1998 white paper Our Healthier Nation 
(Department of Health, 1999) represents something of a paradox when 
considered for its centralising and decentralising effects because of its tendencies 
in both directions. On the one hand the imposition of public health targets by the 
Government marks a centralising tendency – one that again has some continuity 
with previous Conservative policy in the form of the Health of the Nation white 
paper of 1992 (Department of Health, 1992). This tendency can be seen both 
organisationally, in which PCGs (and later PCTs) were given very specific targets 
for a wide range of public health indicators. However, PCGs were also given at 
least some autonomy in the means by which they were allowed to reach the 
targets set, and there was often significant funding attached to putting in place 
projects to tackle specific public health issues (e.g. smoking cessation). This 
created the possibility of bottom-up organisation, in which teams of health 
professionals worked almost autonomously within the NHS to meet centrally 
specified objectives. There are then aspects of the decentralisation of the 
processes designed to meet public health targets, but centralisation of the 
outcomes required. Perhaps less ambiguously decentralising was the widespread 
funding of Health Action Zones in the first few years of the Labour Government 
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(Matka et al., 2002) – some of which continue now. In such projects considerable 
decentralisation often took place, with local agencies setting targets for 
improvement, as well as deciding how those targets would be met. Unfortunately, 
many Health Action Zone projects failed to find private funding after their period 
of central funding ran out – perhaps demonstrating the need for the involvement 
of the centre in public health after all. Public health is the perhaps the area where 
the tension between centre and locality is often most visible (Exworthy et al., 
2002) – it is where central targets are often imposed upon local agencies, and 
where the means of their achievement may or may not be specified in terms of 
their local constitution. There is also the possibility that many of the targets set 
at local level were set additionally to the national targets: they were additions 
rather than substitutes. 
By 2000, however, we can discern a change in the direction of policy. The 
Government was beginning to face criticism that it had not played enough 
attention to the NHS in its first term of office, and a more radical approach was 
beginning to appear. The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) marked the 
beginning of a very different approach to the one seen pre-2000, but with some 
degree of continuity. 
First the subtitle of The NHS Plan – a plan for investment, a plan for reform – 
gives us clues as to the direction of policy. Health care, directly linking analysis to 
that of the Third Way (Giddens, 1998), was now to be about ‘investment’, 
suggesting that the Government was to devote significant sums to the NHS, 
breaking away from the spending patterns inherited from the Conservatives in a 
decisive way. But this investment was not unconditional, leading to the second 
part of the title. In return for the increased investment that the Government was 
to offer the NHS, it had to change significantly. Gone was the expression of 
professional faith from the Government in 1997, policy was now to have teeth. 
The announcement of the performance-assessment framework for the NHS is the 
most obvious manifestation of this, putting in place a grading system for every 
hospital trust in the country according to national criteria. The performance-
measurement system central to the NHS was clearly a centralising measure, 
putting in place clear systems for measuring both outputs and processes. 
We again need to be very careful in unpackaging the effects of this change in 
policy in terms of centralisation and decentralisation. Increasing the sums 
available to the NHS clearly has the potential to be decentralising if it allows the 
discretionary sums available to purchasing organisations to increase, and for local 
responsiveness to occur as a result. Giving additional funding to trust 
organisations clearly then creates the potential for decentralisation. On the other 
hand, we have seen that the sums made available were only done so on the 
condition that reform occurred, and the exact reforms required were specified in 
terms of a wide range of particular performance measures that were to be 
combined to give ‘star ratings’, initially to hospital trusts, and then to PCTs as 
well. Untangling all of this is difficult, but it would seem that we can say that the 
policy of giving additional funding is an example of input decentralisation. The 
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specification of specific targets as part of a performance-assessment framework 
is an example of output centralisation, but as well as this, because there is 
increasing evidence that the output measures chosen significantly change the 
behaviour of those working within health services (Painter and Clarence, 2000; 
Talbot, 2000; Sanderson, 2001; Smith, 2002; Greener, 2003, 2005), it is also 
process centralisation. But because the specific processes that must be met are 
not specified in performance-assessment frameworks, this effect is not entirely 
intentional on the part of the Government – instead we might consider it to be an 
isomorphic effect of the type described by March and Olsen (1984), in which the 
industry, through its standardisation (in terms of output), leads to a 
standardisation of practice through central specification of output measures. 
In addition to this, The NHS Plan presents specific targets and dates for 
improvements stretching over a time period well beyond the Government’s term 
in office into the future. Reductions in waiting times, long a feature of 
government policy, were one aspect of this and were very much a focus, with 
specific target promises across a number of specialties (Economist, 2000). 
Changes in the delivery of primary care continued. PCGs were to be reformed 
into PCTs, being placed eventually on to the same inspection system as hospital 
trusts, and increasing the scope of their brief to bridge the gap between health 
and social services. PCTs were hugely significant for policy; not only were they to 
be a significant driver of integrated care, but they were also to be the site where 
the majority of the NHS’s budget was to be delivered. PCTs were to be both 
significant purchasers and providers of care, at the heart of the Government’s 
plans to drive reform of the NHS. Perhaps most significantly of all, PCTs became 
the major purchasers in the NHS, with, at the time of writing, some 75% of the 
health service’s funds at their command. This is clearly an example of input 
decentralisation, representing a significant movement of resources to 
organisations in the name of local responsiveness (see Figure 4.1). But we can 
question the extent to which this leads to process decentralisation because the 
extent to which PCTs are able to employ these funds discretionally is not clear: 
contracts are often signed on a time scale of greater than a year, meaning that 
markets are more about contestability than competition; there are political 
problems in removing funding from established providers of care where it might 
lead to financial problems on their part and, finally, this decentralisation of 
resource has an ambiguous relationship with more recent reforms around the 
mixed economy of care and patient choice (see below, this section). 
From 2001 an increased emphasis appeared on the purchaser/provider split in 
the NHS that New Labour had initially claimed to have abolished in 1997, but 
which now took to a whole new level. Consultative documents around patient 
choice (Department of Health, 2001b) suggested that patients should be able to 
visit primary care centres and, when they need additional treatment, choose from 
a list of potential service providers and book their care, at the location and time 
of their choosing, online. This is a clear decentralisation policy, attempting to put 
choice (a process) in the hands of individual patients. After this document’s 
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release, proposals for the ‘new’ internal market grew at some pace. The ‘mixed 
economy of care’ proposed allows public, private and not-for-profit organisations 
to compete to provide care in the NHS, so long as they agree to charge the NHS 
‘tariff’ or price for their services, and to be a part of the new unified NHS 
inspection regime. Once again, this takes some unpicking. Patient choice is a 
process decentralisation, but the specification of the NHS tariff and the 
requirement to meet a unified inspection regime is process centralisation. 
Patients gain greater choice at the expense of health providers, who must 
conform to central standards to be able to offer their care. The entry of private 
and not-for-profit organisations into the mixed economy of care is input 
decentralisation though, with non-public sector organisations becoming more 
involved in the provision of care in the NHS, albeit on terms not entirely of their 
own choosing. 
The new mixed economy of care, as we noted above, also has a rather 
ambiguous relationship with the decentralisation of funding that PCTs are meant 
to be enjoying. If secondary and tertiary care decisions are increasingly to be 
made by patients rather than PCTs then this removes at least some of the 
autonomy from PCTs (on the purchaser side), leading to greater decentralisation 
(patients make choices rather than PCTs). But it also creates the opportunity 
potentially for PCTs to put together new care offerings on the provider side that 
correspond more closely to their local population needs and to ‘market’ such 
offerings directly to patients. The mixed economy of care can decentralise 
funding decisions away from PCTs (inputs), but provide the potential for them to 
focus greater attention on their provision, and so a potential decentralisation of 
processes and outcomes. 
The policy of ‘earned autonomy’ (Department of Health, 2000; Secretary of State 
for Health, 2002) and the associated idea of ‘foundation trusts’ again illustrates 
the simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation of policy. Earned autonomy, 
as the name implies, leads to organisations with the demonstrated ability to excel 
at meeting the specific criteria of the performance-assessment framework 
(outcome centralisation), the ability to have greater freedoms from inspection, 
and additional rights including, for example, the ability to borrow from the private 
sector and set up joint ventures with it. Outcome centralisation leads to process 
decentralisation, but with a remaining element of outcome centralisation in place 
(foundation trusts, the clearest example of earned autonomy, may not run at a 
deficit). 
In addition to this, the Expert Patient programme (Department of Health, 2001a) 
has the potential to decentralise the care of the chronically ill to a far greater 
extent to the individual patient, being a clear example of process 
decentralisation. But it also has the potential to free up considerable primary care 
resources because of its explicit approach of moving to a model of care in which 
there is less reliance on health professionals, and where, from the document 
itself, substantial time savings can be achieved (an up to 80% decrease in the 
use of health professionals is claimed for some illnesses using the programme). 
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This creates the potential for PCTs and GPs to have greater local discretion in 
their employment of resources, so potentially achieving more of the aims that 
moving 75% of resources to these groups is meant to achieve (see above, this 
section). 
Another future reform also muddies the water here. Practice-led commissioning 
will allow greater participation for individual GPs in the new mixed economy of 
care, and so a potential process decentralisation back to policy of the 1990s with 
an approach that might appear to have a remarkable amount in common with GP 
fundholding. However, as with PCTs the impact of policy and practice changes on 
general practice are not uniform (see Figure 5). 
Finally, in what sometimes seems like an avalanche of health reform, we have a 
new white paper on public health (Department of Health, 2004). The 
Government’s new statement on public health has some centralising tendencies 
in terms of processes and outcomes. Specific targets appear, meaning that 
outcomes are becoming more clearly specified. As well as this, the potential ban 
on smoking in public places means that organisations beyond the NHS are being 
expected to take a role in protecting the public health, meaning that we have a 
process centralisation for both NHS and non-NHS organisations. But the policy is, 
again, likely to be more ambiguous than this, with substantial opportunities for 
local trust organisations to bid for extra money which will allow them 
considerable discretion in how they achieve particular public health targets. This 
is outcome centralisation, but process decentralisation. 
Thus analysis of current policy presents a complex view of centralisation and 
decentralisation. Figure 4 shows how policy can affect a single organisational tier 
and Figures 6–8 demonstrate how the framework can be used to draw out 
specific directions of current policies and programmes. These are presented in 
terms of inputs, processes and outcomes, providing a useful way of comparing 
different policies and organisational change. What is immediately clear from this 
mapping of the direction of change across a range of areas is the general 
decentralisation trend of inputs and processes but the clear centralisation of 
outcomes: setting of performance targets or health goals. 
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Figure 4  The Arrows Framework applied to PCTs 
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Figure 5  The Arrows Framework applied to general practice 
Tier… 
 
Activity 
Global 
 
Europe 
 
UK 
 
England 
 
SHA 
 
PCT 
 
Practice/local Individual 
 
Input: 
practice-based 
commissioning; 
practice-based 
contracts 
 
 
   
Process: 
patient choice; 
GP Quality 
Framework; 
out-of-hours 
services 
 
 
   
Outcome: GP 
Quality 
Framework; 
meeting 
contract 
targets 
 
 
   
 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 71 
Figure 6  Inputs (funding, staff, etc.) 
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Figure 7  Process (decisions) 
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Figure 8  Outcomes (patient health, targets, etc.) 
Tier… 
 
Policy 
Globa
l 
Europ
e 
U
K 
England/Scotland/Wales
/ 
Northern Ireland  
Region
, e.g. 
SHA 
Organisation
, 
e.g. PCT 
Subunit, e.g. 
locality/practic
e 
Individua
l 
Payment by 
results 
 
 
Performance 
management
: targets and 
performance 
indicators 
 
  
Inspection 
and 
regulation, 
e.g. CHAI/ 
Healthcare 
Commission, 
monitor 
 
  
Evidence-
based policy. 
e.g. NICE 
 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 73 
4.4  Conclusion 
Policy under New Labour is extremely difficult to pin down in terms of its effect 
on centralisation and decentralisation. This demonstrates the extreme care we 
must take when attempting to assess whether particular policy initiatives are 
centralising or decentralising – they may often be both, depending on whether 
we are looking at their implications in terms of input, or process, or outcome. 
The flurry of activity in health policy since 2000 especially also makes it incredibly 
difficult to establish on overall picture of whether we can say the NHS is now 
more decentralised than it was. This is because particular policies seem to often 
lead us often in very different directions; if we were to map the effects of patient 
choice, for example, we would have to examine its potential for decentralising 
processes through moving the selection of secondary care treatment as close as 
possible to the individual patient. But at the same time as this, there are 
competing centralising tendencies for clinicians in attempting to manage the 
process so that the best evidence is incorporated into the clinical decision, and 
this is potential force, at least, of the isomorphism of health provision, and at 
most a strong centralising tendency. Presenting the overall policy direction as 
either centralising or decentralising is therefore fraught with difficulties. The 
figures in this section clearly show that both are occurring and thus discussions of 
policy need to move beyond the rhetorical discussion of decentralisation and 
capture specific nuances of specific policies. 
In addition to this, it might be more helpful, following Jessop (1999, 2002), to 
consider a movement from national to postnational level rather than from 
centralisation to decentralisation. This is because it permits the possibility of 
showing how policy might also move upwards from the national level as well as 
down. Writers such as Pollock (2004), for example, suggest that much of the 
impetus towards patient choice in present policy comes from Government 
commitments in other forums to deregulate the rather closed (to the private 
sector) nature of health care in the UK, requiring us to think of the influence of 
transnational effects on UK health policy. Equally, as European Union health 
policy becomes more coherent and specified, it has the potential to have a 
considerable effect upon the NHS. Policy is therefore becoming postnational in 
the sense of it becoming more localised (and we must certainly consider the 
effect of devolutionary policies in Scotland especially in these terms), but also 
more multinational – with the second movement difficult to capture in the 
centralised/decentralised terminology. 
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Section 5  Analysis of the evidence 
5.1  Introduction 
In this and the next section the extant evidence is reviewed and then applied to 
the NHS in England. The analysis utilises the Arrows Framework described in 
Section 2. This framework extends previous conceptualisations of decentralisation 
to make it more relevant for health care services (and potentially other sectors) 
by including the individual as the furthest limit of decentralisation. The Arrows 
Framework also incorporates a new approach to identifying what is being 
decentralised. Other frameworks have primarily addressed the where 
(organisational/spatial hierarchy) but have not examined the what (what 
properties are being decentralised) with clarity. Much of the evidence views 
decentralisation as a uni-dimensional in that previous studies have taken the 
concept of decentralisation without specifically addressing exactly what was being 
decentralised. As a result studies tended to view decentralisation in 
organisational terms. If decentralisation is to be used as a unit of analysis more 
clarity is required about what is being decentralised, as well as defining from and 
to where it is being decentralised. 
In this report we have presented a framework that separates inputs, processes 
and outcomes as a way of bringing further clarity to the concept of 
decentralisation. It is important when discussing fiscal decentralisation, for 
example, to identify whether resource inputs are decentralised (input), whether 
there are specific guidelines for how the resource should be used (process) and 
whether there are controls over what resources and how much of it should be 
spent on specific things (outcome). More importantly, given the complexities that 
arise in discussing decentralisation, it is important to examine the inter-
relationships between the decentralisation of different sorts of inputs, processes 
and outcomes. Of particular interest is the relationship between the three 
strands. For example, what is the cumulative and catalytic effect of 
decentralisation across two or more strands? In addition, it is important to weigh 
up the relative impact of one strand vis-à-vis the others. Is one strand more 
important than the others? In terms of tracking from where and to where our 
framework includes a clear recognition that any analysis of decentralisation 
should include an individual context – whether this is the professional, the 
individual patient or a member of the public. 
The framework is particularly useful as it enables comparisons to be made 
between and within policies. For example, policies can be compared over time, 
such as the difference between Working for Patients and current Government 
health policy (see Sections 3 and 4). Current policies can also be compared, such 
as practice-based commissioning (decentralising) and national service 
frameworks (centralising). It is also possible to make comparisons within policies 
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such as patient choice where, for example, the outcome is centrally specified in 
terms of the range of choices but the process is left to PCTs. 
The review of extant evidence presented in this section uses the organisational 
performance criteria as set out in the research brief together with the addition of 
two other criteria (see Section 2). The review highlights a number of key points 
about the nature of the evidence and its value to informing policy and practice on 
decentralisation. The evidence review is organised by criteria of specific areas of 
performance criteria according to the SDO and outlined in Section 2. Each 
performance criterion is discussed in terms of the assumptions defining its 
association with decentralisation, caveats linked to these assumptions, evidence 
supporting or challenging these assumptions and an overall assessment of the 
balance of evidence. Although the analysis has been separated into the separate 
performance criteria, there are inevitable links and overlaps between each. For 
example, allocative efficiency, responsiveness and accountability share similar 
assumptions and caveats. There are also relationships between the criteria. For 
example, outcomes are dependent on the effectiveness of other criteria. 
In order to examine the inter-relationships between these variables, Section 6 
synthesises the evidence to draw out key lessons about the relationship between 
decentralisation and the organisation and performance of health care systems in 
England. Sections 5 and 6, therefore, combine these two elements of the review 
to test the framework and to indicate gaps in our knowledge and policy/practice 
implications. 
5.2  A review of the extant evidence 
As discussed in Section 1, given the nature of this review we could not apply 
strict methodological criteria such as hierarchy of evidence relying solely, for 
example, on high-quality research papers. One general problem in the literature 
is that when studies examine decentralisation they often use ill-defined criteria as 
their basic assumptions to test another criteria (e.g. decentralisation is more 
democratic, which therefore leads to more accountability). A further problem in 
appraising such evidence, given the need for multiple evaluative criteria and the 
multi-faceted nature of decentralisation, is identified by Bossert (1998), who 
argues that: 
There is no clear evidence to suggest that we know what combined package of 
policies can maximise the achievement of the objectives of equity, efficiency, quality 
and financial soundness…. There are some choices we have reason to believe are 
effective in reaching health reform objectives, either by strong theoretical logic or 
experience in other countries. 
Bossert (1998: 1522) 
The sections are, therefore, structured around a process of filtering the evidence. 
This section examines the assumptions about the impact of decentralisation on 
health care organisation and performance and what evidence exists to support 
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such assumptions. The relevance and transferability of the evidence to the NHS 
in England are discussed in Section 6. 
5.2.1  Assumptions about decentralisation 
A range of assumptions about the impact of decentralisation on organizational 
performance was identified in Sections 2 and 4. The assumptions identified in our 
initial literature search were contextualised within the organisational performance 
criteria identified by the SDO (see Tables 1 and 2). The majority of assumptions 
about decentralisation are linked to positive organisational performance but at 
this point decentralisation was viewed as a uni-dimensional concept. As we 
argued in Section 2, it is important to be clearer about both the where and what 
of decentralisation. We introduced the Arrows Framework which splits the what 
into the decentralisation of inputs, processes and outcomes. Thus, in examining 
these assumptions we need to extrapolate the assumptions to see what they say 
about the inputs, processes or outcomes associated with each organisational 
performance criterion. 
In Table 7 we identify whether assumptions about decentralisation map onto the 
inputs, processes and outcomes framework against each of the organisational 
criteria reviewed in the previous section. This suggests that even when 
extrapolated across the different dimensions of decentralisation the assumptions 
still hold true. This reflects the general discussion in the literature and also in 
policy rhetoric about the benefits of decentralisation identified in Sections 2 and 
4. The table is based on assumptions about whether decentralisation improves or 
worsens organisational performance, or whether this is unclear. However, a note 
of caution is expressed by De Vries (2000: 193), who highlights that the same 
arguments are sometimes used in favour of both the decentralisation and 
centralisation of public policy and that in different countries opposite arguments 
are used to support the same claim. 
5.2.2  Theoretical propositions 
In order to test these assumptions we explored the theoretical literature to 
examine whether there are specific theoretical propositions that support the 
various assumptions. The theoretical evidence is a lot weaker. The discussion in 
Section 2 of the definitions and frameworks for decentralisation shows that there 
is no single theory of decentralisation and that a key problem with 
decentralisation is that its explanation relies invariably on another set of 
contested concepts (e.g. power, authority, autonomy). However, decentralisation 
features in a number of bodies of literature and these draw on a range of 
theoretical constructs to discuss decentralisation. In general, though, there are 
not strong theoretical propositions that support specific outcomes with 
decentralisation. The exception is perhaps in relation to fiscal federalism. In Table 
8 we have summarised the main propositions made about decentralisation but 
using the Arrows Framework to map the theory in relation to inputs, processes 
and outcomes against each of the performance criteria. Table 8 demonstrates 
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whether there are theoretical propositions that support, or do not support the 
assumptions identified in Table 7. 
5.2.3  Availability of evidence 
Our search strategy identified over 500 papers and studies. Following an initial 
sifting process when all abstracts were reviewed by two or more members of the 
research team 205 papers were selected for inclusion in the review. Results from 
one database search was screened by all four team members, and a consensus 
on relevant articles emerged through discussion. In addition we examined a 
number of papers and books that discussed theories and concepts of 
decentralisation. Previous discussions and reviews of decentralisation and health 
have identified that there is little high-quality available evidence suitable for 
policy and practice (Atkinson et al., 2000; Saltman et al., 2003; Levaggi and 
Smith, 2004; Rubio and Smith, 2004). 
As discussed in Section 1 our review searched a wide range of literature for 
papers and studies on decentralisation. Much of the literature, especially as it 
relates to health care, refers to studies in developing countries. There are few 
studies of decentralisation in developed countries and most of these refer mainly 
to local government. Some of these studies are relevant to UK health care 
systems and these are given more weight. However, the lack of high-quality 
studies and empirical evidence on many aspects of decentralisation and 
organisational performance are in themselves important findings of this review. It 
is significant to note that many apparently relevant studies (e.g. 1990s internal 
market evaluations) were not identified in the evidence search because they did 
not explicitly use decentralisation as an analytical criterion. This highlights the 
need in future research studies to recognise specific aspects of decentralization, 
as illustrated in our Arrows Framework. The selection of studies for inclusion in 
this review was based on two tests of quality and relevance to the NHS in 
England. 
5.2.4  Quality and relevance of the evidence 
In assessing the quality of the evidence we used three general criteria. The first 
was the quality of the study reviewed in terms of other evidence hierarchies 
(Arksey and O’Malley, 2005). In Section 1 we outline our approach for extracting 
papers to include in our review. Using an assessment based on a conceptual 
hierarchy of evidence combined with measures of methodological quality, quality 
of journal, etc. we classified the evidence as strong, medium or weak. Based on 
this assessment of quality and the extent to which assumptions are supported by 
theory Table 9 summarises the strength of the evidence in support of whether 
decentralisation produces the outcomes that are assumed in the literature (see 
Table 7). 
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Table 7  Assumptions about whether decentralisation improves or worsens organisational performance 
Criterion… 
Aspect 
decentralise
d 
Outcome
s 
Process 
measure
s 
Staff 
moral
e 
Humanit
y 
Equit
y 
Responsivenes
s; 
allocative 
efficiency 
Technic
al 
efficienc
y 
Adherenc
e 
Accountabili
ty 
Inputs + + + ? −/+ + + − + 
Process − + + + −/+ + + − + 
Outcomes + + + ? −/+ + + − + 
+, Improved organisational performance; −, worsened organisational performance; ?, unclear. 
Table 8  Decentralisation – theoretical propositions 
Criterion… 
Aspect 
decentralised 
Outcomes Process 
measures 
Staff 
morale 
Humanity Equity Responsiveness; 
allocative 
efficiency 
Technical 
efficiency 
Adherence Accountability 
Inputs √ ? ?  √ √ √ ? √ 
Process √ √ √  √ √ √ ? √ 
Outcomes √ ? √  √ √ √ √ √ 
√, Support the assumptions in Table 7; ?, no clear link between theory and assumption; blank, no theoretical proposition. 
Table 9  Decentralisation – the quality of the evidence 
Criterion… 
Aspect 
decentralised 
Outcomes Process 
measures 
Staff 
morale 
Humanity Equity Responsiveness 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Technical 
efficiency 
Adherence Accountability 
Inputs +    + ? ++ ? ? 
Process + + ?  + ? + ?  
Outcomes + ? − − + ++ + + ++ 
Evidence: ++, strong; +, moderately strong; −, moderately weak; ?, mixed quality; blank, insufficient.
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A common problem in applying the evidence is the lack of a precise definition of 
decentralisation. As De Vries (2000) argues, ‘the same arguments are sometimes 
used to advance either claim and…in different countries opposite arguments are 
used to support the same claim’ (De Vries, 2000: 193). Furthermore, he goes on 
to argue that: 
…The main characteristic of decentralisation policies, namely that some actors lose 
power and others gain power…are found in metaphors like ‘increased efficiency’, 
‘democratization of policy processes’ and ‘effectiveness’. 
(De Vries, 2000: 194–5) 
Similar points have been made by other authors. Atkinson (1995) comments that 
the: 
…range of technical, developmental and humanitarian goals involved [in 
decentralisation] are more difficult to nail down and measure than assessing 
whether outcome and efficiency goals have been met…. These multiple goals are 
reflected in multiple constituencies…and it is not clear who should define what 
represents effectiveness or quality or acceptability and so forth. 
(Atkinson, 1995: 498) 
A further complexity raised in the literature is that the advantages and 
disadvantages of administrative arrangements are not necessarily a property of 
the arrangements as such (Ostrom, 1974; Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). So for De 
Vries, ‘Thinking in terms of centralisation and decentralisation is, in this 
conception, less useful to the study and composition of complex, 
multidimensional administrative practice, as it restricts these complex relations to 
a one-dimensional vertical relation’ (De Vries, 2000: 201). 
This raises questions about the nature of the evidence. Even where the evidence 
is of high quality in a study that is well designed the problem is that the variables 
used may lack sufficient clarity to be of any real use in analysing the effects of 
decentralisation. The discussion in Section 2 raises a number of questions about 
how decentralisation and the associated concepts are defined, concluding that 
there is not sufficient conceptual clarity for terms such as decentralisation, 
power, authority, autonomy, etc., to be used as independent or dependent 
variables. As we have seen, decentralisation is not a uni-dimensional variable. 
The following sections therefore review the evidence by each of the performance 
domains identified in Section 2. 
5.3  Outcomes 
5.3.1  Introduction 
According to Rubio and Smith (2004: 2) it is surprising that little attention has 
been paid to the evaluation of decentralisation in the health care sector. There 
are relatively few studies that examine the relationship between decentralisation 
and outcomes. However, these studies tend to be rather different to the bulk of 
studies that examine other criteria, in that they tend to be quantitative, focusing 
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on the relationship between outcomes as the dependent variable and 
decentralisation as the independent variable, with a range of control variables. 
Robalino et al. (2001: 2) note that despite compelling arguments in favour of 
decentralisation there is little evidence that countries which have decentralised 
management and budgets within their health systems have improved health 
outcomes. They point out that qualitative studies provide ‘mixed results’, and the 
magnitude of the impact of decentralisation on health outcomes remains 
unquantified, so ‘this paper is an attempt to fill, in part, the void of quantitative 
measurement of the impact of decentralisation’ (Robalino et al., 2001: 3). 
The main studies reviewed in this section are very diverse in terms of context, 
data, and dependent and control variables. Khaleghian (2003) examines 
immunization in developing countries. Robalino et al. (2001) focuses on infant 
mortality in a panel of low- and high-income countries covering the period 1970–
95. Rubio and Smith (2004) analyse infant mortality for a panel of the 10 
Canadian provinces for the period 1979–95. 
5.3.2  Assumptions 
The quantitative studies tend to take a public economics or fiscal federalism 
approach. Economic arguments in favour of decentralisation include better local 
information, clearer knowledge about preferences, improved local co-ordination, 
increased efficiency, and more accountability, equity, innovation and competition. 
However, there are also economic arguments in favour of centralisation, some of 
which directly contradict the previous arguments such as flawed information, 
economies of scale, transaction costs, spillovers, equity, macroeconomy and 
competition (Levaggi and Smith, 2004; see also De Vries, 2000). Rubio and 
Smith (2004) note that fiscal federalism theory maintains that decentralisation of 
public goods and services with localised effects is likely to produce efficiency 
gains. Robalino et al. (2001) focus on the route through improved technical and 
allocative efficiency. Khaleghian (2003) argues that many of the proposed 
benefits of decentralisation are based on the premise that it brings local 
decision-makers closer to the constituencies they serve, but many of the inherent 
assumptions such as information, channels for the public to express wants and 
preferences and the incentive environment motivating decision-makers to 
respond are open to question, especially in developing countries. Two conclusions 
follow from these points. First, improved outcomes are a result of improvements 
in other criteria such as efficiency. It is important to examine the mechanism 
through which improved outcomes occur. For example, if it is technical efficiency, 
then if there are no clear improvements in technical efficiency as a result of 
decentralisation (see Section 5.6), then it is hard to see how this can feed into 
improved outcomes. Second, the context may vary significantly. Particular 
decentralisation strategies might lead to improved outcomes in some settings, 
but not in others (see Section 6). Putting these two together takes us close to the 
equation of ‘realistic evaluation’ that ‘context=mechanism=outcome’ (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997). 
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5.3.3  Caveats 
The study authors are very aware of the deficiencies in their data. Robalino et al. 
(2001: 3) admit that their measure of fiscal decentralisation – the ratio between 
total expenditure of central and local government – is ‘only a rough proxy for the 
fiscal administrative process’. Khaleghian (2003) uses three measures: 
subnational expenditure as a share of total government expenditure, health 
spending as a proportion of all subnational expenditure and a binary variable 
taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2000) representing 
the presence of subnational taxing, spending or regulatory authority. It is 
admitted that ‘decentralisation is a complex phenomenon, and the use of 
quantitative methods with a small number of control variables runs the risk of 
over-simplification’ (Khaleghian, 2003: 16). Rubio and Smith (2004: 6) remark 
that all existing empirical studies on the relationship between decentralisation 
and health outcomes have evaluated the effect of public sector decentralisation 
as a whole on health performance, but ‘a precise measure of health care 
decentralisation is difficult to find. Health care decentralisation is a complex 
phenomenon encompassing a number of political, fiscal and administrative 
dimensions. Many of these aspects are, yet, unquantifiable’. They continue that 
‘up to now the only available quantitative measure of health care decentralisation 
is a fiscal one’, but ‘fiscal indicators of decentralisation are only a rough guide, 
however, in the sense that local spending decisions may not be autonomous’ 
(Rubio and Smith, 2004: 7; see Section 2). Outcome indicators used are infant 
mortality rates (Robalino et al., 2001; Rubio and Smith, 2004) and immunisation 
rates (Khaleghian, 2003). 
All the quantitative studies use control variables, but the selection is generally 
not justified, and they vary between studies. Khaleghian (2003) uses a range of 
economic, social and political variables, taken largely from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators data-set. Robalino et al. (2001) also include 
variables on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, corruption, political rights 
and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Rubio and Smith (2004) include an indicator 
of social capital (education) and a measure of needs (low birth weight). It is not 
clear whether a different set of control variables may have changed the results of 
the studies. This is related to the problem of causation. It is rare that 
decentralisation strategies operate in isolation, and it may be difficult to 
disentangle their effects from the effects of other policies (see Khaleghian, 2003: 
9). 
However, the most important point is the crudity of the independent variable. 
The most common measure – local spending as a proportion of national spending 
– is a crude measure of fiscal decentralisation, and fiscal decentralisation is one 
concept of the wider dimensions of decentralisation (see Section 2). However, the 
outcome studies discussed in this section are those few that attempt – however 
crudely – to measure decentralisation. 
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5.3.4  Evidence that decentralisation improves outcomes 
Rubio and Smith (2004: 5) state that ‘there is little evidence that countries with a 
more decentralised health system have better health outcomes’, but then review 
studies which find that ‘on the whole these studies find a positive association 
between fiscal decentralisation and some indicators of health outcomes’. Yee 
(2001) finds a beneficial relationship between several indicators of health care 
performance, including mortality rates and fiscal decentralisation for panel data 
for 29 Chinese provinces for the period 1980–3. Ebel and Yilmaz (2001) report 
that intervention by sub-national governments is positively related to increased 
immunisation rates for measles in six developing countries. 
Robalino et al. (2001) report the results of six models that generally find that 
fiscal decentralisation is likely to improve health outcomes. However, whereas 
higher fiscal decentralisation is consistently associated with lower mortality rates, 
its benefits are particularly important for poor countries. Khaleghian (2003) finds 
that decentralisation is associated with higher immunization coverage rates in 
low-income countries, but lower coverage in middle-income countries. There is 
only one that gives information for high-income countries, and that examines 
variations within rather than between countries. Rubio and Smith (2004) suggest 
that in Canada decentralisation did have a positive and substantial influence on 
infant mortality. 
5.3.5  Evidence that decentralisation worsens outcomes 
There is little empirical evidence that decentralisation decreases outcomes. As 
already noted, Khaleghian (2003) finds that decentralisation is associated with 
lower immunization rates in middle-income countries, but there is no evidence for 
high-income countries. However, Khaleghian (2003) argues that theoretical 
studies of decentralisation generally predict a negative impact for services with 
inter-jurisdictional externalities and public good characteristics (Bardhan and 
Mookerhjee, 1998; Besley and Coate, 2003), and immunization has aspects of 
both. 
5.3.6  The balance of evidence 
Whereas the balance of evidence suggests that decentralisation is associated with 
better outcomes, the implications for the British NHS are far from clear. The 
evidence is limited in quantity, and covers a wide range of contexts. In particular, 
apart from Rubio and Smith’s (2004) study of Canada, most of it is based on low- 
and middle-income countries. Whereas the sophistication of the statistical 
modelling is impressive, most of the studies admit that the measure of 
decentralisation used as the independent variable is extremely crude. Most of the 
studies use general local-government fiscal measures rather than measures of 
health care decentralisation (but see Rubio and Smith, 2004). Moreover, there is 
little justification for and consistency in the choice of control variables, which 
means that different control variables might have led to different conclusions. 
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Whereas the study of Canada (Rubio and Smith, 2004) suggests a positive 
relationship between decentralisation and infant mortality, it would not be wise to 
assume that this result can be generalised to wider health outcomes in very 
different health systems such as the UK. 
5.4  Process measures 
5.4.1  Introduction 
Process measures attempt to capture perhaps the most difficult element to 
measure of organisational activities – those aspects that transform inputs into 
outputs. In the organisational literature, processes are what add value to the 
organisation (Barney, 1995) and, as such, include elements that can be 
notoriously difficult to measure or capture, coming somewhere before outputs, 
although processes are clearly implicated in the resulting outputs. In service-
based organisations, such as health care, where outputs can be extraordinarily 
difficult to define, processes often form the main basis of measurement in 
attempts to capture what the organisation does (Carter et al., 1992). By 
processes, then, we mean the activities that lead to output generation. 
5.4.2  Assumptions 
Decentralisation is assumed to have a number of impacts on process measures, 
with the advantages of decentralised organisations usually being couched in 
terms of the following (taken from Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 253). 
• They are far more flexible and can respond quickly to changing 
circumstances and customers’ needs. 
• They are far more effective than centralized institutions…they know what 
actually happens. 
• They are far more innovative…innovation happens because good ideas 
bubble up from employees, who actually do the work and deal with the 
customers. 
• Decentralized institutions generate higher morale, more commitment and 
greater productivity…, especially in organizations with knowledge workers. 
Many of these points are effectively expressed in terms of the assumption that 
centralisation leads to the opposite in each case – it results in ‘over-regulation’ 
(De Vries, 2000: 193), for example, leading to a reduction in responsiveness, as 
well as suggesting that administrative and ‘red tape’ costs could be substantially 
reduced though greater decentralisation (Enthoven, 1991). In addition to this, 
decentralisation is often held to be central to establishing a more democratic 
means of running health services – a justification used in the case of French 
reforms in the 1990s (Schedler and Proeller, 2002), which were justified using 
the legitimisation of ‘modernisation’ (Maddock, 2002). 
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Decentralisation is also presented as a means of achieving greater, rather than 
less, co-ordination than centralisation is able to achieve. From the theoretical 
perspective of game theory this is because it becomes rational for individuals to 
adopt a policy of co-operation towards one another rather than relying upon a 
central state organisation (Carter, 1999). Alternatively, network theorists suggest 
that complexity can be better managed through decentralised strategies because 
‘emergent’ means of dealing with the difficulties of public service delivery will 
appear (Kickert et al., 1997; Kickert, 2001). As such, decentralisation becomes a 
means of removing the regulation often associated with centralisation, and 
improving communication between individuals in a ‘network’ or ‘N-form’ 
organisation (Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996). Equally, decentralisation can be a form 
of marketisation, a means through which services become more accountable to 
their ‘consumers’ through greater choice (Department of Health, 2003). 
5.4.3  Caveats 
Much contemporary management theory, then, appears to favour 
decentralisation, but a number of issues must also be faced. 
First, there is the difficulty in finding appropriate process measures for an 
organisation as complex as the NHS. The problems of using inappropriate 
measures, especially based around attempts to capture organisational 
performance in the NHS, are well documented (Goddard et al., 1999), and there 
are dangers that utilising inappropriate measures can lead to distorted clinical 
priorities (Smith, 2002; Greener, 2003). 
In addition to these problems, there is a central need for health services to be 
co-ordinated to ensure that no gaps in service delivery appear (Carter et al., 
1992), and so we must be extremely clear in decisions about the extent and 
scope of the powers that are decentralised in a public service (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997). There is also the danger that decentralisation can lead to a 
greater duplication of administrative functions as control is passed to a larger 
number of organisations (Le Grand et al., 1998), possibly removing economies of 
scale and scope achieved in larger purchasing functions, for example (Jessop, 
1999). Certain policies require technologies that will involve large-scale 
investments and economies of scale (Walsh, 1996 p.72), and these may not be 
achieved where policy is decentralised beyond the point where these economies 
are no longer possible. There is likely to be a trade-off, in other words, between 
responsiveness and economies of scale and scope. 
Overall, a significant caveat is one of context – we must be extremely careful in 
assuming that decentralisation suits as an all-purpose solution, and that ‘going 
down to the local’ (Atkinson et al., 2000) with every service is appropriate, while 
ignoring political and social factors. 
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5.4.4  Evidence in favour 
Germain and Spears (1999), in a study examining management outside the 
public sector, suggest that ‘Strategic decentralisation correlates with quality 
management because delegation over issues affecting the entire firm…creates a 
general work environment that empowers employees’ (p.386). As such, this 
evidence would suggest that decentralisation leads to an improvement in 
processes through its psychological impact upon staff morale (see Section 5.6), a 
view that is also suggested by the Dutch public administration literature (Klijn et 
al., 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). 
Hudson (1999) presents similar findings in relation to an early study of primary 
care groups, suggesting that achievements amounted to ‘some improvements in 
morale, better inter-professional relationships and minor changes to some 
community-based services’ (p.170). 
Finally, the importance of context is again raised as a crucial factor in achieving 
success through decentralisation. Putnam (1993), one of the most influential 
writers on community and local democracy, suggests from his studies in Italy 
that decentralisation will work well to improve local democracy in districts that 
already have a number of civil, community-based organisations, but rather less 
well where this is not the case. This appears to highlight the importance of 
existing infrastructure – where this is absent, decentralisation may be 
problematic (Atkinson et al., 2000). 
5.4.5  Evidence against 
Boyne (1996) suggests that a number of factors concerning local government 
performance improve with scale; ‘Councils with a higher level of output provide a 
better service at lower cost’ (p.59). Boyne’s work links output with process, 
suggesting that organisational form can be linked, in terms of scale, to the 
success of its output. Boyne makes clear that population size is not an especially 
good measure of scale, with performance less clearly related to this measure 
than to more sensitive indicators for the specific area concerned – suggesting 
that we must be extremely careful in how we define scale when examining 
decentralisation. Other writers suggest that finding the level of decision-making 
that is optimal is the ‘fantasy of the appropriate scale’ (De Vries, 2000: 203) as 
large populations in one country may be comparatively small to another, 
suggesting that both ‘centralization and decentralisation are relative concepts’ 
(ibid), and that, when it comes to process measure improvement and 
decentralisation, what is ‘missing in most of the theories is an empirical base’ 
(ibid: 217). Powell (2003: 66) notes the confusion over the optimal size for 
purchasing in the NHS. As such, attempting to find appropriate organisational 
size, to base assumptions around reforming processes through scale may not 
lead to a better output. 
In the limited amount of empirical evidence that does exist, an ‘analysis showed 
that decentralisation could not be claimed to make any important difference to 
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health service performance’ (Atkinson, 1995: 496), whereas detailed work from 
Thomason et al. (1991) highlights a fundamental contradiction between the 
desire to decentralise on the one hand, and the need to promote equity in the 
distribution of services and resources on the other. The difficulty appears to be 
that politicians cannot resist getting involved in decision-making when it becomes 
politically expedient to do so (Klein, 1998: 68; Boyne et al., 2003). 
5.4.6  Balance of evidence 
Theory suggests there are a number of process-associated benefits to 
decentralisation, but we lack the empirical evidence to support the majority of 
them. We can perhaps attribute this to two specific problems: 
1 a lack of empirical evidence; there would appear to be a need for detailed 
studies of decentralisation process to determine whether the many claims 
made by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) can be empirically borne out; 
2 the need for the political centre to interfere in the running of health services 
so that, where decentralisation does occur, an additional effect is introduced 
with the government keen to take control of processes again where problems 
might begin to occur. 
In all, there is strong theoretical evidence for an improvement in processes 
coming from increased decentralisation, and some of the claims made by this 
literature concerning improvements in staff morale can be borne out to a degree. 
However, there is also evidence that increased decentralisation (or at least 
reduced scale) can result in a reduction in indicators concerned with service 
improvement and cost, signalling that scale and scope economies in the public 
sector remain significant, and that reducing size or scale beyond a particular 
point can actually reduce performance. At the same time as this, however, we 
have a significant number of authors warning us that attempts to find an optimal 
size or scale for public services is largely a waste of time, as history and 
geography show us that what we might regard as a decentralized service in one 
time or space would be a centralized service in other, and so the need to define 
scale rather more precisely than is often the case is extremely important, as is 
the need to take the existing contextual situations of localities into account. 
5.5  Humanity 
5.5.1  Introduction 
There is no clear definition of humanity within health care texts and its use in 
health policy is also limited. In general usage humanity is either a collective term 
for the human race or it is used in terms of the way individuals should be 
treated; for example, with respect for their humanity. Webster’s Dictionary 
describes humanity as ‘the quality or state of being humane’. A clearer definition 
of humanity from the Oxford English Dictionary includes ‘The character or quality 
of being humane; behaviour or disposition towards others such as befits a human 
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being – civility, courtesy, politeness, good behaviour; kindness as shown in 
courteous or friendly acts, obligingness’. Thus humanity can be seen as distinct 
from the concept of responsiveness (see Section 5.7), is clearly associated with 
both this and accountability (see Section 5.10), but is particularly related to being 
seen to do the right thing as defined by what are seen as good standards of 
conduct and practice by the community. One useful concept that may be applied 
that is increasingly being used in health care is the concept of human rights. 
Within this context the WHO (Gostin et al., 2003) has identified eight domains 
relating to responsiveness in health care services that are also associated with 
humanity: 
• respect for the dignity of persons, 
• autonomy to participate in health-related decisions, 
• confidentiality of information, 
• prompt attention, 
• adequate quality of basic amenities, 
• clarity of communications to patients, 
• access to social support networks and family and community involvement, 
• choice of health care provider. 
Clearly respect for the dignity of persons, autonomy, confidentiality, prompt 
attention, adequacy, clear communication and social support have direct 
relevance to the concept of humanity in respect of health care provision. In 
relation to decentralisation in the NHS this can be translated into the extent to 
which NHS organisations focus on the well-being of the population/service users. 
This will include whether closeness to the community or patient reduces the 
feeling of remoteness and the extent to which organisations may feel accountable 
to local communities or service users for their conduct. Humanity may also relate 
to the way organisations treat their own staff in terms of providing humane 
places and organisations to work within. 
5.5.2  Assumptions 
Within the literature on decentralisation there is a clear assumption that 
decentralised agencies are closer to their communities, as they are seen to be 
more responsive to local needs, are seen as being more openly accountable and 
improve humanity as greater attention is paid to individual patient needs. 
Decentralised organisations are also closer to the public/individuals and are 
therefore less remote and more user-friendly. The key assumption is that local 
organisations will therefore be more likely to act in the best interests of their 
local populations or their patients. While this includes being responsive to local 
needs (Meads and Wild, 2003), Burns et al. (1994) also suggest that in a local-
government context it strengthens local democracy, increases visibility and 
community development and encourages political awareness. Furthermore, De 
Vries (2000) argues that decentralisation also enhances civic participation, 
neutralises entrenched local elites and increases political stability. However, these 
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aspects may be less important to the NHS. In a service with a high degree of 
professionalisation, such as health care, it is also assumed that it is important for 
individual professionals to have a high degree of autonomy in their dealings with 
individuals – in this case patients (Harrison et al., 1992; Hill, 1997). Thus for the 
NHS humanity as a performance criterion relates to the way it treats patients, 
staff and the wider public. Manifestations of humanity in the NHS include the 
Patient’s Charter, issues of consent and the importance of a public service ethos. 
5.5.3  Caveats 
The lack of clarity of definition means that relating evidence to this outcome is 
difficult. There is some question over the extent to which the concept of humanity 
relates to the individual, to communities or to the public more widely. Bossert 
(1996) has argued that the extreme expression of decentralisation is that the 
patient is the ultimate object of this process and the framework used within this 
report reflects this conceptualisation. If the patient is the ultimate expression of 
decentralisation the way that the patient is treated is also of importance. 
5.5.4  Evidence that decentralisation promotes humanity 
Granting greater autonomy to decentralised agencies enhances trust. Trust is 
crucial when performance is ambiguous and behaviour is unobserved (Perrone et 
al., 2003). This is particularly relevant to health care where there is a high 
degree of autonomy granted to health care practitioners to treat patients based 
on the patient’s needs and the professional’s experience and skill. 
Decentralisation has also been shown to enhance worker empowerment (Sheaff 
et al., 2004a). There is also evidence to suggest that local health-agency board 
members have a greater sense of responsibility to the local community 
(Ashburner and Cairncross, 1992, 1993). 
5.5.5  Evidence that decentralisation is detrimental to 
humanity 
One of the key arguments against decentralisation and humanity derives from 
democratic theory. In particular, minorities may be disadvantaged by dominant 
local groups (Bjorvatn and Cappelan, 2002). When areas are small the minority 
groups have fewer members and thus may be more easily muted or dominated 
by local majorities. However, when connected in a national context such minority 
groups may have a more powerful voice. 
Two interesting perspectives suggesting that decentralisation does not increase 
local perspectives of humanity come from Sheaff et al. (2004a), who found 
evidence that decentralisation involves an extension of hierarchical control, and 
Hales (1999), who found that local managers may be unwilling to use 
decentralised powers and/or may be conditioned by former centralised regime. In 
addition, although worker autonomy and empowerment may be increased it is 
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not clear within a highly regulated environment whether trust is eroded, leading 
to a loss of respect. 
5.5.6  Conclusion: the balance of evidence 
There is no direct evidence to support the assumption that decentralisation 
increases humanity based on the criteria defined by the WHO. There is some 
evidence suggesting that local boards may have an increased responsibility to 
their local community. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
decentralisation is a form of centralisation achieved by weakening local power. In 
addition, democratic theory has consistently portrayed the problem of minority 
views as a problem with decentralised units. This would seem to suggest, and 
there is evidence in the participation literature (Lupton et al., 1998) as well, that 
in decentralised units there will be dominant groups and groups that are unable 
to get their wishes recognised. Interestingly, in the development of governance 
arrangements for foundation hospitals the concerns centred on the perceived 
problem that specific minority-interest groups would be able to dominate the 
governance arrangements of the trusts and fairly complex governance 
frameworks were established to guard against this (Klein, 2003a). While there is 
evidence to suggest that closer partnerships with patients improved health care 
(Coulter, 1997), there is little empirical evidence demonstrating that professional 
autonomy is equated with improved communication and respect for patients. In 
fact, some studies suggest that the opposite may be true (Rogers et al., 1999). 
5.6  Equity 
5.6.1  Introduction 
Equity is widely adopted as an evaluative criterion in health policy including 
studies of decentralisation. Its definitional ambiguity and feasibility raise 
important questions in terms of weighing the evidence on the impact of 
decentralisation. 
5.6.2  Assumptions 
There are two basic and opposing assumptions concerning the impact of 
decentralisation upon equity. 
The first and probably the most widely held is that decentralisation reduces 
equity (and/or increases inequality) by enabling greater variations in health 
service access, provision or use (e.g. Kleinman et al., 2002: 28; López-
Casasnovas, 2001: 18; Rubio and Smith, 2004: 4). As Levaggi and Smith (2004) 
argue: 
Unfettered local government may lead to greatly varying services, standards, 
taxes, user charges and outcomes. These variations may compromise important 
equity objectives held at a national level…. 
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(Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 6) 
Local managerial autonomy is increased by decentralisation and, in the absence 
of a central co-ordinating function or of central directives, the potential variations 
are likely, indeed bound, to occur. 
The second assumption presents the opposite argument. Decentralisation 
increases equity (and reduces inequality) by enabling local organisations to meet 
better the needs of particular groups (such as minority communities or vulnerable 
groups) whose needs were previously poorly served by the former ‘centralised’ 
system (e.g. Bossert, 1998). For example: 
Local governments may be better placed than national governments to ensure that 
resources are allocated equitably within their borders. 
(Levaggi and Smith, 2004: .5). 
Decentralisation might also enable: 
Greater equity through distribution of resources towards traditionally marginal 
regions and groups. 
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002: 14) 
The use of targeted funding (such as deprivation payments) is a common 
redistributive mechanism in this strategy. 
These different assumptions largely rest on where the goal of equity is being 
pursued: centrally/nationally or locally. 
5.6.3  Caveats 
In linking decentralisation with equity impacts, several caveats are apparent. 
First, equity may be defined in multiple ways. Policy documents and many 
research papers often employ vague or ambiguous interpretations and definitions 
of equity (Powell and Exworthy, 2003). There is, for example, rarely an explicit 
recognition of the difference between equality and equity. The former represents 
the equal allocation of a commodity (such as access to health care) whereas the 
latter presumes an equal allocation modified according to criteria. In the NHS, a 
common criterion is need; hence, equal access is not necessarily the policy 
objective goal, rather equal access for equal need (Powell and Exworthy, 2000). 
Equity of (health) outcomes may also be a valid goal for health policy. 
Another common misunderstanding concerns horizontal and vertical equity. 
Horizontal equity aims ‘to treat like cases alike’ (e.g. equal access for those in 
equal need) and vertical equity aims to treat ‘different individuals differently’ 
(e.g. allocating more resources to particular areas or groups; Powell and 
Exworthy, 2003: 59). Kleinman et al. (2002: 34) (citing Bramley, 2002) illustrate 
these definitions (in terms of grants from the centre to local authorities): 
• trying to achieve ‘horizontal equity’ so that given types of taxpayer face 
similar local taxes for similar services in different localities; 
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• trying to achieve ‘categorical equity’ by encouraging different localities to 
provide similar standards of service in key areas like education; 
• trying to correct the vertical distribution of income, particularly where local 
authorities are involved in redistributive services. 
Finally, given the geographical organisation of the NHS, it is common to consider 
spatial/geographical notions of equity. However, area-based redistributive 
policies are often a blunt instrument in the policy-maker’s tool kit (Kleinman et 
al., 2002: 35). Moreover, other forms of equity may be relevant, including social 
class, gender, age and ethnicity. Consideration also needs to be given to equity 
aspects of health care: expenditure, access, provision, use and outcome. Often, 
attention is focused on ensuring equity of resource allocation, although this does 
not guarantee equity in other aspects. 
5.6.4  Evidence that decentralisation promotes 
equity/reduces inequality 
Evidence underpinning this assertion is often hypothetical/rhetorical. The ability 
of decentralised organisations to target vulnerable or minority groups is often 
cited as an advantage. For example, 
Decentralisation increases ability to target improved health spending. 
(Bossert, 1998: 1522). 
Some commentators claim that variation per se is not bad and is indeed the price 
of a decentralised/devolved system. This is often cited in the case of US 
federalism (e.g. Leichter, 1997). Such arguments also claim that the advantages 
of (increased, local) autonomy are deemed to outweigh the disadvantages of 
(reduced) equity (Perkins and Burns, 2001). 
Another aspect of this assertion relates to the greater ability of smaller scale/size 
of organisations to respond to the varied pattern of local need (see Section 5.8). 
For example, the World Bank argues that decentralisation can ‘…improve equity 
in the distribution of infrastructure as smaller governments away from the 
political centre gain more latitude and funding to serve their constituents’ (see 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/). 
Empirical evidence of such assertions remains rather limited. Countries with long 
traditions of decentralisation/devolution and research programmes provide some 
insight into the effects upon equity although this evidence can be mixed. For 
example, in Spain, Rico (2000) found that there was a limited rise in (regional) 
inequality partly because of the constrained fiscal powers that regions enjoyed. 
By contrast, Quadrado et al. (2001) found that, in the context of health policies 
in the 1980s, decentralisation may have ‘helped to reduce regional inequality 
although no firm conclusions can be drawn yet’ (p.783). They note a rise in 
regional inequality in Spain between 1974 and 1981 but a fall between 1981 and 
1991 (p.797). They suggest that this is because of an under-estimation of 
inequality due to spill-overs from the contiguity of provinces/regions. In the UK, 
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the equity objectives have never been explicitly stated by policy-makers, making 
evaluation problematic (Powell and Exworthy, 2003). 
5.6.5  Evidence that decentralisation hampers equity/widens 
inequality 
The notion that decentralisation adversely affects equity is widely cited (e.g. 
Atkinson, 2000; De Vries, 2000; Mouzinho et al., 2001; Quadrado et al., 2001; 
Levaggi and Smith, 2004). The justifications for such assertions include 
permissible variations resulting from autonomous decision-making, the loss of 
equity advantages of centralisation and the unequal distribution of health care 
facilities. 
Variations in decision-making are likely because of the ability of autonomous 
organisations to diverge from previous (central, equity-promoting) policies. Some 
organisations may, for example, ‘neglect the public health and macroeconomic 
consequences of their services’ (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 15). 
Some justifications allude to the converse, namely that centralisation is more 
effective in securing equity. For example, Koivusalo (1999) stresses the need for 
legal powers (in Finland) to ‘guarantee equitable provision’. Also, Mouzinho et al. 
(2001) argue for ‘clear guidelines, monitoring and adequate resources’ to 
minimise inequities arising from decentralisation. Walker (2002) notes central 
government’s ‘ability’ to ‘achieve equality’. However, it should be noted that 
centralisation (at whatever level) does not, in itself, ensure an equitable 
distribution. Uniformity at the centre (whether central or regional government) 
may not reflect the variable pattern of need, for example. However, some 
centralising pressures (such as national wage agreements or the influence of 
national professional bodies) do make it difficult to decentralise (Exworthy, 
1998). (The shift away from uniformity in the private sector has also been 
problematic; Pendleton, 1994.) Moreover, equitable service (whether concerning 
access, provision or use) is difficult to attain in practice (Elstad, 1990; Powell and 
Exworthy, 2003). Decentralisation may not only lead to inequity but, in doing so, 
it can also weaken the role and power of the centre (Collins, 1996) and hamper 
co-ordination (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 10). 
Few studies distinguish between different notions of equity. For example, Levaggi 
and Smith (2004: 13) argue that ‘a guarantee of patients’ mobility can reduce 
inequity when the provision of hospital care is not equally distributed.’ 
Empirical evidence to support the claims (above) that decentralisation harms 
equity can be found in terms of service provision, regional inequality and the 
(non-)decisions of central government. 
• Service provision: much of this evidence derives from the GP fundholding 
schemes in the 1990s. Smith and Barnes (2000) claimed (from other 
evidence) that fundholders sought to improve access to services for their 
patients but, in doing so, ‘some inequity of provision emerged’ (p.46). 
Another aspect of fundholding was the ‘perception of increasing inequity in 
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[Total Purchasing Pilots]’ by some health authorities (Leese et al., 2001: 
174). Goodwin (1998) identified ‘strong reasons to believe that the practices 
of fundholding GPs have enjoyed better access to hospital treatment than 
other patients’ (p.55), although he concluded that claims of cream-skimming 
(the preferential selection of patients by GPs) was supported by little 
evidence despite the potential for fundholding GPs to do so. In a different 
context, Grogan (1993) found that decentralisation in the USA was 
associated with further variations in service provision. 
• Regional inequality: much of this evidence is from countries with strong 
regionalised (meso-level) structures. In Italy, Bankauskaite et al. (2004) 
note the ‘high risk’ of inequality between regions. Giannoni and Hitris (2002) 
also note that Italian regionalisation has been associated with a persistence 
or even widening of inequality. While health care costs have been contained, 
the reforms did not curb higher-spending regions. Regional differences in 
New Zealand were magnified by the decentralisation of purchasing structures 
(Barnett and Newberry, 2002). Lomas et al. (1997) express similar concerns 
in Canada. Some of these issues may emerge within the UK if/when a 
regional (health) agenda develops. 
• Central government policy: De Vries (2000) argues that decentralisation 
poses a ‘threat to the principle of equality’ (p.199). Central government 
policies have not always promoted equity. For example, in the USA, Medicaid 
(supposedly aimed at providing financial assistance to the poor) has been ‘so 
restrictive that less than half of the poor received coverage’ (Sparer, 1999: 
146). This was magnified by ‘significant interstate variation in eligibility 
coverage’, which raised concerns about equity. This raises questions as to 
how much variation or diversity is or should be permitted by central 
government (Klein, 2003a). Empirical evidence (including negative public 
perceptions) of increasing inequity (associated with decentralisation) is 
leading some countries (such as Finland, Canada and New Zealand) to ‘re-
centralise’. For example, Meads and Wild (2003) note that: 
Switzerland, which ‘de-concentrated’ its health services to its cantons before any 
other European country did anything similar, is now struggling with the continent’s 
widest disparities in national service distribution. 
Others note the need for redistributive policies to counter the inimical effects of 
decentralisation upon equity (e.g. World Bank, see 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/, p.2). To remedy inequities 
associated with decentralisation, Bossert et al. (2003) calls for an ‘equity fund’ to 
redistribute between regions and groups (p.366). 
5.6.6  The balance of evidence 
Bossert’s (2000) conclusion that ‘Decentralisation improves some equity 
measures but worsens others’ is widely applicable. For example, he shows that, 
whereas per-capita expenditure may increase following decentralisation, 
wealthier areas tend to spend more than poorer areas and there is no direct link 
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to overall service improvement. Likewise, Janovsky (1997) finds that there is ‘no 
clear evidence’ that decentralisation has increased equity. Such partial 
conclusions make it difficult to attribute the equity consequences of 
decentralisation (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002: 26). 
Despite such equivocal conclusions, a number of key themes emerge from the 
literature. First, the (spatial) scale at which equity is sought and measured is 
crucial. In short, is equity sought between areas or within areas (or groups)? 
While López-Casasnovas (2001) argues that the ‘main equity concern relates to 
intra-regional differences rather than inter-regional differences’ (p.19), the 
Spanish context of this statement underlines the need to consider the context of 
such equity conclusions. López-Casasnovas (2001) identifies a strategy whereby 
decentralisation (enabling full autonomy) is constrained if, in doing so, it 
threatens the achievement of equity goals (p.18). This is theoretically attractive 
though practically hard to implement. 
Second, local autonomy may not always be exercised by organisations. They 
may, for example, follow previous strategies and seek to conform to equity at a 
macro scale. For example, equity is widely ascribed as a value of the NHS and so 
decentralisation may challenge the core value of NHS staff. Nevertheless, the 
uneven diffusion of (organisational or clinical) innovations will inevitably mean 
that (in-)equity issues will arise. Central structures and processes can help to 
shape a culture in which equity issues are addressed. For example, tackling the 
postcode lottery or ensuring national standards are but two ways of achieving 
this. These are desirable objectives but, as Kleinman et al. (2002) argue, 
‘Enhancing local autonomy and providing territorial equity are both desirable 
policy goals – but they can and will conflict’ (p.16; original emphasis). 
This last point raises a crucial issue, the third consideration in these conclusions: 
clarification of the equity objectives. In noting the centripetal force of equity, 
Klein (2003a) urges greater clarification of equity, this ‘chameleon concept in the 
context of the new localism and pluralism’ (p.196). Klein points out that it could 
mean: 
1 equality in the ability to design local services, or 
2 equality in the type, level and kind of service delivered. 
The Haskins Report (King’s Fund, 2002) reaches a similar conclusion, urging a 
broader ‘understanding of equity of treatment’ (p.19). This report argues that the 
notion of equity needs to extend beyond clinical need to include other factors 
important to patients including preference for location of treatment and perceived 
clinical quality. This is especially important, the report argues, in the context of 
‘patient choice’ policies. 
Whereas Klein poses the question ‘can health services a la carte be reconciled 
with a national menu?’ (Klein, 2003a: p.196), the Haskins Report (King’s Fund, 
2002) supports centralised tax-based funding (on equity grounds; as does 
Wanless, 2002) but also ‘…equal opportunity for patients to choose the best 
available option to meet their individual needs without denying similar choices to 
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the next person’ (King’s Fund, 2002: 19). Achieving this balance will take 
considerable skills and judgment. 
5.7  Staff morale/satisfaction 
5.7.1  Introduction 
Human resources management is a key area of decentralisation. The majority of 
health care resources are spent on human resources and thus any reorganisation 
of health care systems or shifting of responsibility for functions within health care 
systems will impact on human resources. Kolehmainen-Aitken (1999) identifies 
four human resource issues emerging from the decentralisation process: 
• the adequacy of available information on human resources; 
• the complexity of transferring human resources; 
• the impact of professional associations, unions and registration bodies on the 
design and implementation of management structures and jobs; 
• the morale and motivation of health staff. 
This section examines the fourth of these in detail although reference is made to 
broader issues of human resources management and this issue is returned to 
later in the report. 
5.7.2  Assumptions 
There are four broad staff-morale assumptions that are made about 
decentralisation. The first and often most widely quoted is that decentralisation 
improves job satisfaction and morale (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Burns et al., 
1994; see De Vries, 2000, 198). The assumption here is that a decentralised, 
participative form of organisation leads to increased effectiveness from both an 
organisational and employee perspective (Likert, 1967; Argryis, 1972). As 
Pennings (1976) notes: ‘Presumably a decentralized participative structure 
promotes satisfaction, feelings of security and self-control and leads to increased 
effort when it encourages employees to commit themselves to higher production 
goals’, hence higher morale (p.688). Decentralized institutions generate higher 
morale, more commitment and greater productivity….especially in organizations 
with knowledge workers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 253). 
The second assumption is that decentralisation empowers middle managers 
(Hales, 1999). This is clearly related to the first assumption but it is useful to 
identify as a separate impact. In his report on the management of the NHS Sir 
Roy Griffiths (DHSS, 1983) argued that managers should have freedom to 
manage with managerial autonomy to improve health services efficiency and 
effectiveness. Thus the distinction here is that not only does decentralisation 
bring improved morale and satisfaction but giving managers freedom can lead to 
improvements in organisational performance. 
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A third assumption that arises from decentralisation is about pay bargaining, with 
claims being made that local pay systems would lead to improved conditions for 
staff and help motivate staff, with better recruitment and retention, the ability to 
attract higher calibre staff and establish better conditions of employment 
(Thornley, 1998). 
Conversely the final assumption is that decentralised units lack capacity for 
managing human resources and have inadequate skills and managerial 
competence (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1999). De Vries (2000) has also noted that it 
may be more difficult to recruit skilled officials at a local level and recent events 
in the UK have suggested that there is a managerial skills shortage in PCTs 
leading to management mergers. 
5.7.3  Caveats 
A key problem in assessing improvements to staff morale and satisfaction is the 
being able to directly attribute any increase or decrease directly to 
decentralisation processes. Many writers note that organisational change often 
leads to a lowering of staff morale (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1999). Hales (1999) 
also suggests that decentralisation within an organisation, such as the NHS, may 
have problems as local staff and managers, in particular, are used to working 
within a rule-based hierarchy. The evidence base is also relatively weak as there 
are few studies that specifically examine issues of human resource management 
and decentralisation. The major focus of attention has been in relation to 
developing countries where circumstances are clearly different to the UK, as 
decentralisation often relates to physical relocation from the centre to the locality 
and issues of staff skills and management competencies are also very different 
(Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1999). The following sections draw on evidence that 
primarily relates to the UK and developed health care systems. 
5.7.4  Evidence that decentralisation promotes staff morale 
and satisfaction 
In his review of the impact of decentralisation on managerial behaviour Hales 
(1999) reports a number of claims that giving divisional/unit managers greater 
autonomy, challenge, variety, sense of contribution and feedback will enhance 
their job satisfaction and improve their morale. This concurs with the findings of 
Pennings (1976: 695) from a survey of staff in 40 local offices of a US brokerage 
firm that staff had higher morale in more autonomous units. Similarly Germain 
and Spears (1999), in a study examining management outside the public sector, 
argue that ‘Strategic decentralisation correlates with quality management 
because delegation over issues affecting the entire firm…creates a general work 
environment that empowers employees’ (p.386). More recently, in a review on 
organisational form and performance Sheaff et al. (2004a) conclude that 
decentralisation is linked to higher levels of involvement and commitment (van 
der Vlist, 1989; Elden, 1994; Spender and Grinyer, 1995; Perrone et al., 2003; 
Prince, 2003; Sheaff et al., 2004a) and that job satisfaction is increased. 
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Pennings (1976) suggested that these benefits are associated with participative, 
decentralised and autonomous organisations, arguing that these forms of 
organisation are most effective. In a study of three non-profit organisations in 
Israel, Schmid (2002) found that decentralised management is appropriate in 
organisations where structure and management are informal and professionalism 
is high. He found evidence of improved confidence, self-control and commitment 
(Schmid, 2002: 379). In a review of the literature on surgical teams Zetka 
(1998; quoted in Sheaff et al., 2004a) found some evidence that decentralisation 
to flexible teams increases worker empowerment and democracy. 
Studies of the NHS have shown that decentralisation of human resources 
management to trusts has led to changes in working times and shift patterns in 
local organisations: ‘Trusts were able to develop local initiatives over working 
time, in particular shift patterns, flexible working and part-time working, through 
collaboration of line managers, [human resources] and in direct consultation with 
staff’ (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002: 372). In a review of locality commissioning 
in the NHS in the 1990s Hudson (1999) found that decentralised commissioning 
at a locality level was associated with some improvement in morale. 
5.7.5  Evidence that decentralisation decreases staff morale 
and satisfaction 
However, there is also evidence to suggest that decentralisation has a negative 
impact on staff morale and satisfaction. Ahmad and Broussine (2003) found that 
UK NHS reforms are generating feelings of disempowerment and control among 
local staff and Greener (2004) has argued that changes in Labour health policy 
are likely to breed cynicism and disaffection among staff. More recently a study of 
one PCT found that increased autonomy is not always welcomed by staff 
(McDonald and Harrison, 2004). This reflects the finding of Bojke et al. (2001) 
that changes, in this case mergers, are likely to adversely affect staff morale and 
satisfaction. In his analysis of decentralisation in the UK public sector Hoggett 
(1996) concluded that changes have led to a high-output, low-commitment 
workforce. 
Whereas some studies have shown that local autonomy has increased staff 
morale and satisfaction, Simonis’ study of local government in the Netherlands 
(Simonis, 1995) found that some local governments are wary of greater 
autonomy. In his study of social work ManoNegrin (2004) reported that social 
work staff saw decentralisation as a response to or sign of poor management. 
Zetna (quoted in Sheaff et al., 2004a) also found that staff in teams often saw 
decentralisation ‘as a despotic extension of hierarchal control’. 
Finally, studies have clearly shown that decentralisation is not a sufficient 
indicator or determining criterion directly related to staff morale, satisfaction or 
the success or failure of human resources management in decentralised units. 
Arrowsmith and Sisson (2002) identify the importance of external factors, citing 
for example the case that very little localization of pay took place partly due to 
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limited financial reserves for transitional costs. Internal factors are also 
important, with managers’ background, training, experience, careers and the 
physical and technical demands of the work system combining to shape 
managers’ jobs regardless of its organisational context (Hales, 1999). 
Furthermore, local managers may be unwilling to use decentralised powers as 
they may be conditioned by former centralised regimes into acting in particular 
ways and not using their new autonomy (Hales, 1999). 
5.7.6  Conclusion: the balance of evidence 
As discussed in the introduction to this section there are a number of broader 
human resources management issues associated with decentralisation in addition 
to staff morale. There is very little on staff morale and motivation in the literature 
although there may be important relationships to other aspects of human 
resources management that require further research. 
The evidence to link decentralisation and improved staff morale is at best 
equivocal. The existing evidence suggests that there is a wide variety of factors 
that influence morale and motivation and that decentralisation may not be a 
single determining factor. A key problem is the complexity of transferring human 
resources. Bossert (1996) has argued that for decentralisation to work central 
officials must possess skills in policy-making and monitoring while local-level 
officials need operational and entrepreneurial skills. More importantly, as Anell 
(2000) has argued there is a need for motivation of the decentralised level and 
the capability to make decisions or take appropriate actions. It is pertinent to 
note that Anell’s study of Swedish councils found that delegation of responsibility 
often precedes the delegation of authority. 
A key problem identified by Sheaff et al. (2004a) is that decentralisation and 
centralisation occur simultaneously within the same organisation and therefore it 
is difficult to clearly identify specific outcomes of human resources management 
to decentralisation per se. 
Singh’s (1986) study on organizational performance suggests that 
decentralisation is positively related to good performance in that better 
performance means that there is generally less central control. In a decentralised 
organisation there is also more risk-taking as local staff have more autonomy. 
Conversely, poor performance is associated with increasing centralisation, less 
risk-taking and less autonomy. However, it is clear that internal and external 
environmental factors play an important part in the success or otherwise of 
achieving staff benefits in decentralised organisations (Hales, 1999; Arrowsmith 
and Sisson, 2002). Interestingly, as discussed in Section 5.3, decentralisation is 
seen to lead to an improvement in processes through its psychological impact 
upon staff morale (Klijn et al., 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Similar findings 
in the UK by Hudson (1999) suggest that there is a link but a clear problem is 
identifying which variable – decentralisation, processes or staff morale – is the 
independent one. 
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There was no specific evidence on the relationship between decentralisation and 
the adequacy of available information on human resources or the impact of 
professional associations, unions and registration bodies on the design and 
implementation of management structures and jobs in decentralised 
organisations. In the NHS the latter aspect is still dominated by a national pay 
structure and there is little evidence to demonstrate developments in local pay, 
although there is some evidence to suggest that human resources management 
may benefit from important bottom-up initiatives and this requires further 
research (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002). 
5.8  Responsiveness and allocative efficiency 
5.8.1  Introduction 
Responsiveness has been identified as a key outcome indicator for health care 
systems by the World Health Authority (De Silva, 2000; Gostin et al., 2003). This 
is not one perspective but links governance, stewardship and health services 
delivery, focusing on the extent to which health care systems meet the needs of 
those receiving health care. It is complex in that it addresses individual health 
needs and population health needs. As described in Section 5.3 there are eight 
dimensions to the WHO’s conceptualisation of responsiveness. Some of these 
areas have been discussed in relation to humanity (Section 5.5) and discussion 
here focuses on the following dimensions: 
• autonomy to participate in health-related decisions, 
• prompt attention, 
• clarity of communications to patients, 
• access to social support networks and family and community involvement, 
• choice of health care provider. 
Responsiveness also suggests, however, that health care systems are applying 
resources appropriately in accordance with need. In economic terms efficient 
allocation of health care is when the health care system is producing exactly the 
quantity and type of health care that society wants – in this sense being most 
responsive to the distribution of needs. Thus this section also examines the 
evidence in relation to allocative efficiency as a further dimension of 
responsiveness. There are also close links to issues of accountability, which are 
dealt with in Section 5.10. 
5.8.2  Assumptions 
Local responsiveness to the needs of local people is one of the key claims for 
decentralisation of public services. Derived from welfare economics and public 
choice theory, decentralisation is ‘ …better apt to take into account the different 
preferences of the community's members than are extremely unitary states with 
their systematically uniform approach’ (Frey, 1977). Tiebout (1956) suggested 
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that the most efficient allocation of public resources is attained if such services 
are provided (and paid for) by governments responsible to those most directly 
affected. 
Burns et al. (1994) argue that decentralisation will result in the improvement in 
the quality of public services with more sensitive service delivery and achieving a 
better distribution of resources through targeting resources to areas and groups 
in most need. This view is echoed by Saltman et al. (2003), who argue that 
decentralisation improves (allocative) efficiency as patient responsiveness and 
accountability improves – improved governance and public service delivery is 
achieved by increasing the allocative efficiency through better matching of public 
services to local preferences. The link between decentralisation and 
responsiveness has also been noted by Meads and Wild (2003) and is supported 
by De Vries (2000), who argues that decentralised organisations are more likely 
to reflect local preferences. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) also argue that they are 
far more flexible and can respond quickly to changing circumstances and 
customers’ needs and are far more innovative; innovation happens because good 
ideas bubble up from employees, who actually do the work and deal with the 
customers. 
These assumptions are also inherent in the Niskanen (1971) critique of monopoly 
public services, which are seen as inherently inefficient and producer-dominated 
and therefore need to be broken up to achieve efficiency gains but also to 
‘…break through…inflexibility and make services more responsive to users’ (Pollitt 
et al., 1998: 34). Seabright (1996) has argued that accountability increases 
responsiveness and overall performance (despite spillovers). Decentralisation is 
believed to stimulate innovation, initiative, experimentation and risk-taking 
(Hales, 1999). Similarly Kanter (1985; quoted in Hales, 1999) argued that there 
is a need to encourage innovation by dismantling bureaucratic constraints and 
empowering middle managers. It is also claimed that diversity encouraged by 
decentralisation offers incentive for innovation (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 5, 10). 
5.8.3  Caveats 
Previous research on the NHS suggests that both external and internal contexts 
affect the way organisations and those within them work (Pettigrew et al., 1992; 
Sheaff et al., 2004a). There is also a problem in identifying what local 
organisations or individual professionals are being responsive to. For example, 
there are tensions between responsiveness to individual consumer choices and 
wishes expressed by groups in local communities. Essentially we see here the 
tension between market and more community-based or collective approaches to 
health care that have characterised much recent debate about health policy in 
the UK (see Section 4). 
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5.8.4  Evidence that decentralisation promotes 
responsiveness 
In their review of organisational performance Sheaff et al. (2004a) did find 
evidence of increased adaptation and flexibility resulting from decentralisation, a 
finding also supported by Reed and Blunsdon (1998). Research from the 
devolution process in Spain also found increased innovation (Rico, 2000). In a 
study of the decentralisation of health service in New Zealand managers report 
increased accountability, commitment and innovation (Malcolm et al., 1994). 
Research in New Zealand and Sweden has suggested that decentralisation and 
fragmentation of services can lead to increased responsiveness to specific groups. 
In New Zealand Craig (2003) found that Maori providers were able to use the 
purchaser/provider split to channel funds into identity-based programmes. In 
Sweden the introduction of choice and number of providers into local public 
welfare services increased the stratification and cultural diversity of local services 
(Blomqvist, 2004). 
5.8.5  Evidence that decentralisation decreases 
responsiveness 
There is little evidence that diversity encouraged by decentralisation leads to 
innovation (Levaggi and Smith, 2004). Although it is claimed that diversity is 
encouraged by decentralisation and therefore offers an incentive for innovation 
there is scant evidence to support this hypothesis from health care in the USA 
(Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 5, 10). Furthermore, organisational coherence is 
reduced by decentralisation (Sheaff et al., 2004b). 
Decentralisation aimed to offer managerial autonomy and to be locally responsive 
but analysis of UK reforms found that local organizations have not been 
responsive to local populations because of a highly centralised state (Milewa et 
al., 1998). In fact Hales (1999) found that managers in decentralised agencies 
rarely develop innovative practice because of continued pressures, constraints 
and controls traditionally exerted from the centre. Similarly Deeming (2004) 
found that purchasers are locked into previous decisions and they have a fear of 
destabilising the local health economy by their decisions. In their study of 
decentralised firms Singh (1986) found that some organisations aim for 
satisficing levels of performance and that some organisations tend to respond to 
poor performance by centralisation. Finally, Moran’s (1994) review of health 
policy in the USA, UK, Scandinavia and Germany found that where institutional 
structures encourage innovation, cost inflation results. 
5.8.6  Conclusion: the balance of evidence 
The concept of increased responsiveness is perhaps central to the 
conceptualisation of decentralisation. Economic theories have identified 
decentralisation closely with allocative efficiency based on a strong link with fiscal 
theory (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972) and a specific approach to democracy. 
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However, local innovation is linked to free-riding but there is no evidence to 
suggest that decentralisation is more innovative than centralisation, or vice versa 
(Oates, 1999). The evidence seems to suggest that there will be increased 
responsiveness to patients and local communities. However, there is some room 
to question this positive finding as there is an assumption made about increased 
accountability. Studies show, for example, a link between increased 
accountability and responsiveness (e.g. Seabright, 1996) but do not necessarily 
demonstrate that there is increased accountability. There is then a paradox that 
centralisation and participation co-exist but that there is a tension between them. 
The crux is how power is shared between powerful interests and patients within 
the health care system (Quennell, 2001). 
Responsiveness does not therefore seem to be directly associated with 
decentralisation. Clearly some aspects of health care rely on some decentralised 
activities. For example, the autonomy of patients to participate in health-related 
decisions does require that the professionals they engage with are able to grant 
autonomy and respond to patients’ wishes. Thus, patient autonomy is predicated 
on professional autonomy. There are problems associated with this and there 
have been a number of debates surrounding, for example, the concept of patient-
centred care and the expert patient regarding the nature of autonomy (Little et 
al., 2001; Wilson, 2001). There is no evidence to link prompt attention to 
decentralisation. In fact, in the UK most shifts towards reducing waiting times 
have been centrally driven (Patient’s Charter, waiting-time initiatives, patient 
choice and book and choose), although there is some limited evidence that 
GPFHs in the 1990s made changes to the outpatient processes in local hospitals 
(Le Grand et al., 1998). Similarly the recent initiative regarding copying letters to 
patients was also centrally driven and other approaches to patient/clinician 
communication have been professionally led. Choice of provider is linked to 
issues of access and the availability of multiple providers. 92% of the English 
population live within 1 hour of two or more hospitals and most people have a 
choice GP practice. The development of additional providers is being driven 
centrally but this does suggest deconcentration of providers. Choice requires 
fragmentation of services and the Swedish experience in social care does suggest 
more responsiveness to specific groups of the population (Blomqvist, 2004). With 
regard to access to social support networks and family and community 
involvement this requires the availability of networks outside of the NHS. These 
are by nature more likely to be localized around neighbourhoods and 
communities rather than centralized. 
5.9  Adherence to performance targets and 
evidence-based protocols 
5.9.1  Introduction 
The notion of adherence to externally defined measures is intuitively at odds with 
the autonomy that decentralisation is supposed to confer upon local organisations 
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and individuals. However, if decentralisation retains a connection between the 
centre and locality, it is feasible that decentralised agents are incentivised to 
adhere to central performance targets and/or evidence-based protocols. This 
reinforces the under-current of centralisation that is inevitably associated with 
decentralisation (De Vries, 2000). 
Both targets and protocols are external performance controls upon the 
decentralised organisation. As such, they can be examined together. However, 
targets are likely to be organisationally or institutionally specific whereas 
evidence-based protocols are likely to be more generic. 
5.9.2  Assumptions 
The notion that decentralisation might improve/ensure adherence to targets is 
based upon an assumption that decentralisation introduces a stronger 
performance-management framework upon local agents. Hence, local 
organisations and individuals are held more accountable for their decisions. Smith 
(2002) identifies three facets of performance management: guidance, monitoring 
and enforcement. Each has elements of centralisation although the degree to 
which guidance becomes direction, monitoring becomes interference and 
enforcement becomes control is the crux of the decentralisation/centralisation 
balance. Bossert (1998) argues, for example, that decentralisation should be 
different from directed change. 
In terms of evidence-based protocols, decentralisation might improve adherence 
if it enhances trust and professional commitment to evidence-based practice. This 
might also be enhanced by a general improvement in morale (see Section 5.7). 
5.9.3  Caveats 
Adherence to performance targets assumes an effective ‘transmission belt’ 
between the centre and the locality which has not always been present in the 
NHS (Powell, 1997). In other words, there needs to be a mechanism which links 
those who steer and those who row. Klein and Day (1997) found that this 
separation was blurred in the Department of Health and NHS. Rowers (local 
health care organisations) were hampered in their task by direction from those 
supposed to be steering (the Department of Health). This account of 
‘interference’ is familiar in much of the literature (e.g. Exworthy et al., 2002; 
Ahmad and Broussine, 2003; Greener, 2004). 
Adherence is also based upon clear and powerful incentives which persuade local 
(decentralised) agents to adhere to clear performance targets. Often, such 
incentives are ill-defined, contradictory and/or not strong enough to effect the 
desired change. The internal market (1991–7) did not fully achieve its intended 
impacts partly because the incentives were insufficiently strong (Le Grand et al., 
1998; Le Grand, 2003). Limited local capacity might also explain the failure to 
adhere to performance targets; local organisations and individuals may thus lack 
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sufficient resources to bring about local service changes, advocated by the 
centre. 
In terms of adherence to evidence-based protocols, there is a large literature on 
why the practices of clinicians (and managers) are not always consistent with the 
evidence (e.g. see Davies et al., 2000; Walshe and Rundall, 2001). 
Professional/clinical autonomy is one explanation for such inconsistency. 
Decentralisation would have no (direct) impact upon adherence if clinical 
autonomy permitted ‘variations’ in practice. Such autonomy might also be 
dependent on the ways in which clinical governance is ‘managed’ by professional 
leaders (Gray and Harrison, 2004; Sheaff et al., 2002). This begs the question: 
to what extent are local variations permissible? Variations have recently become 
less tolerated as attention on health care inequalities has risen (Roche, 2004). It 
also seems to contradict one of the supposed benefits of decentralisation – that it 
promotes innovation and experimentation (Smith, 1980: 148; see also Section 
5.8). 
Caveats to both aspects of ‘adherence’ highlight the need for a clear framework 
within which decentralised agents operate. Without it, the ambiguity inherent 
within decentralisation becomes intolerable (Vancil, 1979). It also reinforces the 
notion that decentralisation and centralisation are inextricably linked. In short, 
decentralisation involves freedom within constraints. 
5.9.4  Evidence that decentralisation improves adherence 
The evidence for the notion that decentralisation improves adherence to 
performance targets and evidence-based protocols concerns the retention or 
redefinition of centralisation. Evidence suggests that this operates at institutional 
and individual levels. At an institutional level, the separation between 
policy/strategy and operations/practice (i.e. between steering and rowing) may 
be ‘impossible to maintain’ (Bromwich and Lapsley, 1997: 200). Bossert (1998) 
claims that central authorities manipulate decision space and shape (including the 
control of information), which might tighten performance control of decentralised 
organisations. 
At an individual level, Hales (1999) argues that decentralisation may not realise 
intended benefits because it: 
may engender great caution and adherence to known procedures rather than 
innovative…behaviour. 
(p.847) 
This may be due to poorly communicated messages from the centre, negotiated 
settlements between the centre and locality, strong incentives allowing little local 
autonomy or an aversion to risk on behalf of local managers. This last point is 
significant if local managers have become accustomed to central direction and 
control, and are wary of the new decentralised regime. Adherence may be 
achieved through the legacy of the former centralised system rather than 
decentralisation. 
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In terms of evidence-based protocols, decentralisation is often associated with 
greater autonomy, which can enhance trust. This trust is crucial when 
performance measurement is ambiguous and/or behaviour is unobserved, as 
often happens in the health care (Perrone et al., 2003). Schmid (2002) also 
argues that decentralisation is appropriate where the organisational structure and 
management are informal and where professionalism is high; this includes non-
profit voluntary and health care organisations. Bojke et al. (2001) argue that 
there is ‘no evidence that clinical governance benefits from scale economies’, 
rather ‘larger organisations encounter increased problems in sustaining 
professional commitment and involvement in quality improvements activities’ 
(p.600). Such commitment is critical in aiding adherence to evidence-based 
protocols. 
5.9.5  Evidence that decentralisation reduces adherence 
By granting autonomy, decentralisation might reduce the adherence to central 
performance targets as autonomy and central targets may not be compatible. 
However, decentralisation is often accompanied by measures of centralisation 
(partly to foster adherence). Evidence that decentralisation reduces adherence is 
relatively weak. 
Blom-Hansen (1999) found that guaranteed waiting times for hospital treatment 
in Scandinavian countries were associated with lower local autonomy. Regional 
variations in health service provision in New Zealand were not tackled partly 
because performance accountability was lacking (Barnett and Newberry, 2002). 
Moreover, Craig (2003) found that uneven local organisational capacity in New 
Zealand hindered development of decentralised organisations. In England, Dixon 
(2004) notes that the freedom (autonomy) of purchasers is ‘heavily restricted’ 
and the local capacity to deliver within these restrictions is ‘questionable’. She 
argues that the centre should be less ‘over-bearing, trust more and experiment’. 
This would seem to place less emphasis on central targets and local adherence to 
them. Hales (1999) offers theoretical evidence of how organisations in centralised 
systems learn to operate within the regulations, thereby affording them a degree 
of ‘de facto managerial freedom’ (p.847). This finding offers the prospect of 
adherence within some degree of autonomy. 
Decentralisation shifts the relationship between professionals/clinicians and 
managers. It is one means to increase (managerial) power over professionals. 
Exworthy (1994) found that community health nurses disputed the need for and 
legitimacy of local management. Subsequent developments have sought to foster 
management by professionals (rather than managers; Gray and Harrison, 2004). 
This accords with the notion that the routine, local practices of professionals 
become the de facto policy of the organisation despite central directives (Lipsky, 
1980). It also reflects the management of professional groups, often by (senior) 
professionals in clans and across networks (Bourn and Ezzamel, 1987; Ferlie and 
Pettigrew, 1996; Ferlie and McGivern, 2003; Sheaff et al., 2004a). 
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Given such discretionary behaviour, McDonald and Harrison (2004) question the 
extent to which autonomy can be exercised given ‘top-down directives’ (see also 
Deeming, 2004). They conclude that central control can be achieved through 
recognition of (professional) autonomy but especially by the ‘internalisation of 
central values’ which might reflect central performance targets and/or the tenets 
of evidence-based practice. They also note that this strategy is both more 
effective and less costly than direct control. 
Organisational change in the NHS has created larger primary care organisations 
which have established new internal systems of professional management (i.e. 
clinical governance; Sheaff et al., 2004a). These systems are, in part, designed 
to foster adherence to evidence-based protocols. They are, however, likely to 
reduce ‘professional engagement’ as they become more ‘centralised and 
hierarchical’ (Bojke et al., 2001: 601). 
5.9.6  Balance of evidence 
The emphasis of performance targets and evidence-based protocols in the NHS 
has been strong over the last few years. However, it appears that, in terms of the 
former, a subtle shift took place in 2004 with the demise of the ‘star rating’ 
system (Stevens, 2005). In terms of the latter, evolving systems of clinical 
governance have also subtle shifts whereby clinicians occupy lead positions, 
influencing colleagues to meet targets and to conform to evidence-based 
protocols. The extent to which clinical governance leads can maintain collegial 
identity with the rank-and-file colleagues will largely explain whether adherence 
in decentralised organisations (such as PCTs and foundation trusts) will improve 
or decline. 
The evidence reviewed here does not permit a definitive conclusion as to whether 
decentralisation permits or hinders adherence to performance targets and/or 
evidence-based protocols. It does, however, highlight that the answer depends 
crucially on the form of decentralisation implemented, the local organisation 
configuration (especially the balance of power between managers and 
professionals) and the historical legacy of the previous centralised regime. A 
significant aspect of the answer will be the template of centralisation (in systems, 
processes and attitudes) that remains despite an espoused policy of 
decentralisation. More specifically, it raises a question as to whether a 
compromise be found between market pressures and the centralization of 
performance targets while at the same time encouraging local learning networks 
(Ferlie and McGivern, 2003: 13). 
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5.10  Technical efficiency 
5.10.1  Introduction 
Technical or productive efficiency is defined as the production of goods and 
services using the lower-cost combination of inputs (Hurley et al., 1995: 4). 
Kleinman et al. (2002) state that technical efficiency refers to: 
…maximising outputs (ideally outcomes) per input. Improving technical efficiency is 
about reducing waste, duplication and poor management so as to maximise the 
productive potential of a given range of inputs. 
(p.17) 
Leese et al. (2001) offer another, simpler definition: 
Efficiency is broader and is concerned with both the costs (inputs) and benefits 
(outputs) of programmes. 
(p.174) 
However, Kelly (2003) argues that ‘Efficiency…lacks a precise definition’ (p.467) 
and is made more complicated in the context of ‘interpersonal public services’ 
(p.469). 
These definitions of efficiency are those most easily understandable and that 
relate directly to the categorisation of decentralisation (used in this study), viz. 
inputs, process and outcomes. As the inputs might involve any combination of 
material, financial or human resources, the potential technical efficiency deriving 
from decentralisation is likely to be manifest in various guises. This makes 
evaluation problematic. 
5.10.2  Assumptions 
Several assumptions underlie the assertion that decentralisation can improve 
technical efficiency of organisations and/or systems. First, there is a widespread 
assumption that centralisation in the public sector is often associated with 
negative aspects of bureaucracy such as unnecessary paperwork, impersonal and 
inappropriate use of resources (e.g. Gershberg, 1998: 407; Johnson, 2001: 523) 
and ‘unnecessary’ administrative tiers (Saltman et al., 2003: 2). In short, 
centralisation implies waste; therefore, decentralisation implies a more 
(technically) efficient use of resources. Decentralisation involves ‘local people, 
local provision, local services’ and is therefore ‘cheaper’ (De Vries, 2000: 198). A 
related aspect of this concerned the association of quality and efficiency; the 
former was the product of the latter (Arrowsmith and Mossé, 2000: 287). 
Technical and allocative efficiencies would thus be aligned. 
A second and related assumption concerns the ‘better’ performance of smaller 
organisations (e.g. see Bojke et al., 2001). By being closer to the communities 
they serve, smaller organisations are not only more responsive (see Section 5.6) 
but also are less hierarchical, and have shorter lines of accountability and fewer 
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overheads. Decentralised organisations have fewer tiers of bureaucracy and a 
better of knowledge of inputs (Saltman et al., 2003: 2). Decentralised 
organisations may be better able to identify and tackle inefficiencies (Coulson, 
1999; Levaggi and Smith, 2004). There is thus greater local ‘cost consciousness’ 
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002: 14). These aspects are also associated with the 
third assumption: that decentralisation fosters greater experimentation and 
innovation (e.g. Oates, 1972). Local staff cannot only be more attentive to the 
mix of local inputs but they can also apply lessons from experimentation 
elsewhere. They can thus ‘learn from diversity’ (De Vries, 2000: 197) and apply 
lower-cost techniques. 
5.10.3  Caveats 
These assumptions are subject to several caveats. For example, smaller 
organisations may not necessarily derive technical efficiencies from 
decentralisation. By duplicating services in each decentralised organisation, such 
efficiency might be impaired. Moreover, organisational scale and size may not be 
dominant influences upon organisational performance. Equally, smaller, 
decentralised organisations may be unable or unwilling to exert the same 
efficiency controls that centralised systems can. Finally, unless effective 
processes of policy learning/transfer are in place, local services may lose the 
benefit of comparative advantage that can be derived from cheaper locations 
elsewhere. 
Another set of caveats concerns the motivation and willingness of managers in 
decentralised organisations. Unless supported by effective incentives, local 
managers may not be inclined to seek out the lowest cost combination of inputs. 
(Hales, 1999). Furthermore, decentralised organisations may have limited 
managerial capacity to ensure that technical efficiency is realised. 
Decentralisation creates a number of external (‘spill-over’) effects. One such 
effect is the ‘free-rider’, whereby organisations enjoy benefits without incurring 
associated costs. Another is the ‘tragedy of the commons’ whereby resources are 
employed excessively to the point of dis-benefit (De Vries, 2000: 199). 
Decentralisation may also foster the over-provision of services in the form of 
duplication (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 13); this is sometimes referred to as 
‘producer capture’ and is thought to be especially prevalent in professionalised, 
expert services. 
As cited elsewhere in this report, the lack of information hampers any robust 
debate about the impact of decentralisation upon technical efficiency, especially 
in a comparative dimension: 
This lack of information and analysis is most striking with respect to the effects of 
decentralization reforms on efficiency and financial soundness of the health 
system. 
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002:.26) 
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This point is supported by the World Bank (2004; see 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/) and Kleinman et al. (2002). 
The latter argue that even at the level of technical efficiency, there are problems: 
…the evidence is currently inadequate to distinguish managerial inefficiency from 
the sheer difficulty of the task of providing services in cities. 
(Kleinman et al., 2002: 17) 
Finally, by nature of the definition, efficiency measures are mainly concerned with 
(the lowest-cost combination of) inputs. This is inevitably a limited and partial 
view of organisational effectiveness. For example, technical efficiency is not 
necessarily connected to notions of accountability (Hurley et al., 1995: 9). Also, 
the assumed link between decentralisation and technical efficiency presumes that 
the former has created an ‘institutional environment’ which generates sufficient 
‘levels of political, administrative and financial authority’ (Saltman et al., 2003: 
2; quoting World Bank, 1997). 
5.10.4  Evidence that decentralisation improves technical 
efficiency 
Evidence in support of the claim that decentralisation improves technical 
efficiency consists of positive support for decentralisation and a negative reaction 
against centralisation. For example, Malcolm and Barnett (1995) claim that 
decentralised organisations seemed to achieve increased efficiency and 
accountability while Moreno (2003) claims that ‘central state apparatuses are 
often clumsy and inefficient’ (p.279). Some of these claims distinguish between 
national contexts. For example, Bankauskaite et al. (2004) cite ‘high technical 
efficiency’ in decentralised Nordic countries while Johnson (2001) argues that 
‘systems of local governance’ in developing countries have been shown to 
improve the efficiency..of public officials’ (p.527). Evidence in support of these 
claims can be grouped into three main themes. 
Lower costs 
Manor (1999) claims that lower transaction costs were among the efficiency gains 
associated with decentralization. Sheaff et al. (2004a) cites evidence that 
organizational efficiency is associated with lower costs of care. Much of the 
evidence for such efficiency gains is derived from the private sector; for example, 
Young and Gould (1993; quoted in Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996) found that over 
50% of private companies involved in decentralisation (in the form of ‘down-
sizing’ corporate headquarters) were doing so in order to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency. Others refine this general point by noting the efficiency gains 
of decentralization achieved by ‘limiting the leakage of funds and other resources’ 
(Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1999; Saltman et al., 2003: 8). Additionally, Lomas (1997) 
argues that efficiency gains might only be expected while there is ‘still slack in 
the system’ (p.817). However, transaction costs are not likely to be ‘materially 
higher under decentralisation’ (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 15). 
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Related to cost reduction is the notion that variations in costs are associated with 
efficiency gains. Hurley et al. (1995) argue that the ‘gain in technical efficiency is 
directly proportional with the degree of variation in production-relevant local 
conditions’ (p.10). Variations in knowledge about costs might also be a 
justification for decentralisation by virtue of the ‘better knowledge of local 
governments about the efficiency of local providers’ (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 
11). Indeed, the argument may be applied to ‘smaller’ organisations in general. 
The case of the GP fundholding scheme provides some support for this. In 
reviewing the evidence on commissioning, Peckham and Exworthy (2003) found 
that, while it was difficult to attribute efficiency gains to health authority 
commissioning decisions, GPFHs did achieve some efficiency gains: 
The technical efficiency of GPFHs can be gauged by considering, for example, 
prescribing…. Evidence points towards a lower rate of increase in prescribing costs 
among GPFHs than among non-GPFHs, at least in the first few years of the GPFH 
scheme. Whereas increases were evident in both groups, the Audit Commission 
(1995) concluded that differences were only statistically significant in the 
first-wave GPFHs. 
Peckham and Exworthy (2003: 146) 
Markets and competition 
Efficiency gains are claimed from the separation of purchaser and provider 
functions through market-style relations (e.g. Litwinenko and Cooper, 1994; 
Bromwich and Lapsley, 1997; Bossert, 1998). Such claims have also been applied 
to the NHS; for example (see also Arrowsmith and Mossé, 2000: 289): 
In the current NHS, competition has been seen as a driving principle, perceived as 
the route to efficiency and effectiveness. 
(Kessler and Dopson, 1998: 62) 
Efficiency is derived from greater experimentation and innovation (Rubio and 
Smith, 2004). This follows the Tiebout (1956) mode whereby ‘under certain 
circumstances, competition between jurisdictions supplying rival combinations of 
local public goods would lead to an efficient supply of such goods’ (Seabright, 
1996: 62). 
Examples of claims of efficiency gains have been in terms of market testing and 
contracting out. Banner (2002) claims that ‘the most single important measure 
for increasing efficiency is market testing. It leads to a drop in prices…’ (p.224). 
However, Banner cautions that a market orientation may overlook quality in 
favour of price. Equally, some client groups may demand ‘maximum quality 
(frequently synonymous with maximum cost)’ (ibid: 224). This could, Banner 
claims, lead to deterioration in quality. 
In the NHS, the internal market system (1991–7) has been associated with 
increased patient throughput and reduced length of stay. Finished consultant 
episodes increased by 29% between 1991 and 1995 and length of stay decreased 
from 11 to 8 days over the same period (Peckham and Exworthy, 2003: 145). In 
the more recent NHS context, Dixon (2004) claims that the fixed national tariff is 
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an incentive to providers to examine their own organisational efficiency and to 
compete with other providers on the basis of quality rather than price (p.970). 
Organisational size 
A major debate linking decentralisation and efficiency concerns the optimal 
organisational size for specific functions. It is complicated by the multiple 
functions that organisations undertake, the technology enabling them to execute 
these functions, notions of political control and subsidiarity (Sass, 1995; Tester, 
1994). The debate has assumed particular relevance in recent years in the NHS 
given the interest in organisational mergers (e.g. Bojke et al., 2001; Fulop et al., 
2002; Walshe et al., 2004). 
In support of smaller organisational size, Bojke et al. (2001) claim that mergers 
often fail to deliver their anticipated benefits because organisations suffer from 
adequate infrastructure and skilled managers. Walshe et al. (2004) support this 
notion. Bojke et al. (2001) argue that (primary care) organisations with more 
than 100 000 patients may not generate improved performance. They claim that 
there is no ‘good evidence’ that mergers work because there is no single optimal 
size for organisations. Further evidence that mergers will bring efficiency gains 
comes from Australia; Drummond (2002) argues that the search for cost savings 
through organisational mergers is ‘misguided’ partly because central government 
(state and federal levels) is more inefficient and unlikely to yield better cost 
savings: 
Australia’s large federal units provide many public goods and services less 
efficiently than could be achieved through a country-wide agreement and are much 
too large to achieve scale economies in the provision of sub-national public goods 
and services. 
(Drummond, 2002: 53) 
By contrast, in Italy, regional cost-sharing in health care contributed to lower 
levels of public expenditure (Bankauskaite et al., 2004). Petretto (2000) argues 
that the decentralisation of financial responsibility to lower administrative tiers 
also brings about improved financial responsibility from these organisations 
(p.217). 
Evidence for the performance of smaller organisations is somewhat mixed and 
varies according to the criteria used and the services delivered. Boyne (1996) 
shows how perceptions have changed relating to organisational size: 
The Local Government Commission analysis suggested scale economies were 
possible up to one million population and diseconomies above one million. By 1995, 
the Local Government Commissions reached the view that, on the whole, larger 
authorities did not perform better. 
(p.55) 
Boyne (1996) concludes that improved performance of local authorities is linked 
to organisational scale in non-metropolitan areas but the evidence was equivocal. 
Smaller authorities tended to perform better in housing and planning services 
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whereas larger authorities tended to perform better in refuse-collection services. 
He warns that valid measures of scale and performance are essential to such 
analyses. 
Such evidence on performance may be explained by informational asymmetries 
between local and central governments. Gilbert and Pichard (1996) argue that 
‘smaller local governments have an informational advantage concerning public 
goods’ production costs and the central government has imperfect information on 
spillover effects induced by local projects’ (p.19). They conclude that the optimal 
balance is a ‘compromise between small jurisdictions so as to benefit from the 
geographical proximity effect on information and large entities in which spillover 
effects are more easily internalized by means of linear or non-linear taxation 
schemes implemented by the Centre’ (ibid: 19). 
5.10.5  Evidence that decentralisation hampers technical 
efficiency 
The notion that decentralisation hampers technical efficiency is refuted by other 
evidence (e.g. Reich, 2002). The same themes used in support of the assertion 
can also be used to counter those arguments. 
Higher costs 
Scale economies limit the benefit of decentralisation (Andrews and Schroeder, 
2003); a centralised structure may therefore be more efficient (Schmid, 2002: 
379). Whereas decentralisation does shift responsibility to lower administrative 
tiers, it does not necessarily generate cost savings (Esping-Anderson, 2000). 
Van der Laan (1983) found that fiscal centralisation is associated with lower 
levels of health care expenditure although the federal-unitary status of 
government had no impact on such spending. This assertion is supported by 
empirical evidence from India where Varatharajan et al. (2004) found that local 
government allocated lower levels of funding to primary health care than central 
government and concluded that ‘decentralisation brought no significant change to 
the health sector.’ Also, Spain encountered cost-containment problems under 
devolution (Rico, 2000). In France, tighter financial control has been used to 
increase efficiency (Arrowsmith and Mossé, 2000: 287), an approach similar to 
the UK, according to McEldowney (2003: 70). Luft (1985) argues that 
regionalisation of health care provision (here, implying a degree of centralisation) 
may contain costs (although it increases travel costs). Furthermore, central 
financial allocations to decentralised organisations incur inter-jurisdictional 
conflicts, the degree of which varies by the amount of spill-over and local 
preferences, according to Besley and Coate (2003). In summary, Kelly (2003) 
concludes that: 
…only exceptionally are the promised efficiency expectations fulfilled, a situation 
precipitated by factors such as overestimation of available savings and the costs of 
reorganization and rationalization. 
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(p.468) 
Markets and competition 
The shift from hierarchical and/or network-based structures to market-based 
structures has been identified with a ‘fall in efficiency’ (Iliffe and Munro, 2000: 
318). Decentralisation may not ‘always be efficient, especially for…network-based 
services’ as it can lead to a loss of scale economies and control over scarce 
financial resources (see www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/). The 
variable levels of managerial or technical capacity may further reduce efficiency. 
Equally, institutional structures (such as markets) which foster innovation tend to 
result in cost inflation (Moran, 1994). Greener (2004) also identified the 
fragmentation of decision-making and distortion of priorities despite the aim of 
improving efficiency (p.305–306). Thus, even with market-style incentives, 
organisations may not necessarily search for efficiency but rather legitimacy 
(Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996). 
Organisational size 
Bojke et al. (2001) and Walshe et al. (2004) conclude that the size (of primary 
care organisations) is only one factor in shaping their performance. Perceptions 
that organisations are too small to be effective or efficient has, however, driven 
the push towards organisational mergers in the UK and elsewhere (e.g. Sweden; 
Anell, 2000). 
Recognising the potential benefits of scale economies, some decentralised 
functions do not generate improved efficiency. Kleinman et al. (2002) identify 
‘limited evidence of improved efficiency from local tax-rising powers (as opposed 
to central grants).’ Also, Travers et al. (1993) claim that: 
It is not possible to say that larger [local] authorities perform better than smaller or 
smaller authorities perform better than larger even in one specified services. 
(quoted in Boyne, 1996: 56) 
Optimal size varies with function but organisations conduct multiple functions, 
therefore making any organisational size a compromise between competing 
‘optimalities’; for this reason, De Vries (2000) notes the ‘fantasy’ of optimal size. 
Kleinman et al. (2002) offer a different perspective by highlighting the 
disjuncture between ‘the most efficient spatial scale in relation to economic 
activity’ and the spatial scale at which citizens vote (e.g. constituency or council; 
p.26). 
5.10.6  Conclusion: the balance of evidence 
Oates (1999) argues that ‘there is not much evidence on the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic performance’ at macro-economic 
level. (The World Bank (see www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/, 
p.9) qualifies this conclusion by arguing that the design of decentralisation 
policies is crucial to determining their impact on technical efficiency.) However, at 
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the macro level, there are strong efficiency (and equity) justifications for 
financing (collection and expenditure) health care through centralised systems 
(e.g. King’s Fund, 2002; Wanless, 2004). Nonetheless, the weight of evidence 
(such as it is) does tend to point towards decentralisation offering some gain in 
technical or productive efficiency at organisational levels. 
Improvements in technical efficiency have been reported in various contexts 
(World Bank, 1993; quoted in Varatharajan et al., 2004: 48) but equally, poorly 
designed policies may compromise any efficiency gains. Technical efficiency has 
become a key criterion for the NHS and other public organisations. It has, for 
example, set the parameters of ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’; efficiency has 
become the ‘ground for central intervention’ in ‘failing schools’, for example 
(McEldowney, 2003: 81). 
5.11  Accountability 
5.11.1  Introduction 
As discussed in earlier sections on humanity (Section 5.5) and responsiveness 
(Section 5.8) there is thought to be a strong relationship between 
decentralisation and how the decentralised agency or, in many cases the 
professional with decentralised responsibility, relates to their local constituency 
(whether community, patients or individual service user). So far we have 
examined notions of humanity and responsiveness. In this section we examine 
issues of accountability. Accountability is conceptualised in two forms: 
• accountability to – to be held to account to another for actions taken; 
• visibility or openness – to be seen as open to scrutiny by others. 
Both types of accountability are relevant to the NHS but it is more relevant to 
conceptualise the NHS as consisting of a number of accountabilities (Lupton et 
al., 1998). Klein (2003a), in discussing accountability arrangements for 
foundation trusts, for example, states: 
In the first place, foundation trusts will be accountable to the newly created 
independent regulator who will license them, monitor them, decide what services 
they should provide, and if necessary dissolve them. In the process, the regulator 
will be able to impose additional requirements on the trusts, remove members of 
the management board, and order new elections. The regulator will also determine 
the limits of the trust’s capital spending and will be informed by the reviews 
carried out by the new Commission for Health Audit and Inspection. Foundation 
trusts will also have to answer to the overview and scrutiny committee of the local 
authority (which may interpret the wishes of the local population rather differently). 
Finally, foundation trusts will be accountable to PCTs (who may have yet another, 
yet again different view about the local population’s needs) for fulfilling contracts. 
(Klein, 2003a: 175) 
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5.11.2  Assumptions 
Within current debates about decentralisation there is a strong assumption that it 
will lead to more accountable organisations. De Vries has argued that it enhances 
civic participation, neutralises entrenched local elites and increases political 
stability (De Vries, 2000: 197). Much of the literature on public sector 
decentralisation places a strong emphasis on the link between increasing 
democracy and decentralisation, especially as it relates to local government 
(Burns et al., 1994). Being closer to the public makes agencies more conscious of 
their responsibility to and relationship with local communities (Hambleton et al., 
1996). With respect to health decentralisation has been seen as a way of 
promoting democracy and accountability to the local population (Bossert, 1998; 
Meads and Wild, 2003). The central assumption is that decentralisation enables 
the local performance of agents to be easily identified and thus enable greater 
accountability. 
Accountability has also been linked by some writers to performance. 
Accountability mechanisms are critical to improving efficiency (Hurley et al., 
1995). Accountability is poorly defined but is closely related to allocative 
efficiency (Levaggi and Smith, 2004: 5). However, others have argued that 
seeking legitimacy is better than searching for the most efficient geographical 
unit (Mulgan and 6, 1996) and accountability is wider than simple allocative 
efficiency, especially in terms of both being held to account and openness. Thus a 
focus on the accountability, democratic and participative mechanisms is more 
useful. 
5.11.3  Caveats 
There are, however, problems relating to the relationship between 
decentralisation and accountability. First the relevance of democracy to the NHS 
is limited, although recent debates about foundation trusts have raised issues 
about what the appropriate balance between representative and direct democracy 
should be. De Vries has pointed out that turnout is lower in local elections (De 
Vries, 2000: 200) and elections for Centres locaux de services communautaires 
(Quebec Community Health Councils) also had a low turnout, averaging 13% 
(Abelson and Eyles, 2002). 
Second, there is a need to explore inter-relations between dimensions of 
accountability (Gershberg, 1998). Accountability in health care is complex, with 
many accountabilities (Klein, 2003a). Accountability needs to more clearly 
defined in terms of accountability for what and to whom. There is a need to 
balance accountability and autonomy: autonomy to overcome interests but 
accountability to public. A certain degree of re-centralisation may be needed 
(Johnson, 2001). 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 116 
5.11.4  Evidence that decentralisation promotes 
accountability 
In their study of the devolution arrangements in the UK Ezzamel et al. (2004) 
found that devolution is associated with more openness, transparency, 
consultation and scrutiny regarding budgets. In health New Zealand has possibly 
moved further than other countries in decentralisation, accountability and 
integrated systems due to the creation of area boards rather than from market 
reforms (Malcolm, 1993). Craig (2003) has suggested that common 
accountability platforms in New Zealand involve agreements between local 
providers and central government (including measurable service outcomes). 
Managers in New Zealand report increased accountability, commitment and 
innovation (Malcolm et al., 1994) and decentralised organisations seemed to 
achieve increased efficiency and accountability (Malcolm and Barnett, 1995). 
In their study of decentralisation in the UK Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996) found that 
greater decentralisation was balanced by tighter (central) accountability in HQ 
reforms. Thus whereas decentralisation is associated with greater accountability 
this may not necessarily mean local accountability. However, Ashburner and 
Cairncross (1992, 1993) found that local board representatives were more likely 
to feel that some accountability to the local community was necessary. 
5.11.5  Evidence that decentralisation decreases 
accountability 
In his study of Norwegian health service decentralisation Elstad (1990) concluded 
that decentralisation does not necessarily lead to more democracy. In fact 
Fattore (2000) argues that there has been a traditional lack of accountability. A 
greater role for the centre regarding accountability and comprehensive care is 
required. With decentralisation there are problems of co-ordination, 
accountability and control in diversified/multi-divisional organisations (Hill and 
Pickering, 1986). In New Zealand decentralisation was accompanied by 
monitoring, performance management and accountancy control. This link raises 
questions about the link between decentralisation and performance and 
uncertainties exist in both upwards accountability to funders and downwards 
accountability to electors (Jacobs, 1997; Craig, 2003). 
5.11.6  Conclusion: the balance of evidence 
The evidence relating to the extent to which accountability is increased through 
decentralisation is mixed. In fact there is evidence of dual trends – centralisation 
and decentralisation and therefore the impact on accountability is uncertain 
(Wistow, 1997). Clearly the complex nature of accountabilities in health care 
makes a simple assessment of accountability limited. There is little research that 
examines the relationship explicitly between accountability and decentralisation 
and what information does exist uses a simplistic approach to the analysis of 
decentralisation. On balance decentralisation is likely to further increase the 
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complexity of accountability as it increases the number of accountability 
relationships. More research is needed on the relative weights and benefits of 
different forms of central and local accountabilities. The tension between central 
performance measures and local participation is perhaps best summed up by 
Abrahamson (1977: 208): ‘It is hard to deny that centralisation, concentration of 
resources, increasing expert functions very often leads to gains in efficiency. But 
the ethos behind participatory democracy is to ask “whose efficiency” or if we are 
to consider efficiency always presupposes an outcome “whose outcome”?’ 
5.12  Conclusion 
The SDO and additional criteria do offer a reasonably comprehensive assessment 
of the impact of decentralisation. However, a number of problems have been 
identified relating to the coverage of the literature and how far it is possible to 
assess the balance of evidence that supports the assumptions made about the 
effects of decentralisation on organisational performance. In addition, having 
completed the analysis, it has become apparent that other criteria could 
potentially have been included, such as participation and quality (user and 
technical). Furthermore, some criteria are defined too narrowly (for example, 
staff morale) or too vaguely (for example, humanity). 
As identified at the beginning of the section the review identifies the fact that the 
performance criteria are not discrete and there are substantive overlaps between 
the different criteria. The review of evidence confirms that some of the studies 
identified use one performance criterion as a variable to measure another. This 
raises questions about the strength and quality of the evidence. In addition, the 
review demonstrates that the balance of evidence is often equivocal at best or 
does not provide any real conclusion. These issues are addressed in the next 
section, which examines the application of the evidence to the NHS in England. 
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Section 6  Understanding and interpreting the 
evidence 
6.1  Relevance of the evidence to English health 
care organisations 
In this section we synthesise the review of the evidence, taking into account the 
relevance of the evidence to English health care organisations. The discussion 
takes into account the need to address key questions about the link between 
decentralisation and organisational relations and performance within the English 
health care system. Of particular concern here is the extent to which the 
empirical evidence is transferable to the UK NHS. 
Context is seen as highly relevant to the identification of effective interventions 
and there is a clear view in the policy-implementation and -evaluation literature 
that any intervention is likely to be context-specific, limiting its relevance to other 
contexts and thus its transferability (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Rogers, 1995; 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Dolowitz et al., 2000). Context here is defined in terms 
of temporal, spatial and institutional dimensions. The review of the extant 
literature in the previous section includes a wide range of studies including those 
on local government, health care and the private sector, and also examines 
decentralisation in a wide range of countries. Therefore, evidence is filtered 
through a hierarchy of contexts relating to where the evidence comes from (UK, 
developed country, developing country), the area of activity (unified health care 
system, social insurance system, mixed model, local government, etc.) and when 
the study was undertaken (more recent is more relevant than older studies). The 
most relevant evidence would be recent studies of the NHS in England whereas 
weaker evidence refers to studies from non-health contexts, other countries or 
older studies. In particular, as discussed in Section 2, the English NHS is an 
administrative structure with funding determined centrally so that while authority 
can be shifted between levels political control is retained centrally. 
There is little explicit evidence that relates to the UK health care context. Much of 
the evidence on outcomes relates to developing countries and relates to activities 
that are on the whole already decentralised in the UK – family planning, child and 
welfare services, immunisation, etc. Table 10 (at the end of this section) 
summarises the relevance of the evidence to the UK. 
In order to highlight aspects of the relevance to English health care organisations 
to each of the performance criteria the following sections summarise the main 
points from the review in Section 5. 
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6.2  Outcomes (for patients/health outcomes) 
The evidence on the link between health outcomes and decentralisation is weak. 
The main area of theory that underpins a positive association between outcomes 
and decentralisation is fiscal federalism. As discussed elsewhere this has little 
relevance to English health care as budgets are set centrally and although 
resources are allocated to purchasers on a per-capita basis there is no 
opportunity for local purchasers to raise revenue locally. However, the incentives 
associated with cost savings rather than just revenue raising are significant to 
health care organisations. For example, GPFHs were able to retain some of their 
unplanned savings, thereby affecting their autonomy. In addition, most evidence 
of outcomes is predominantly located in developing countries and, therefore, of 
little direct relevance to the UK. One recent study in Canada (Rubio and Smith, 
2004) does link decentralisation positively to improved infant-mortality 
outcomes. However, the relevance of this to the UK is limited given the differing 
fiscal and child welfare service arrangements between the two countries. The UK 
is more fiscally centralised than Canada, where Provinces have some fiscal 
leeway and child welfare services in the UK are already more decentralised, 
organised around GP practices and community services than their counterparts in 
Canada. In fact many of the benefits in terms of outcomes associated with 
decentralisation in developing countries refer to services that in the UK we would 
see as already at a very localised level (e.g. immunisation). Thus, can a 
centralised funding system be reconciled with decentralisation of (public or 
private) provision? 
6.3  Process measures 
There a number of key assumptions that link decentralisation to improvements 
and benefits in process, including co-ordination, accountability, responsibility and 
cost. Game theory and organisation theory (network model) provide some 
support for the assumptions of improved co-ordination and communication. 
However, there is a lack of any real definitive empirical evidence to support the 
key assumptions that have been made. In particular there is a continuing debate 
between the scope for economies of scale vis-à-vis responsiveness. There is 
some UK literature that has specifically addressed health care purchasing warning 
that decentralisation can lead to duplication (Le Grand et al., 1998). In local 
government studies have suggested that performance improves with scale but 
there is also a body of literature stating there can be no optimal size for making 
specific decisions or undertaking functions (De Vries, 2000) and Atkinson (1995) 
concluded that decentralisation does not make any difference to performance. 
6.4  Humanity 
The concept of humanity lacks clarity when applied to health care services and 
performance. The concept is closely linked to responsiveness but perhaps focuses 
more on issues of respect, autonomy, confidentiality, promptness, adequacy and 
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clear communication. In the NHS this relates to well being of the 
patients/population served in terms of how they are treated and the relationship 
organisations have with their local communities/patients. In this respect 
decentralised agencies are seen as being closer to the populations/patients they 
serve. There is some limited evidence from the UK that local boards feel more 
responsible to their local populations. However, the participation literature 
identifies the dangers of local agendas being dominated by groups with more 
resources and some people may, therefore, be excluded. There is good evidence 
to conclude that closer patient partnerships improve outcomes and the Expert 
Patient programme is predicated on the assumption that people with long-term 
chronic conditions can take more control over their own care. However, whereas 
studies in the States support the notion of self care there have been questions 
raised about the nature and delivery of the programme in the UK (Wilson, 2001). 
6.5  Responsiveness (including allocative efficiency) 
There is a strong assumption that decentralisation will improve allocative 
efficiency. The theoretical approaches associated most closely with this 
assumption are welfare economics and public choice theory. There are a number 
of studies that relate to this area and some that are specifically UK-based or 
relate to other Western European countries, so their relevance is strong. Studies 
of decentralisation in local government in the UK have suggested that 
decentralisation results in an improvement in the quality of public services 
achieving a better distribution of resources (Burns et al., 1994; Hambleton et al., 
1996). In their review of health care systems and decentralisation Saltman et al. 
(2003) argue that decentralisation increases allocative efficiency as services are 
more responsive and accountable to patients. There is also a link to the literature 
suggesting that decentralised agencies are more innovative (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Levaggi and Smith, 2004). However, as Seabright (1996) has 
argued, while there is a link between increased accountability and 
decentralisation this does not demonstrate that increased accountability will 
necessarily result/be achieved. In addition there is no evidence to show that 
decentralisation is more innovative than centralisation. The evidence on this is 
mixed. Also, if innovations are linked to decentralisation, it is important to have a 
mechanism to aid policy transfer and learning. In fact Walker (2004) has argued 
that many innovations are centrally driven. There is some limited UK evidence 
that decentralisation led to improved patient outcomes with respect to GP 
fundholding in the 1990s (Le Grand et al., 1998) but many current innovations in 
health service delivery are centrally driven (see Section 4). There may also be 
some evidence to support the view that fragmentation of services may lead to 
more responsive services for specific groups in the community (Blomqvist, 2004). 
However, these gains may need to be balanced against other measures of 
performance such as economies of scale and equity. 
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6.6  Staff morale/satisfaction 
There has always been a strong relationship between decentralisation and human 
resource management. In particular, decentralisation has been associated with 
innovative management and freedoms in approaches to human resource 
management, increased staff morale and staff satisfaction (Argryis, 1972; 
Pennings, 1976; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Thornley, 1998). However, there is 
little empirical evidence to support these claims. The evidence that exists is also 
contradictory, in that organisational change has been shown to lower staff morale 
and that managers do not significantly change their behaviour simply through 
organisational change (Hales, 1999; Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1999). There is little 
empirical evidence that directly relates to health care in developed countries 
although studies of the private and non-profit sectors do show increased 
satisfaction and morale in professional decentralised organisations (Pennings, 
1976; Schmid, 2002; Sheaff et al., 2004a). Studies of the NHS in the UK have 
tended to focus on pay bargaining and there is no evidence to show that this is 
improved through decentralisation; there may be other benefits in decentralised 
health care organisations, but these require further research (Arrowsmith and 
Sisson, 2002). However, studies of the NHS suggest that it is likely that internal 
and external environmental factors may play a more important role than 
decentralisation per se (Hales, 1999; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002). However, 
Arrowsmith and Sisson suggest that there may be bottom-up benefits in terms of 
the local organisation of human resources management but that this requires 
further research. 
6.7  Equity 
Decentralisation can either increase equity by better meeting the needs of 
different groups (vertical equity) or reduce equity by creating differences 
between groups in equal need (horizontal equity). Fiscal federalism theory 
supports the view that decentralisation can provide a better distribution of 
resources that meet local needs. However, much depends on where the goal of 
equity is pursued (centrally or locally) and also on what sort of equity is sought 
(spatial, class, age, gender, etc.). Empirical evidence to demonstrate the impact 
of decentralisation on equity is scarce and a key problem is that few studies 
distinguish between different forms of equity. Research on regionalisation in 
Spain found little conclusive evidence that decentralisation had either a negative 
or positive effect on equity, while in Italy and New Zealand the evidence 
suggested a widening of inequalities and Switzerland, the most de-concentrated 
health care system in Europe, is currently struggling with the worst disparities in 
service distribution. There are few UK studies but research on fundholding in the 
UK suggested that this led to some inequalities in access. Therefore most 
evidence seems to imply that decentralisation will lead to inequity at the inter-
area level (though it may assist intra-area equity via improved responsiveness). 
This is of particular relevance to UK important given the NHS emphasis on equity 
and fairness and concerns about a postcode lottery. 
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6.8  Efficiency (technical/productive) 
Two assumptions link decentralisation to increased technical efficiency. The first 
is that large, centralised bureaucracies are wasteful and the second is that small 
organisations perform better as they are closer to the communities they serve. 
Public choice theories point to a number of problems with these assumptions 
including, spill-over effects, duplication and excessive employment of resources. 
In addition it is not clear that scale and size have any influence on organisational 
performance (Sheaff et al., 2004a). There is some evidence from the private 
sector, health care systems in Europe, North America and the UK that 
decentralisation may help reduce costs both as a result of better resource use 
and where competition arises. However, these gains need to be set against lack 
of economies of scale and transaction costs. The empirical evidence regarding 
size of organisation and performance is equivocal, with contradictory findings 
from local government in the UK. In relation to health care, studies in the UK 
suggest that size is only one of a number of factors that shape performance. This 
is a strong theme in the decentralisation literature. The evidence does indicate 
some gain in technical efficiency from decentralisation in different contexts. There 
is, however, mixed evidence on whether decentralisation increases or decreases 
costs. The idea that there is an optimal size is a fantasy; multiple functions mean 
organisations need to compromise between different optimal sizes for each 
function. 
6.9  Adherence 
While the concept of adherence to centrally determined performance targets or 
other centrally defined goals appears at odds to the autonomy granted to 
decentralised units, the nature of the vertical relationship between the centre and 
periphery and between higher and lower levels of organization are central to any 
discussion of decentralisation. Adherence implies centralisation to institutional 
targets or generic evidence-based protocols although targets and evidence-based 
protocols are different, reflecting institutional goals and professional autonomy. 
This is particularly relevant in the UK context of the NHS which is a single-payer 
health system. The assumption is that the process of decentralisation can 
introduce a stronger performance framework based on guidance, monitoring and 
enforcement (Smith, 2002). Organisation theory does highlight the fact that 
decentralised organisations will learn to operate within a centralised system, 
affording them a degree of managerial freedom (Hales, 1999). The evidence 
tends to point to the fact that in systems that are decentralised some form of 
centralisation is retained. Bossert (1998) claims that central authorities will 
always manipulate the decision space and shape within which decentralised 
agencies will operate. There is also evidence to suggest that when organisations 
are decentralised managers’ behaviour tends to continue to be shaped by 
adherence to previously centrally determined procedures. However, 
decentralisation is also seen as important in terms of gaining trust, which is 
useful where performance measurement is ambiguous, and as being beneficial to 
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sustaining professional commitment and involvement in quality improvements 
(Bojke et al., 2001). Conversely, in New Zealand uneven local organisational 
capacity developed because of a lack of central performance accountability, 
hindering the development of decentralised organisations. Context would appear 
to be a significant factor in shaping the conclusions – type of decentralisation, 
organisational configuration and historical legacy/template. 
6.10  Accountability 
Accountability has always been an area of tension within the NHS (Klein, 2001). 
Recent debates around governance arrangements for NHS foundation trusts, 
patient and public involvement – especially local authority scrutiny and patient 
and public involvement forums – have demonstrated the broad range of opinions 
and concerns held at central government level, in the NHS and in local 
communities (Klein, 2003a). There is a strong assumption in the literature that 
decentralisation improves accountability. However, there are some contradictions 
in the literature as it is seen both as increasing local accountability (De Vries, 
2000) and as an approach to increasing central control and accountability (Ferlie 
and Pettigrew, 1996). In relation to health at an international level 
decentralisation is associated to improved accountability (Bossert, 1998; Meads 
and Wild, 2003). The evidence from New Zealand found that the development of 
local boards did increase local accountability and when boards were established 
for DHAs in the 1990s local representatives saw themselves as accountable to 
local communities even though specific mechanisms for achieving this did not 
exist (Ashburner and Cairncross, 1992, 1993). Yet, similarly to the UK, in New 
Zealand the improved local accountability was accompanied by increased central 
monitoring, performance management and accountancy control. As Wistow 
(1997) has observed there are dual trends of centralisation and decentralisation, 
both of which have an impact on accountability. 
6.11  Conclusion 
The discussion in this and the previous section points to some important 
weaknesses in the evidence base. While there are a number of key assumptions 
about the positive benefits of decentralisation there is less theoretical support for 
these and even less evidence to support them. This becomes increasingly true as 
the evidence is applied to health care organisations in England. A brief review of 
Tables 7–10 underlines this point and there is clearly a lack of good-quality, 
relevant evidence to support the link between decentralisation and organisational 
performance. 
A key problem in the evidence base is the way decentralisation is used as an 
independent variable. This is then compounded by the fact that other variables 
employed in studies also lack conceptual rigour or different performance criteria 
are utilised to demonstrate that other criteria are affected by decentralisation. 
For example, decentralisation leads to increased staff morale so this improves 
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managerial processes (Germain and Spears, 1999). However, the evidence 
supporting a link between decentralisation and improved staff morale is itself not 
clear, so the central assumption of this study is not sound. 
There is also a question of weighting. Decentralisation is a complex process and 
clearly operates alongside centralisation. These are complementary processes. 
However, the evidence does not identify whether the decentralisation or 
centralisation of one activity or function should carry more weight than another. 
For example, if funding decisions (process) are decentralised to PCTs from central 
government so that they have freedom to spend money as they decide, how 
should this be measured against the need for PCTs to meet specific performance 
criteria set at the centre (outcomes). There are also trade-offs between different 
performance criteria. Is it better to have decentralised inputs, processes or 
outcomes and how do we weigh up the difference between say equity and 
responsiveness? These are crucial service questions but the current evidence 
base does not provide clear answers. Similarly there are key questions about the 
degree of decentralisation – how far should functions be shifted to produce the 
best performance? 
Finally the review of evidence again highlights the importance of context. It is 
clear that while many assumptions are made about the effect of decentralisation 
– both in policy and practice – which have some support within the general 
literature on decentralisation, there is little substantive empirical evidence to 
support these. In Tables 7–10 we have demonstrated that whereas most 
assumptions are positive about the effect of decentralisation on organisational 
performance (the exception being adherence), there is less support for these 
assumptions in the theoretical literature, less general evidence and, with respect 
to health care organisations in England, very little relevant empirical evidence. 
Thus context is clearly very important and points to the need for further empirical 
research on these areas within the UK. Transferability of evidence from other 
countries and contexts is difficult (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Rogers, 1995; Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997; Dolowitz et al., 2000). Much research is focused on developing 
countries, is on local government or relates to health care contexts that are 
significantly different to England. 
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Table 10  Decentralisation – relevance to English health care organisations 
Performanc
e criterion… 
 
Aspect 
decentralise
d 
Outcome
s 
Process 
measure
s 
Staff 
moral
e 
Humanit
y 
Equit
y 
Responsivenes
s; allocative 
efficiency 
Technic
al 
efficienc
y 
Adherenc
e 
Accountabili
ty 
Inputs   −−  ?  + ?  
Process  ? −−  ? − + ?  
Outcomes −− − −−  ? −− ++ + − 
+, Some evidence; ++, strong evidence; −, quite weak evidence; −−, weak evidence; ?, equivocal evidence; blank, no 
relevant evidence. 
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Section 7  Conclusions: outstanding research 
questions and further work 
7.1  Introduction 
In this final section we present the key findings from the review and identify key 
messages relating to health care practice, policy and research. It is clear from 
this review that decentralisation/centralisation are highly relevant concepts in 
health care systems and are of current health policy concern in the UK and 
elsewhere. However, despite the wide general discussion about decentralisation it 
would appear to be a neglected aspect of health services and policy research. 
7.2  Summary of the main findings 
It is clear that decentralisation in health policy is a problematic concept. First, 
there are significant problems of definition (Atkinson, 1995; Gershberg, 1998; 
Hales, 1999; Saltman et al., 2003; Levaggi and Smith, 2004). The term 
decentralisation has been used in a number of disciplines, such as management, 
political science, development studies, geography and social policy, and appears 
in a number of conceptual literatures such as public choice theory, 
principal/agency theory, fiscal federalism and central–local relations. It has links 
with many cognate terms such as autonomy and localism, which themselves are 
problematic (Page, 1991; Boyne, 1993; Pratchett, 2004; Stoker, 2004). Other 
commentators tend to use different terms, such as agency (Ham, 2004), central–
local relations (Baggott, 2004), hierachies, markets and networks (Exworthy et 
al., 1999; Le Grand, 2003; Ham, 2004), and national versus local (Powell, 1998). 
While decentralisation and devolution tend to be the dominant terms, they are 
rarely defined or measured, or linked to the conceptual literature. Second, much 
of the literature refers to elected local government with revenue-raising powers. 
As discussed previously, application to a national health service, which is 
appointed and receives its revenue from central grants, is problematic. 
The discussion in this report identifies three main problems associated with the 
analysis of decentralisation. These are that: 
• there is a lack of clarity regarding the concepts, definitions and measures of 
decentralisation; 
• the debate about decentralisation, and subsequent analyses of 
decentralisation, lack any maturity and sophistication; 
• assumptions about the effects of decentralisation on a range of issues 
including organisational performance are incorporated into policy without 
reference to whether evidence or theory supports such an approach. 
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Current analyses of decentralisation pay little attention to clearly defining what is 
being decentralised and our new Arrows Framework provides a useful way of 
conceptualising this aspect of the process. However, the literature and evidence 
on decentralisation makes little reference to the relationships between different 
levels and within different levels and the results of the governance project will 
help inform the development of analyses that address these issues in future 
research. 
Decentralisation is not a completely discrete area of research and more attention 
needs to be paid to how it is utilised as a concept in future practice, policy and 
research. The brief for this review identified two areas for analysis relating to 
relationships between organisations. In addition, the changing nature of the 
dynamics between parts of a system over time resulting from the combination of 
multiple centres of direction and regulation (including financial, political and 
technical) and multiple strategies emerging among the regulated organisations 
(including collaboration, compliance and competition) were identified as an area 
for investigation. There was little evidence in our review to be able to comment 
on these areas and further substantive reviews may be required. We only found 
one NHS paper that specifically examined partnerships (Hudson, 1999). However, 
there are clear links between the evidence examined in this review and the 
review of organisational performance undertaken for the SDO (Sheaff et al., 
2004a) and the review on governance also commissioned by the SDO at the 
same time as this review. The findings of these reviews may also have 
implications for future research on decentralisation. 
The evidence base, while extensive, is very diverse and only loosely connected to 
organisational performance. This finding is similar to that in Sheaff et al. (2004a). 
The evidence is often equivocal and there is little good-quality evidence that 
supports key assumptions about decentralisation that is also supported by 
theory. In particular, much of the evidence is context-specific and we found little 
evidence of high quality that is specifically relevant to the UK context. However, 
as discussed in Section 4 decentralisation remains a strong emphasis in current 
Government policy but this review suggests that there is little evidence to 
support assumptions made in policy. 
7.3  Implications for the development of health care 
organisations in England 
The key message from this review is that decentralisation is not a sufficiently 
strong individual factor to influence organisational performance as compared with 
other factors such as organisational culture, external environment, performance-
monitoring process, etc. Neither is there an optimal size/level that provides 
maximum organisational performance. Different functions and the achievement 
of different outcomes are related to different organisational size and level. There 
are, therefore, trade-offs or compromises between different activities and 
outcomes. For example, different approaches to equity, responsiveness versus 
economies of scale and so forth. 
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In addition, policy-makers and managers need to view decentralisation and 
centralisation together and simultaneously. Given the fundamental commitment 
in the UK to keeping the NHS as a public service funded from taxation (Wanless, 
2002) there will always need to be a recognition that health care services in 
England will be set within the context of central–local relations. Therefore, every 
decision by policy-maker or a manager affects the balance between 
decentralisation and centralisation. It is important that in making decisions 
policy-makers and managers recognise inter-relationships between inputs, 
processes and outcomes and levels in the sense that any organisation (or 
individual) can gain and lose. It also essential that decentralisation is seen as a 
process – one of a number of factors – that can be employed for achieving 
particular goals rather than as an end in its own right. Decentralisation is a 
means rather than an end of policy. There should also, therefore, be a 
recognition of the changing nature of dynamics over time – as demonstrated by 
the discussion in Sections 3 and 4. 
The specific context of the English NHS means that discussions of decentralisation 
are within the context of administrative rather than political decentralisation. 
Local NHS organisations do not have devolved political power or the ability to 
raise finance. Funding comes from the central body. Thus while it is possible to 
discuss political decentralisation or devolution in a UK context referring to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, when examining the organisation of the 
English NHS this does not apply. While developments such as lay representation 
on executive boards and foundation trust governance arrangements suggest local 
independence they operate within a tight, centrally defined structure. 
The lack of a strong and relevant evidence base has important consequences for 
policy and practice. This review has demonstrated that much discussion of 
decentralisation is based on assumptions that are not substantiated by theory or 
evidence. A key problem is that benefits in one context are incorporated into 
general assumptions and are often transferred to other contexts despite the 
problems associated with doing this (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Rogers, 1995; 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Dolowitz et al., 2000). As Boyne et al. (2004) have 
argued in relation to local government organisational performance, there is a real 
need to improve the connection between theory and practice. Therefore in 
developing an evidence base attention should be paid to the contribution of 
theory. As this review demonstrates, currently there is little relationship between 
the assumptions, theory and evidence base about decentralisation in health 
services. 
However, from this analysis it is possible to identify a number of key 
recommendations for policy-makers and managers. However, as identified in 
Section 6 our key recommendation is for further empirical research that 
addresses the gaps in the current evidence base. 
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7.4  Recommendations for policy 
In 2001 the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office published a 
paper, Better Policy Delivery and Design (Policy Innovation Unit, 2001), that 
identified the need to develop a balance between decentralism and centralism 
and suggested that more attention needs to be paid to identifying the type of 
decentralisation – for example over process and over outcomes (e.g. 
performance targets). Our conceptual framework presented in this report clearly 
identifies the need for policy-makers to more clearly take into account the what 
of decentralisation and the inter-relationships between the decentralisation and 
centralisation of different functions and responsibilities. It is important that 
policy-makers develop a more sensitive and sophisticated approach to the way 
decentralisation is developed within policy and the Arrows Framework provides a 
simple framework for addressing these issues (as shown in Sections 3 and 4). 
Clearly there are important questions that need to be answered about whether 
key policy assumptions about freedom, earned autonomy, patient choice, 
effective commissioning, localisation, accountability, equity, etc. that are to be 
achieved within health care services can be achieved through a simple approach 
to organisational decentralisation. 
The analysis in this report suggests that currently, whereas a number of key 
inputs and processes are being decentralised, the retention of outcomes at a 
central level limits the extent of decentralisation and the autonomy of local health 
care organisations. In addition, as the discussion in Sections 3 and 4 
demonstrates, whereas responsibility for outcomes may have been decentralised 
from the Department of Health to DHAs in the 1990s its re-centralisation after 
1997 has been to the Health Care Commission not the Department of Health. 
Thus changing central relationships are as key a characteristic of 
decentralisation/centralisation as relationships between organisations at other 
levels. Policy-makers therefore need to: 
• be more explicit about the aims and objectives of decentralisation in relation 
to inputs, processes and outcomes based on a clear awareness of the poor 
evidence base; 
• be more aware of the importance of context in transferring mechanisms; 
• recognise that decentralisation is a process and not a single event; 
• address the changing central context as responsibility over outcomes shifts 
between central organisations. 
7.5  Recommendations for practice 
The application and implementation of policy is clearly one area where managers 
and practitioners will be concerned with issues of decentralisation. However, 
organisations also need to understand what impact the flows of decentralisation 
and centralisation have on their organisations. For example, using the Arrows 
Framework it is possible to identify that for an English PCT there are a number of 
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cross currents of decentralisation/centralisation as shown in Figure 9 (at the end 
of this section). 
This means that within health care organisations more attention does need to be 
paid to the impacts of decentralisation. With current key policy initiatives on 
practice-based commissioning, patient choice, foundation trusts, etc. local as well 
as national health care organisations need to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of decentralisation processes and simple assumptions about the 
benefits, or otherwise, should be avoided. Health care managers and 
practitioners should therefore: 
• give more explicit recognition to the compromises/trade-offs between 
performance criteria (e.g. equity versus efficiency versus responsiveness, 
etc.) when developing strategies; 
• understand the equivocal nature of evidence and, in particular, the important 
role of context; 
• understand that decentralisation is not a panacea – it is a process which 
among other factors can have an impact on organisational performance – but 
which should not be seen as an end in itself. 
7.6  R&D questions and further work 
There are clear links between some of the issues arising from our examination of 
decentralisation and other SDO programme areas. In particular research on 
organisational performance, human resource management and workforce issues 
are clearly linked to decentralisation. One area the SDO may want to consider is 
the value of comparative research across these programme areas. The research 
proposals outlined here have been identified from existing gaps in the evidence 
that relates to health care organisations in England. Comparisons within the UK 
to examine and compare developments in England with Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales as well as the impact of devolution itself may provide further 
significant insights. In particular, we recommend that consideration is given to 
research that addresses the issue of context with the use of good-quality case 
studies and also for research that takes a longer time span than the normal 
3-years, to capture change over a more realistic period. In addition, we believe 
that there is a need for research that examines specifically the relationships 
between and within levels by adopting studies that focus on health care 
economies rather than simply organisations. Nine areas for further research are 
identified, as follows. 
7.6.1  Conceptual framework 
Further research is needed on the development of a conceptual model and 
framework for health services decentralisation. In this study we have extended 
the current conceptual frameworks of decentralisation to include a recognition of 
the individual dimension and also clarity about defining what property is being 
decentralised. The concept of decentralisation is often poorly used with the 
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purposes of decentralisation being unclear and confused. A clearer conceptual 
model is particularly important in policy development. Further research is needed 
to refine this conceptual framework and examine how it is applied in practice. 
Much of the evidence identified in our review has been generated in other 
contexts – sectors, countries – and further research is needed to examine what is 
transferable or generalisable. What theories (e.g. on local government) are 
applicable? 
7.6.2  Measuring decentralisation 
There is little research literature on measuring decentralisation as a dependent 
variable. As a concept it is multi-dimensional and therefore the measures must 
be as well. Often, the only dimension that is measured (albeit poorly) is fiscal 
decentralisation. Further research is required to identify the key indicators for 
measuring decentralisation. Our research establishes some of the key principles 
but there is little literature that measures decentralisation in terms of key criteria 
such as access, equity, responsiveness, etc. This may also include examining 
health outcomes and a more explicit use of measurement criteria of 
decentralisation policies is needed. Decentralisation presumes many benefits 
which may not always be realised in practice. We need to ask the question about 
under what conditions might these be achieved. How might the compromises 
between these objectives be managed? That is, how to resolve the common 
efficiency-equity trade-off? (Other trade-offs may provide significant avenues for 
future research.) We need a much clearer appreciation of the key criteria for 
measuring decentralisation and organisational performance. This will also include 
gathering stakeholder views at different levels (centre, locality, practice, 
individual) to provide a range of perspectives about the nature and impact of 
decentralisation and also develop an understanding of how to weight the different 
criteria. 
7.6.3  Links to organisational performance 
There is a clear relationship with organisational performance research but which 
factors are more important: organisational size, structure, the people in it, 
population served, organisational mechanism, autonomy (over what?) or 
leadership? Decentralisation is not a single mechanism in its own right; it is 
multi-dimensional. It is however, an approach for examining other aspects of 
organisational and policy performance. Research on organisational performance 
should therefore incorporate decentralisation as one aspect to be studied. 
7.6.4  Decentralisation and function 
More research is needed to examine the contexts of decentralisation. In 
particular, which function works best at what level? Is there a specific receptive 
context for particular functions? There remains uncertainty around what decisions 
are best taken where and the size of the constituency – this might vary across 
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different areas. There is little consensus about the level that is most efficient for 
provision – for example, commissioning and practice-based commissioning. 
Where are commissioning, financial management, public health, etc. best 
located? What are the factors that would enable an area/function to fare best 
with decentralised services, and to what extent is this related to existing context 
and culture? These questions are particularly important in relation to earned 
autonomy and the relationship between different agencies at any particular level. 
Is earned autonomy only related to an organisational context? Can earned 
autonomy be achieved by specific services within an organisation or across local 
health economies? What is the impact of this? Does 'one size fit all' or is 
decentralisation more suitable for some activities but not for others? Is there a 
trade-off between criteria? The literature suggests that there is no single optimal 
size so any organisational arrangement in decentralisation will involve trade-offs 
between functions. In addition, research is needed to explore how actual policies 
(e.g. earned autonomy) relate to decentralisation concepts and measures? 
7.6.5  Decentralisation and decision space: relationship 
between decentralisation and local health economies 
Another key issue is to conduct research that moves beyond a focus on single 
organisations. To what extent can it be said that local health economies or 
communities have autonomy? To what extent does differing levels of local 
organisational autonomy (e.g. one-star PCT and three-star trust) affect the 
organisational performance of each organisation? A case-study approach would 
be most applicable here. Bossert’s conceptualisation of decision space – the 
freedom to act within a given local health system context and at a particular 
vertical level (e.g. clinician, PCT, SHA) – may provide a useful approach to this. It 
may not be possible to examine decentralisation in isolation and thus it is 
important to measure the effect of decentralisation alongside other factors and 
system changes. It is recognised that it will be difficult to hold other 
factors/changes constant and research needs to take account of the challenges of 
analysing complex contexts. There are difficult causation/attribution problems to 
address as it is important to examine both the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of decentralisation. However, a key question is to determine how much decision 
space organisations in a system have – in terms of between levels and in terms 
of relationships with other agencies. 
7.6.6  Decentralisation and participation 
It has long been recognised that the NHS lies outside of local democratic 
structures and many attempts have been made to address what has been 
described as a democratic deficit. However, given the strong assumption made 
about participation and democracy being improved through decentralisation it is 
important that further research is undertaken in the UK to address this aspect of 
organisational change. What level of decentralisation is best for public 
involvement and meeting public preferences? There is a need for further research 
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on how the public relates to local health agencies and the methods and 
mechanisms of engagement. Do foundation trusts have better systems through 
their governance arrangements? What levels of influence do local consumer 
health groups have on local health services and what is the balance between 
different types of group? How does this relate to issues of accountability, 
humanity and responsiveness of local health services? 
7.6.7  Decentralisation and human resources management 
There are important questions about autonomy and capacity in organisations. 
Human resource management is clearly an important organisational issue for 
decentralised agencies and there are concerns about capacity in relation to the 
operation of specific functions. Does freedom to manage deliver better 
organisational performance notwithstanding skill base and capacity issues? There 
is a need to examine the motivation of local managers who may be used to 
central control. Also, how do local organisations manage competing pressure for 
autonomy and control from the centre and also increasing autonomy for lower 
level organisations, more professional autonomy, patient autonomy, etc. An 
important area for further research in this area is the link between 
decentralisation and professional roles and professional autonomy. 
7.6.8  The impact of decentralisation on the centre 
An important area that is rarely addressed in the literature is the impact of 
decentralisation on the role of the centre. Further research is needed on the 
design and implementation of steering mechanisms such as how the centre 
should conceptualise decentralisation that distinguishes between inputs 
(resources), processes (commissioning, patient choice processes, etc.) and 
outcomes (targets, indicators). There is little research that addresses the impact 
of shorter hierarchical lines of authority. Also, no literature was found that 
explicitly addresses the relationship between multiple centres examining the 
inter-relationships between the role of regulatory agencies (monitor, Healthcare 
Commission, professional bodies) or between territorial centres (in Scotland, 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland). Research should also take account of the 
movement towards the European Union (e.g. Health Protection Agency). 
7.6.9  Longitudinal studies of decentralisation 
The process of decentralisation and its effect on organisations takes many years 
to develop. Further research is needed on the dynamic nature of decentralisation 
to capture change over time. This also links to other areas of SDO interest in 
relation to organisational change and performance. This includes the need to 
examine the impact of continual re-organisation upon organisational and personal 
development. (e.g. the impact on governance structures of anticipated PCT 
mergers before and after the 2005 general election). 
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7.7  Conclusion 
It would appear that Klein’s (2001: 106) summing up of the situation in the 
1990s holds true for today, in that everybody paid verbal homage to the principle 
of decentralisation, but how was this going to be achieved in a nationally financed 
service? Similarly, it is still not clear whether the NHS is a central service that is 
locally managed or a local service operating within central guidelines Butler 
(1992: 125). Klein’s (2003a) analogy of decentralisation as a revolving door is 
also apt as it reflects the ways in which decentralisation falls in and out of 
fashion. To extend this analogy, there is a need to learn from the current 
previous revolutions of this door to inform future policy and practice. Given that 
decentralisation is a major part of policy rhetoric and current policy development 
there is an urgent need to develop a strong evidence base to support these 
developments. 
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Figure 8  Decentralisation/centralisation at a PCT level 
Tier… 
 
Activity 
Department of Health/CHAI SHA PCT Practice Patient/professional 
  Inputs: funding; 
GMS/PMS contracts 
  
  Processes: commissioning; 
patient choice 
  
  Outcomes: performance targets; 
GP Quality Framework 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  Summary of evidence 
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and year 
Quality Methods Context Year 
of 
study 
Terms Measurement Function Perf domain Conclusions: impact on 
org perf 
Other 
comments 
Abelson et 
al. 2002 
PR; public 
admin 
QV: 59 
interviews 
Canada: 
Ontario and 
Quebec; 
health 
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–
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Devolution 
(provincial 
govt to 
regional HA) 
Why and when 
to consult? 
How to 
consult? How 
to measure 
success? 
Public 
involveme
nt 
Accountability  Public consultation: 
means or end – views 
divided 
 Preoccupation with 
consensus 
 
Ahmad and 
Broussine 
2003 
PR; public 
mgt 
QV: critical 
case 
sampling 
UK: public 
sector 
nd Dec. (as 
part of UK 
modernisati
on 
programme) 
Subjective 
assessment 
from 
interviews 
Various Perception of 
(lack of) trust 
 Feelings of 
disempowerment and 
control 
 
Ambivalence 
re. 
modernising 
cent. 
Amin et al. 
2003 
Report Commentary UK nd Dec; de-
centre 
Inequality 
between 
regions 
Socio-
economic 
inequality 
Equity; efficiency  Concept of regions 
flawed in era of networks 
 UK unequal structure 
helps explain regional 
inequality 
 New econ regionalism 
requires more than 
devolution of power: 
instead, multinodal nation 
 Against devolution as a 
tool of bureaucratic 
efficiency 
 
Concentratio
n of political 
power 
sustains 
regional 
inequality 
 SE England 
does not 
‘succeed’ by 
its own 
intrinsic 
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 Disenchantment 
w/centre→new localism 
qualities 
Anderson 
1998 
PR Review: 
states’ 
policy 
USA: health 1991
–4 
Federalism Relations 
between state 
and federal 
govt. 
Health 
services 
Efficiency 
Responsiveness 
Acctbly 
 Review of Reforming 
States Group: to develop 
guide to organising state 
legislative action 
 Governor meeting 
catalysts 
 Reform 
process of 
state health 
policy-
making 
Andrews 
and 
Schroeder 
2003 
PR; devel 
studies 
Normative 
arguments, 
models and 
empirical 
evidence 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
nd Dec: 
assignment 
of services 
to 
subnational 
govts 
Congruence 
between 
theory and 
practice 
Primary 
health 
care and 
rural 
roads 
Efficiency  Legislated models of 
decentralisation are 
largely informed by 
normative theory 
 Disjoint between what 
govts decentralise in a 
formal sense (in law) and 
what they decentralise in 
an actual sense, 
explained by limits to dec  
 Limits to 
dec: 
spillovers, 
scale 
economies, 
bureaucratic 
politics and 
capacity 
constraints 
Anell 2000 
 
Comment
ary 
Policy 
review; 
principal/age
nt theory 
used  
Sweden 1990s Dec: change 
in locus of 
power 
between 
different 
admin levels 
Assessment of 
dec impact in 
terms of perf 
domains 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; 
equity; quality 
 Difficult to isolate single 
dec measures, so effects 
of dec on efficiency, 
equity and quality remain 
unanswered. Also lack of 
interest in answers 
 Two requisites: 
motivation of dec level 
and local capability, e.g. 
some managers unwilling 
to tackle equity concerns 
 Delegation of resp often 
precedes delegation of 
authority 
 Concern that Swedish 
councils too small→ 
merger 
 Dec does 
not end 
w/formal 
delegation; 
mgt devel 
and support 
systems 
 Dec not a 
solution to 
problem; 
better 
opportuni-
ties for 
dealing 
w/problems 
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 Cent via guidelines 
Anton 1997 
 
PR Policy 
review 
USA; health 
(shift from 
ADFC to 
TANF, 
1996) 
1990s Federalism; 
intergovern
mental fiscal 
relationships 
‘Devolving 
authority’ 
Administr
ation of 
federal 
programm
es; ‘local’ 
flexibility 
on 
programm
e design 
and 
implement
ation 
Allocative 
efficiency 
(though term not 
used) 
 Debunking myths re. 
size, control, uniformity, 
sustainable separation 
and disorder 
 Functional specialisation 
among national, state and 
local govts based on 
pragmatic decisions 
 Devolution cannot mean 
separation; limits mean 
that close political ties 
remain 
 States will 
continue to 
be leading 
players 
 Inter-state 
differences 
are 
increasing 
 Debate 
over 
entitlement 
versus block 
grants 
Arrowsmith 
and Sisson 
2002 
PR; mgt; 
IR 
Survey and 
case 
studies; 
firm-in-
sector 
approach 
UK; health 1995
–8 
Dec: linked 
to 
marketisa-
tion and 
privatisation 
Respondents’ 
views and 
attitudes 
Employme
nt 
recruitme
nt and 
retention 
 Staff 
morale/satisfacti
on 
 Local flexibility 
 Very little localisation of 
pay partly due to limited 
financial reserves for 
transitional costs 
 Impact of dec shown by 
trust-specific employment 
contracts (less so in 
hospitals) 
 External 
factors were 
main 
constraints 
on 
localisation 
 Dec is not 
a solution 
per se; 
conflict with 
scale 
economies 
Atkinson 
1995 
PR; 
geographi
cal 
Review Intl nd Dec: 
transfer of 
authority to 
plan, make 
decisions 
and manage 
public 
functions 
(Rondinelli) 
 Participation, 
implementatio
n, org scale 
 Eval at 
national, 
regional and 
local levels 
 Main input: 
decentralised 
or non-
Mgt of 
health 
service 
Responsiveness 
versus equity 
 National: few studies 
explore processes which 
facilitated success and 
only rarely report failure 
 Regional: dec alone 
could not claim to make 
difference to health 
service perf. Limited 
definition of perf used 
(output~coverage) 
Simple 
indicators of 
dec are 
inadequate 
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decentralised  Local: lack of autonomy 
due to central control 
Atkinson et 
al. 2000 
PR; 
anthropol
ogical 
Case study Brazil: 
health 
1990s Dec: not 
defined; 
assumes a 
geographical
ly defined 
local govt 
 Sources of 
income 
 Information 
 Local voice in 
planning 
 Mgt style 
 Personalised 
leadership 
 Commitment 
Health 
services 
Social org, social 
and political 
culture 
Two types of impact: 
(a) equity, efficiency, 
quality, outcomes, 
democracy 
(b) mechanisms and 
processes (Bossert) 
Need to 
recognise 
social/politic
al culture: 
spaces for 
autonomy, 
local voices 
and spaces 
for practice 
and acctbly 
Atkinson 
2002 
PR; 
geographi
cal; 
anthropol
ogical 
Case study NE Brazil nd Dec Impact of 
political 
culture on 
health mgt 
Health 
service 
planning 
Equity  Health research failed to 
recognise cultural impact 
 Unless research 
addresses cultural issues, 
dec likely to widen 
inequalities between 
districts  
 
Balogh 1996 
 
PR; social 
policy 
Review UK: health  1990s Dec: 
devolution 
of 
operational 
functions 
and resp 
Localities as 
units of mgt 
and decision-
making 
Health 
services: 
primary 
care 
Commissioning  Move towards locality-
based commissioning but 
little analysis of 
experiences 
 Locality initiatives part 
of wider agenda re. 
collaboration, dec and 
community devel 
 Notion of locality varies 
 Can dec be 
an ‘add-on’ 
or is radical 
restructuring 
required? 
Bankauskait
e et al. 2004 
Report 
(Institute 
for Public 
Policy 
Research) 
Policy 
comment 
and analysis 
Europe 
(federal 
and unitary 
states; tax 
and social 
insurance 
finance) 
2004:
curre
nt  
Dec (ref to 
Rondinelli) 
Dec to 
whom (only 
agencies), 
what 
functions 
a. How far 
have services 
been dec’d? 
b. Why was 
dec 
implemented? 
c. Improved 
Health 
services 
Outcomes 
(weight given to 
each outcome?); 
efficiency; 
outcomes; 
acctbly 
 Governance structure 
shapes outcomes 
 Nordic countries: patient 
satisfaction high due to 
dec and choice/voice 
ability 
 Denmark and Finland: 
 Decision to 
dec often 
made at 
general 
policy level 
first and 
then applied 
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Case 
studies: 
Nordic 
countries, 
Spain, Italy 
and w/what 
regulation? 
Autonomy 
outcomes? cost control via local tax 
and provision functions. 
 High-tech efficiency 
despite political factors 
 Spain: dec took 20 
years and led to policy 
experiments. Variations in 
drugs and spending; 
others marginal 
 Italy: incr acctbly, 
reduced spending, incr 
inequality risk 
 Anticipated outcomes 
may not always be 
attained. Dec is 
statement of political 
intent not policy 
framework 
to health 
 Dec 
involves 
continued 
supervision 
by state 
 To ensure 
consistent 
and 
acceptable 
outcomes, 
state relies 
on 
regulation 
Barnett and 
Newberry 
2002 
PR; HSR  QV NZ public 
sector 
1997 Dec, 
privatisation
, flexibility: 
not defined 
Subjective 
assessment 
from 
interviews 
Mental 
health 
Efficiency Regional variations; lack 
of perf acctbly 
Market 
system 
combined 
with central 
control 
Besley and 
Coate 2003 
PR; 
economics 
QT: 
economic 
modelling 
Theoretical nd Dec; cent; 
~allocation 
of costs and 
authority 
Trade-off 
between dec 
and cent 
provision of 
local public 
services 
Local 
public 
services 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Sharing costs of local 
public spending in cent 
system →CoI between 
juridisdictions 
 Amount of conflict of 
interest varies by 
spillovers and local 
preferences 
 Draws on 
Oates 1972 
Bjorkman 
1985 
PR; 
politics 
QV and QT UK, 
Sweden, 
USA; health 
1970s 
and 
1980s 
Dec; 
participation 
and 
representati
Subjective 
assessment; 
patterns of 
expenditure 
Various Various Greater cent seems 
inevitable 
Central–
local 
tensions 
persist; dec 
is a way of 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 166 
on coping 
Blom-
Hansen 
1999 
PR; public 
policy 
Policy 
review 
Sweden, 
Norway, 
Denmark; 
economic, 
health and 
child policy 
1980s 
and 
1990s 
Central–
local 
relations; 
local 
autonomy; 
dec used but 
not defined 
Patterns of 
local 
expenditure 
Organiz-
ation and 
funding of 
health 
services, 
especially 
waiting 
times 
Various, mainly 
efficiency 
Policy networks and 
stakeholders influenced 
policy outcomes, e.g. 
extent to which national 
waiting-time guarantees 
reduced local autonomy 
Policy 
stakeholder: 
expenditure 
advocates, 
guardians 
and 
topocrats 
Bogdanor 
1999 
 
PR; 
politics 
Political 
review 
UK C20; 
mainl
y 
1990s 
Devolution; 
dec 
Distribution of 
political power 
Various: 
mainly 
division of 
resp and 
revenue 
allocation 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Devolution to Scotland 
creates new ‘constitution’ 
for UK, dividing power to 
legislate 
 Emergence of 
asymmetric federalism 
(Westminster has 
differing area resps) 
Focus on 
political 
devolution 
w/in UK 
Bojke et al. 
2001 
PR; HSR Review UK: health  nd Dec and 
devolution 
not used as 
terms 
Org size Primary 
care 
Efficiency (scale 
economies) 
Optimal size varies with 
function 
Agencies 
above 100k 
patients 
may not 
generate 
improved 
perf 
Boles 2002 Report Policy 
commentary 
UK nd Dec Tensions in 
resolving three 
key issues 
Public 
services 
Acctbly; equity; 
efficiency 
 No consensus about 
what a decentralised is or 
how to achieve it 
 Three issues: role of 
choice in giving 
individuals control; role of 
private sector; level to 
which power should be 
devolved  
 Individual 
should be 
the ultimate 
point of dec 
 More 
agreement 
about move 
away from 
c/govt than 
destination 
Bossert Chapter in Review of Intl nd Dec: Difficulty of Health Equity;  Extreme expression:  Need to 
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1996 Janovsky 
report; 
public 
admin 
literature 
and 
research 
distribution 
of authority 
and 
responsibil-
ity; refers to 
Rondinelli 
models 
isolating dec 
effects 
services efficiency; 
quality 
Difficulty of 
developing and 
agreeing criteria 
of perf 
patient is the ultimate 
object of dec; emphasis 
on efficiency and quality 
thru choice and market 
 Tension between pursuit 
of equity and efficiency 
 Most research assumes 
dec will achieve 
objectives; not in practice 
 Need to examine 
mechanisms of control, 
policy process 
clarify form 
and impact 
of dec 
 Most 
research in 
public 
admin, not 
regulated 
market 
Bossert 
1998 
PR; devel 
studies 
Review: 
conceptual 
Intl; 
Colombia, 
Chile, 
Poland 
nd Dec~ 
expansion of 
local choice; 
defined re. 
principal/age
nt theory, 
public admin 
and social 
capital  
Decision 
space, 
incentives, 
local govt 
characteristics 
Finance, 
org, HR, 
access 
and 
governanc
e 
Equity, 
efficiency, 
quality, financial 
soundness 
 No clear evidence about 
combined package of 
policies to maximize 
achievement of objectives 
 Efficiency improved by 
separating financing and 
provision, competition 
 Equity: incr targeted 
funding 
 Lack of analytical 
framework to study how 
dec can achieve goals 
 Need info re. amount of 
choice, what local choices 
available, what effect 
choices have on perf 
 Principal/agent and 
decision space might help 
 Central authorities 
manipulate decision 
space, incentives, 
sanctions and control of 
information 
 Lack 
analytical 
framework 
on impact of 
local 
autonomy 
on perf 
 Dec 
different 
from direct 
change 
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Bossert 
2000 
Report 
(US AID) 
Case studies 
of 
implementat
ion of dec 
policies and 
application 
of decision-
space model 
Chile, 
Colombia 
and Bolivia: 
all leaders 
in Latin 
America 
dec 
1990s Dec: 
transfer of 
authority for 
planning, 
mgt, service 
delivery 
from 
Ministry to 
other 
institutions 
Dec: not a 
single act 
(refers to 
Rondinelli 
model) 
Decision space Health 
services 
Equity; 
efficiency; 
quality 
 Wide decision space 
initially but reduced over 
time 
 Wide space: contracting 
and governance 
 Moderate space: 
financial allocations 
 Limited space: HR, 
services, targeted 
programmes 
 Dec ~ improve some 
equity measures (per 
capita expendit) but 
worse others (richer 
areas aspent more, widen 
inequality; no link to 
wider improvement) 
 Institutional capacity 
had some impact on dec 
 Lack of 
robust data, 
so partial 
view. No 
before/after 
data 
 Per capita 
expendit= 
intermediate 
indicator 
 Little 
evidence 
that quality 
improved. 
e.g. dec no 
impact on 
waiting time 
or views on 
quality 
Bossert and 
Beauvais 
2002 
PR; devel 
studies 
Review; 
conceptual 
(Rondinelli, 
principal/age
nt and 
decision 
space) 
Ghana, 
Uganda, 
Zambia and 
Philippines 
1990s Dec= 
granting 
authority 
from central 
national 
govt to 
other 
institutions 
at the 
periphery 
Decision space Finance, 
org, HR, 
access 
and 
governanc
e 
Efficiency 
(allocative and 
technical); 
innovation; 
quality; equity 
 Variety in types and 
degrees of dec 
 Philippines; devolution 
to local govt most 
varied.; Delegation to 
autonomous health 
service least varied in 
Ghana, Uganda, Zambia 
 Insufficient evidence of 
impact of dec on decision 
space to assess system 
perf 
Danger of 
viewing dec 
as a single 
activity 
(advanced 
by 
Rondinelli) 
Bourn and 
Ezzamel 
1987 
PR; mg Review; 
financial 
devolution 
UK: health 
and 
universities 
1980s Devolution 
(defined in 
financial 
terms) 
Financial Budgetary 
decision-
making 
Efficiency ~ 
‘budgeting’ 
 Devolution as a means 
to increase (managerial) 
power over professionals 
Budgetary devolution can 
Griffiths and 
Jarratt 
reports on 
health 
service and 
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counter institutional 
stagnation 
 Mgt by (professional) 
clans 
universities 
Boyne 1996 PR; public 
mgt 
QT: 
secondary 
data 
UK: local 
govt 
nd Org scale Various: 
financial 
Various Service quality, 
speed, efficiency 
Perf linked to scale in 
non-metro areas 
 
Boyne et al. 
2004 
PR; public 
mgt 
Review: 
conceptual 
UK: local 
govt 
nd Public 
service 
improve-
ment 
Perf measures: 
cost, 
efficiency, 
quality, 
effectiveness, 
access and 
user 
satisfaction 
(based on Best 
Value) 
Local govt Structure, 
culture, 
formulation and 
content of Best 
Value 
Perf assoc w/bureaucracy, 
cent and integration in a 
simple and stable 
environment but 
negatively associated in 
complex and dynamic 
environment 
 Research 
on perf in 
public org is 
in its infancy 
 Difficult to 
do an a 
priori eval of 
impacts 
Bradbury 
2003 
PR; 
politics 
Concepts 
applied to 
UK political 
devolution 
UK 1997 
onwar
ds 
Regionalisati
on (sub-
state); 
devolution 
Loyalty, 
background 
conditions, 
socio-
economic 
groups, policy, 
authority 
Political 
machinery 
Political authority  Sub-state 
regionalisation different 
from supranational level 
 Territorial loyalty makes 
political mobilisation 
difficult 
 
 
Bradbury 
and 
McGarvey 
2003 
PR; 
politics 
Political 
review  
UK; 
England 
2002 Devolution 
(political) 
Differences in 
political 
leadership and 
acttbly 
between 
Scotland, 
Wales and 
Northern 
Ireland 
Devolved 
functions 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Asymmetric devolution 
 UK operated four 
different forms of 
devolution (plus 
London/England=5) 
 Only Scotland showed 
degree of stabilisation, 
confirming legitimacy 
 First years 
of 
devolution= 
tranquil 
 Centripetal 
and 
centrifugal 
forces 
remain 
Bridgen 
2003 
PR Review of 
policy 
UK: health 
and social 
1946 
– 
Joint 
planning, 
Domain 
consensus 
Joint 
planning 
Collaboration  Collaboration involves 
loss of control 
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care 2003 collaboration 
(dec not 
used) 
(agree what 
each agency 
will do) 
 Collaboration hampered 
by org differences and 
lack of domain consensus 
Bromwich 
and Lapsley 
1997 
PR; 
accountac
y and mgt 
Review of 
policy: Next 
Steps and 
Financial 
Management 
Initiative 
UK; c/govt nd Dec not 
defined  
n/a C/govt 
policy-
making 
n/a  Services subject to 
political control; likely to 
have objectives at higher 
org levels which are 
difficult to define 
 Public sector mgt and 
accounting do not keep 
abreast of developments 
Separation 
of policy and 
operations 
may be 
impossible 
to maintain 
Brooks and 
Cheng 2001 
PR; 
politics 
QT; survey 
data 
USA; public 
policy 
1974
–96 
Devolution, 
federalism 
Public’s 
confidence in 
govt 
institutions 
Federal 
govt 
Public 
support/confiden
ce in federal govt 
 Public confidence in govt 
limited effect on policy 
preferences; symbolic 
effect 
 High levels of support 
for public provision 
 Devolution may not 
restore confidence 
Change in 
party partly 
affects 
presidential 
confidence 
Bryson et al. 
1995 
PR; mgt; 
IR 
Policy 
review and 
interviews  
UK; health  1992
–3 
Dec of pay 
determinatio
n 
Extent to 
which pay 
determination 
has been dec’d 
Pay 
determine
ation 
Staffing/pay  Union recognition: not 
all trusts recognise all 
unions 
 Bargaining: single-table 
forum most common 
 Staff pay: shift to 
reward loyalty to trust not 
occupation 
 Evidence of 
partial 
exclusion of 
unions 
 Few trusts 
had moved 
to local pay 
determineati
on 
Burns 2001 PR; tax 
journal 
Policy 
review 
Canada Post-
1945 
Central–
provincial 
govt 
relations; 
localism 
used (once) 
with respect 
Central–
provincial govt 
relations 
Various: 
public 
policy 
Various  Provincial powers may 
be required to meet 
responsibilities but these 
are incompatible with 
national sovereignty 
 Need for strong c/govt 
generally recognised 
Provincial 
right to 
direct 
taxation 
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to province 
Busse 2000 Comment
ary 
Policy 
review 
Germany 1990s Dec; 
deconcentra
tion 
Balance of 
power 
between 
federal govt 
and Lander 
and self-
regulatory 
actors 
(sickness 
funds) 
Health 
services 
(esp. 
legislation
) 
n/a  Undevolved devolution: 
powers were never 
passed down though 
Lander=dec 
 Delegation of powers to 
self-regulatory actors: 
statutory sickness funds 
 Hospital financing: no 
powers in Constitution but 
federal govt bought right 
to pass legislation 
 Balance between actors 
and govt moved to and 
fro 
 Health not 
an area for 
exclusive 
federal 
legislation 
 Other 
actors= 
provider 
associations 
 
Deconcentra
tion: only 
minor 
importance 
Cameron 
and Ndhlovu 
2001 
PR Literature 
review 
Europe; 
Canada; 
developing 
countries 
nd Subsidiarity 
(spatial 
distribution 
of power); 
federalism 
Regionalism Various 
public 
services 
Various, mainly 
efficiency 
(allocative and 
technical) 
 Economic case for 
regionalism? 
 Few economists favour 
radical dec in federal 
system 
Fiscal 
federalism=
public sector 
with two or 
more levels 
of decision-
making 
(Oates) 
Cameron 
2001 
PR; local 
govt 
Conceptual 
and policy 
review 
South 
Africa; local 
govt 
1994
–7 
Dec, 
autonomy 
Dec (transfer 
of workload of 
central to local 
govt); 
autonomy 
(incl. constitu-
tion, treasury 
and staff) 
Various 
local govt 
services 
Accountability Different motives for and 
views on dec: 
integrational (functional 
interdependence) and 
autonomous (separate) 
 
 Three-tier 
govt: 
municipality,
province and 
national 
govt 
Cartei 2004 PR; public 
law 
Review of 
public law 
Italy; public 
policy: 
schoolsand
police 
nd Devolution 
Subsidiarity 
Regional 
autonomy 
Central-
regional 
relations 
Various: 
public 
policy 
Legislative 
competences 
 Competencies assigned 
to regions. Eg health 
 Constitution inclined to 
favour regional 
Will regional 
autonomy 
affect 
national 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 172 
Federalism 
Dec 
autonomy. 
 Devolution part of dec 
process but federalism 
part of centralising 
process 
cohesion? 
Carter 1999 PR; 
philosophy 
Conceptual 
(game 
theory) 
n/a nd Dec (not 
defined) 
Geographical 
concentration 
Geographi
cal org of 
population 
(urbanis-
ation) 
Coordination  Arguments for and 
against dec in 
environmental debates 
 For: overcomes free-
riding 
 Against: Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, co-ordination 
(need for coercive action) 
 Conditional co-operation 
(co-operate, then imitate) 
generates most benefit 
 Carter: 
strong case 
for dec 
Chapin and 
Fetter 2002 
PR; public 
policy 
Policy 
review; 
some 
conceptual 
USA Mainl
y late 
1990s 
Federal, 
state, 
municipal 
(dec rarely 
used) 
Contracting 
through quasi-
market 
Public 
health, 
contractin
g 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Willingness to pay 
flawed in public health 
 Problem in establishing 
buyer value 
 Zero sum game: two-
buyer co-operative 
strategy 
 Five impacts: fiscal and 
descriptive acctbly, skill 
devel, defining objective 
attainment and political 
survival 
 Local govt 
provide bulk 
of public 
health 
services 
Christensen 
2000 
PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
review 
Denmark; 
local govt 
1970 
onwar
ds 
Dec 
(authority 
from natl to 
sub-national 
govt); 
re-cent 
Autonomy 
Transfer of 
functional 
responsibilities 
to local govt 
(policy 1970+) 
Local govt 
services 
(mainly 
health and 
care of 
elderly) 
Equity  Central and local govt 
actors have mutual 
incentive to negotiate 
joint solutions 
 Multi-level 
interdependencies provide 
dynamic process of dec 
 Dynamic 
change can 
occur in 
corporatist 
and multi-
level public 
sector 
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which helps local govt  
Cole 2004 PR; 
politics 
QV; 
thematic 
analysis 
Wales; 
Brittany 
1998 
onwar
ds 
Dec; 
devolution 
Changes to 
regional 
governance 
processes 
Public 
services 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness; 
efficiency 
(allocative) 
 Outcomes ~ institutions, 
relations, identifies, 
political opportunity 
structures and 
environmental constraints 
 Wales~1998 Act; 
Brittany~ dense network 
of relationships 
 Political opportunity 
structures shape political 
space 
 Identity, 
territory and 
institutions 
inter-linked 
Collins 1996 Chapter in 
Janovsky 
report; 
public 
admin 
Policy 
analysis 
Intl nd Dec: 
transfer of 
functions, 
resources 
and 
authority 
from centre 
to periphery 
Measured 
according to 
aims of dec 
(see perf 
domain); role 
of centre 
 
Health 
sector 
reforms 
Equity; efficiency  Many dec policies not 
implemented as they fail 
to overcome cent forces 
 Where implemented, 
dec often fails to achieve 
aims 
 Conceptual approaches 
(a) social devel ~ equity 
(b) market ~ efficiency 
 Dec cannot be reduced 
to simple statements: 
overall conditions for 
implementation 
 Dec can lead to 
fragmentation, weakened 
centre, inequity 
 
Privatisation 
may not be 
dec but cent 
via incr 
state control 
 Org/al 
models of 
dec=ideal 
types 
 Dec 
provides 
cover for 
hidden 
agendas 
Craig 2003 PR; social 
policy 
Policy 
review re. 
‘third way’ 
ideas 
NZ 1990s 
onwar
ds 
Dec 
=devolving 
resources 
commensura
te with 
responsibilit
y; multi-
Various Health 
services; 
inter-
agency 
collaborati
on re. 
determina
Spatial scales: 
functions and 
levels; acctbly 
 De facto dec; i.e. ‘not 
premeditated technically 
as one’ 
 Common acctbly 
platforms: agreements 
between local providers 
and c/govt (including 
 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 174 
layered 
governance; 
subsidiarity 
nts of 
health 
measurable service 
outcomes) 
Davidson 
1997 
Comment
ary 
Review of 
other papers 
USA: health nd Political 
consideratio
ns 
n/a Policy n/a Importance of politics  
Defever 
2000 
Comment
ary 
Policy 
review 
Belgium 1990s Dec Relations 
between 
federal govt, 
pronvinces, 
communities 
and 
municipalities  
Health 
services 
Resource 
allocation and 
expenditure 
(average 
expenditure: 96 
out of 100 
(national 
average) in 
Flanders, 
102/100 in 
Wallonia) 
 Federal structure: 
overlapping regions (non-
personal matters) and 
communities (personal) 
 Segmented pluralism; 
devel of organised and 
powerful interests 
 Pacification: conflict 
muted; emphasis on co-
operation but policy-
making complex 
 Call for autonomy from 
Flemish community 
 50% 
Belgian 
hospitals 
were run by 
religious 
orders 
 
Subsidiarity 
principle 
espoused in 
Flanders 
Deeming 
2004 
PR; social 
policy 
QV; 
income/expe
nd data 
UK 2001
–2 
Dec 
(relatively 
straightforw
ard concept 
to define): 
extent that 
signif 
decision-
making 
discretion is 
available at 
lower 
hierarchical 
levels 
Share of local 
spending 
determined by 
the centre and 
how much by 
health care 
purchasers 
Health 
spending 
by a 
single 
district 
purchaser 
Efficiency 
(allocative); 
equity 
 Purchasers locked into 
part decisions 
 Fear of destabilising 
local health economy 
 Centralist approach to 
allocation of growth funds 
 Little evidence of shift in 
power and resp from 
centre to local purchasing 
authorities 
 
 Level of 
central 
control 
appears to 
be distorting 
central 
priorities 
 Pay and 
price 
inflation 
absorbed 
1/3 of 
growth 
money 
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De Roo and 
Maarse 1990 
PR; mgt Conceptual 
and 
empirical 
Netherlands n/a Central–
local 
relations 
Strategic org 
behaviour; 
policy space 
Health 
care 
services 
Efficiency  Problems of policy 
implementation especially 
if not based on valid 
theory of policy space 
 Negotiation and mutual 
adaptation vital to 
manage policy space and 
interdependencies  
 
De Vries 
2001 
PR Review: 
conceptual 
Intl: 
Germany, 
England, 
Sweden, 
Netherlands 
nd Dec= 
devolution 
of power 
and 
responsibilit
y over policy 
(United 
Nations) 
Various Various Various: mainly 
efficiency and 
democracy 
 Little published on 
effects of dec 
 Fantasy of optimal size 
 Values in political 
culture more impt than 
inherent features of dec 
 Same arguments often 
justify dec and cent 
Arguments 
for/against 
dec are 
subjective; 
third 
approach -
differences 
between 
policy areas 
Di Matteo 
2000 
PR QT; 
expenditure 
analysis 
Canada: 
health 
1975
–96 
Public-
private 
expenditure 
Financial: 
various 
Finance Efficiency/financ
e 
 Determinants of public-
private mix: per-capita 
income, govt transfers 
and % of total income 
held by top 1/5 
 Federal decisions since 
1975 explain recent 
changes 
 
Dixon 2001 Op-ed; 
economics 
Policy 
review 
UK; health 1997
–
2001 
Cent (not 
defined) 
Various Various 
health 
services 
Equity; 
efficiency: alloc 
and technical; 
acctbly 
 Freedoms of purchasers 
and providers in internal 
market heavily restricted 
 Vision ‘right’ but NHS 
capacity to deliver? 
 Centre should be less 
over-bearing, trust more 
and experiment 
 
Drummond 
2002 
PR; public 
admin 
QT and 
conceptual 
Australia nd Dec; 
federalism 
Spending by 
central, state 
Resource 
allocation 
Efficiency  Regional states or 
central–local models 
 AU is most 
centralised 
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and local govt  and 
expend. 
could save over AU$20bn 
 ‘Duplicated centralism’ 
costs AU$20bn 
 Evidence shows 
potential of cost-effective 
dec 
federal 
structure 
Elstad 1990 PR 
 
Review of 
policy 
Norway: 
health 
1984
–8 
Dec not 
defined 
 Staffing 
ratios 
 Control over 
annual budget 
Primary 
care 
Equity; 
democratisation 
 Increased primary care 
staffing numbers 
 Distribution of services 
has not become more 
equitable 
 Dec does not necessarily 
lead to more democracy 
Uncertain 
whether dec 
promotes 
growth of 
services 
Esping- 
Anderson 
2000 
PR; social 
policy 
Diagnosis of 
welfare 
policy 
reforms 
Intl nd Dec Various Welfare 
state 
services 
Various  Reform strategies: 
privatisation, dec and 
familialisation 
 Dec linked to growth of 
third sector 
 Dec will shift 
responsibility but not 
generate savings 
 
Estes and 
Linkins 1997 
PR Policy 
analysis 
USA 1980s
–97 
Dec; 
devolution 
(devolution 
revolution) 
Various Long-term 
care 
 
Equity; finance  How will states use 
policy discretion to 
balance gap between 
social services and acute 
care? 
 State discretion may 
alter capacity of non-
profit org to deliver long-
term care 
 Forces for 
change: 
shorter 
length of 
stay, 
technology, 
ageing 
population 
Exworthy 
1993 
PR; 
geography
, policy 
QV: policy 
analysis 
UK 1991
–2 
Dec; cent Org/structural 
changes to 
NHS 
Health 
services 
Responsiveness; 
equity; efficiency 
 Internal market reforms 
led to HA merger and 
search for locality 
structure 
 Need for 
policy 
direction 
regarding 
hierarchy of 
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 Costs and benefits of 
merger and dec; south-
west region savings from 
HA mergers: £1.3–2.7 
million per annum 
purchasers 
Exworthy 
1994 
PR; social 
policy 
QV: 
interviews 
UK 1988
–91  
Dec 
(territorial: 
district HA 
to 
neighbourho
od) 
Staff 
interviews 
Communit
y health 
services 
Responsiveness; 
equity 
 Dec generated prof–
managerial conflict: 
nurses disputed need for 
local mgt 
 Fluid concept of ‘local’ 
 
Exworthy 
1998 
PR; 
geography 
QT; 
secondary 
data 
UK; health 1995
–6 
Localism: 
multiple 
definitions 
Financial: % 
HA budget 
Commiss 
ioning  
Equity; efficiency Limited effect of internal 
market due to embedded 
social and institutional 
relations 
Power of 
local org 
relations 
Exworthy et 
al. 1999 
PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
analysis 
UK 1945
–90s 
Cent Balance 
between 
market, 
hierarchy and 
network 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; 
equity; acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Decline of hierarchy 
false as market, hierarchy 
and network co-exist 
 Mix of market, hierarchy 
and network impt 
 Hierarchy never was 
fully centralising 
 Third way is a different 
mix of market, hierarchy 
and network 
 Catalytic effect of mix? 
 Command-
and-control: 
never able 
to command 
or desire to 
control 
 
Ezzamel et 
al. 2004 
PR; public 
mgt/accun
ting 
Policy 
analysis 
UK 1997 
onwar
ds 
Devolution Change in 
responsivenes
s and accbtly 
following UK 
political 
devolution 
Public 
services 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness; 
efficiency 
(allocative and 
technical) 
 Devolution ~ more 
openness, transparency, 
consultation and scrutiny 
regarding budgets 
 Extensive information 
overload  
 
Fattore 2000 Comment
ary 
Policy 
review 
Italy 1990s Dec; 
regionlisatio
Relations 
between state 
Health 
services 
Acctbly  Traditional lack of 
acctbly 
 Regions: 
where 
willingness 
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n and regions  1992 reforms aimed to 
concentrate functions 
from centre and locality 
to region. 
 Greater role for centre 
re. acctbly and 
comprehensive care 
 Future balance between 
regional autonomy and 
national system uncertain 
to devolve 
powers is 
tested; risk 
of further 
fragmentatio
n 
Ferlie and 
Pettigrew 
1996 
PR; mgt Lit review; 
descriptive 
case 
studies: 
business 
process and 
Department 
of Health 
(no impact 
data yet) 
Intl nd  Dec: resp 
and 
authority 
 Cent (over-
cent ~ 
bottleneck) 
 Also 
delayering, 
downsizing 
Change in 
nature and 
role of 
corporate HQ 
Evidence 
mainly 
from 
private 
sector but 
public 
sector 
case study 
(Departm
ent of 
Health) 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Practitioner concern with 
effective head office 
design and defining value 
added 
 HQ change ~ often 
downsizing driven by cost 
but also over-cent. 50% 
not prepared for 
downsizing 
 Dec strategy→ 
incremental approach; 
centre too weak 
 Greater dec balanced by 
tighter acctbly 
 Hetarchy: geog diffusion 
of strategy and coord/n 
 Promise of HQ change 
greater than reality 
 Theory ~ managerial 
strategy, new 
institutionalism, power, 
networks, value creation 
 Some 
parallel in 
public sector 
(e.g. 
Department 
of Health) 
 Often no 
downsizing 
but 
regulatory 
agencies 
expanding 
 Hard to 
access to 
study 
 Most 
=insider 
reports 
 Staff=resp 
of which 
level? 
 Coord/n 
less cost 
than control 
Ferlie and 
Shortell 
PR; HSR Policy 
review, 
UK and USA nd Dec (not 
defined; US 
Quality of 
service 
Health 
services 
Quality 
improvement/res
 Core properties: 
leadership; pervasive 
Success 
due to 
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2001 secondary 
data 
dec cf UK) provision ponsiveness quality culture; effective 
teams and IT 
 Multi-level: individual, 
groups, org and system 
ability to 
resolve 
trade-offs: 
UK cent 
 Approach 
and bottom-
up devel 
Frank and 
Gaynor 
1994 
PR QT; financial 
analysis 
USA: 
mental 
health 
1985 
–91 
Various Financial; 
access 
Mental 
health 
services 
Equity; finance Financial incentives  
Gauld 2002 PR QV: policy 
analysis 
NZ 1989
–
today 
Dec; cent; 
autonomy 
Central–local 
balance 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; 
responsiveness 
 1997–9 involved 
cent=‘headquarters’ 
controlling planning and 
purchasing w/distance 
from provision 
 1999–today: devolution 
of considerable autonomy 
but w/strong central 
control 
 Apart from 
market, 
policy 
developed 
an adequate 
environment 
for effective 
planning and 
purchasing 
Gershberg 
1998 
PR; devel 
studies 
Review Mexico, 
Nicaragua; 
health 
schools 
1990s Dec 
definition 
problematic; 
re-cent (cf 
cent) 
Various, linked 
to framework 
Education
al and 
health 
service 
provision 
Efficiency; 
equity; acctbly 
 Whole-system (dec and 
cent) framework: 
-finance 
-auditing/eval 
-regulation 
-demand-driven 
mechanisms 
-democratic mechanisms 
-provider choice/mix 
-mgt systems (staff and 
IT) 
 Framework focuses on 
functions 
 Favours term acctbly 
rather than dec 
 Re-cent 
=aspects of 
provision 
and acctbly 
that c/govt 
must 
develop to 
maintain 
effectivenes
s of dec’d 
reform 
 % of 
finance 
w/sub-natl 
source is 
misleading 
 Method 
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 Need to explore inter-
relations between 
dimensions of acctbly 
commentary 
Giannoni 
and Hitris 
2002 
PR; 
economics 
QT Italy 1980s 
1990s 
Dec: 
transfer of 
autonomy in 
political and 
econ power 
to sub-
central 
authorities; 
devolution; 
subsidiarity 
Health service 
expenditure by 
region (change 
over time) 
Health 
services 
Equity  Health costs contained 
but regional inequality 
has persisted/widened 
 Higher spending regions 
continued to spend more 
even after reforms 
 Diversity measured 
financially 
Italian 
health 
service aims 
for equality 
of provision 
but regional 
diversity 
exists 
Gilbert and 
Pichard 
1996 
PR; 
economics 
QT: 
economic 
modelling 
n/a 
e.g. French 
education 
n/a Territorial 
dec 
Optimal size of 
local 
jurisdictions  
Local govt 
services 
Efficiency; 
responsiveness 
 Local govt have 
informational advantages 
and c/govt info 
disadvantage ~ spillovers 
 Shape of transfer 
schedules from centre to 
local crucial 
 
 Uncertain~ 
private cost 
of public 
suppliers 
and 
spillovers 
may explain 
division of 
resp 
Goggin 1999 PR QT: multi-
variate 
model 
USA: health 1997 Determinati
on of 
variables 
Various Administr
ation 
Expenditure; 
planning 
Importance of political 
and economic variables 
 
Gray 1988 PR Historical 
analysis 
Canada and 
Australia 
1980s Federalism 
(catch-all 
term) 
Degree of 
policy change 
Policy; 
health 
services 
Policy outcomes   Devel of policy not 
inhibited by dec 
 Search for universally 
valid theory of federalism 
seems likely to be 
unrewarding 
 Fed inst seem less impt 
 Power of 
medical 
profession 
had 
enormous 
impact on 
policy 
outcomes 
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in policy impact than 
initially thought 
Greener 
2004 
PR; social 
policy/ 
public 
admin 
Critical 
discourse 
analysis of 
documents 
UK: health 1997
–
2003 
Dec not 
used; 
central–local 
localisation 
Analysis of key 
words in texts 
Health 
policy/ 
services 
Various 
-efficiency 
-staff morale 
 Labour’s health policy 
moved through three 
stages ~ driver for 
change: quality, perf, 
choice 
 Discourse of health 
consumerism likely to 
remain 
 Moments likely to breed 
cynicism and disaffection 
among staff 
 
Griffiths 
1999 
 
PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
review 
UK: Wales 
Housing, 
education 
1980s 
1990s 
Devolution Policy devel Housing 
and 
education 
Acctbly  Significant autonomy of 
Welsh territorial 
ministries by late 1980s 
 Claims of Welsh 
exceptionalism 
exaggerated; uniformity 
w/England 
Legislation 
and financial 
coercion 
enforced 
local govt 
compliance 
w/ c/govt 
policy 
Grogan 
1993 
PR Literature 
review and 
policy 
analysis 
USA: health 1990s  Finance Finance Finance Variation in decentralised 
services 
 
Hales 1999 PR; mgt Review: 
conceptual/
mgt studies 
Intl; mainly 
private 
sector 
nd Dec 
(transfer of 
power and 
resp down); 
devolution  
Managerial 
behaviour 
Various Innovation, 
morale 
Transfer of power alone is 
insufficient to improve 
perf 
Recognises 
terms are 
ambiguous 
Hamilton 
2000 
PR; mgt QV: 1 in-
depth case 
study 
(north-west 
England) 
UK  1990s Dec (not 
defined) 
Analysis of 
negotiation 
between union 
and managers  
Pay 
negotiatio
ns 
Staffing; acctbly  No formal negotiation 
structures introduced but 
more issues for over 
which local formal 
negotiation has been 
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est’d 
 Local pay flexibility not 
always achieved 
 Persuasion important to 
gain assent for IR 
changes 
Hardy et al. 
1999 
PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
review 
UK, 
Netherlands
: health/ 
social care 
1990s Hierarchical 
relations; 
collaborate 
and 
compete, 
needs led 
provision 
Comparison of 
vertical and 
horizontal 
structures 
Health 
and social 
care: 
integrated 
care  
Degree of 
integration 
 England: hierarchy 
important; Netherlands: 
bargaining in networks 
important 
 Barriers to joint working 
 No single 
locus for 
policy 
formul, 
funding or 
implem 
Hill and 
Pickering 
1986 
PR; mgt QT; postal 
survey of 
500 
chairmen of 
largest UK 
companies 
(28% 
response) 
UK; private 
sector 
1982 Dec (multi-
divisional 
org w/ 
autonomy) 
Survey 
responses re. 
org structure, 
reasons for 
dec, location 
of decision-
making, 
financial perf 
Org 
decision-
making 
and 
structure 
Efficiency; 
acctbly; profit 
 
 75 had no more than 6 
divisions 
 Diversification/multi-
divisional org (dec): 
-limited evidence of 
improved profitability 
-problems coord/n, 
acctbly and control 
 Dec not a panacea: impt 
to consider size and 
shape of divisions 
Structure 
may only 
partly 
explain 
outcomes; 
ways 
resources 
are used is 
also impt 
Hoggett 
1996 
PR; social 
policy, 
public 
admin 
Conceptual 
analysis 
UK (and intl 
relevance) 
1990s Dec 
(operation/s
trategy; 
loose/tight; 
rowing and 
steering); 
Centralized 
dec=standar
d part of 
org/al 
literature. 
Degree of 
control (self 
and external) 
Operation/stra
tegy difference 
=socially 
constructed. 
Dec units=cost 
centres 
Various 
public 
sector 
functions 
Morale (low job 
insecurity); 
efficiency; 
acctbly; process 
 Dec to operational units 
and cent to strategic 
control 
 Competition is main way 
of co-ordinating dec’d 
units 
 Perf mgt and monitoring 
of dec’d units 
 Changes involve ‘control 
at a distance’ ~ 
 Dec, 
market and 
perf mgt 
=post-
bureauratic 
control 
 Changes 
lead to high 
output, low 
commitment 
workforce 
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Dec w/o 
autonomy 
regulation and autonomy 
 Central co-ordination via 
incentives/changing rules 
of the game 
Howell 2004 PR; HSR Review of 
policy 
NZ, UK NZ: 
1993
–9 
UK: 
2003 
onwar
ds 
Dec: 
operation 
and mgt 
 
Thematic 
comparison 
between NZ 
and UK 
Hospital 
services 
Acctbly; 
efficiency; 
governance 
 Devolution to hospital 
governance in 1990s (NZ) 
 Foundation trusts pose 
challenges to governance 
and control of assets 
 UK (+) local acctbly and 
competition may be more 
responsive 
 UK (−) soft budget 
constraints and 
boards=regulated and 
local beneficiaries 
 Foundation trusts 
bearing risk outside their 
control? 
 Improve-
ment not 
just due to 
structural 
form but 
whole sector 
and info 
 How to 
ensure 
acctbly? 
 How to 
resolve 
competing 
interests? 
Hudson 
1999 
PR; social 
policy 
Review of 
policy 
UK; 
England 
1990s Dec not 
defined; 
Burns 
framework 
(five 
dimensions) 
used 
Localisation, 
flexibility, 
devolution 
(org 
relocation) and 
democratisatio
n 
Primary 
care: 
commissio
ning 
Inter-agency and 
inter-
professional 
collaboration 
Locality commissioning 
associated w/some 
improvement in morale, 
better inter-professional 
relationships and minor 
change to some 
community-based 
services 
 
Hudson and 
Hardy 2001 
PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
review: 33 
interviews in 
1998 
UK: 
England 
and 
Scotland 
1997
–
2000 
Dec not 
defined; 
refers to 
purchaser 
not provider 
Degree of 
localisation: 
power and 
control 
(market/ 
hierarchy/ 
network) 
Inter-
agency 
partnershi
ps 
Governance; 
acctbly 
 Recognition of de facto 
dec despite uniformity 
rhetoric 
 Uncertain role of centre 
given localisation 
 
Hughes and PR; QV: 31 UK; Wales 1990s Dec; Subjective Health Acctbly  Governmentality:  Contracts 
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Griffiths 
1999 
sociology interviews 
and meeting 
observations 
(c80) 
centralism assessment service: 
Patients 
Charter, 
waiting 
times 
action/steering at a 
distance replacing 
bureaucratic control (via 
contracts) 
 Informal resistance 
counters dec governance 
 Need for more weight to 
centralising processes and 
local discretionary power 
advance 
central 
policy 
through 
choices 
made by 
actors 
w/local 
concerns 
Hurley et al. 
1995 
PR Review Canada nd Dec= 
dispersal of 
authority 
among 
smaller org 
units that 
function 
w/some 
autonomy 
Availability 
and use of 
information 
Various 
health 
services 
Efficiency (tech 
and alloc), 
acctbly and 
patient 
involvement 
 Critical factors: 
-nature of information 
-decision-making context 
 Dec has potential to be 
more efficient (via ability 
to incorporate info and 
system innovation) 
 Dec has potential to 
exploit context-specific 
info 
 Acctbly mechanisms 
critical to improving 
efficiency 
Variation in 
values, 
preferences 
and needs 
are beyond 
policy-
makers 
control 
Hutchcroft 
2001 
PR; 
politics 
and social 
policy 
Analytical 
framework 
Intl; mainly 
developing 
countries 
n/a Dec; means 
of promoting 
democratic 
and devel 
aims 
Measurement 
of dec cannot 
be precise 
Various Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Lack of framework to 
assess central–local 
relations 
 Continua (political and 
admin) proposed: 2x2 
 Position on continua 
affects outcomes (dec 
harm>good?): starting 
point for dec and 
area/function balance 
 Character 
of central–
local ties 
critical 
 
 
Iliffe and 
Munro 2000 
PR Policy 
analysis 
UK: 
health 
1991 
–
Reforms, 
market 
Quality; 
effectiveness 
Commissi
oning; 
Quality; equity; 
effectiveness 
Market model=regulation 
from centre 
 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 185 
2000 forces finance 
Jack 2003 PR; 
politics 
Policy 
review 
Nicaragua 1990s Dec; 
autonomy 
 
Incentives 
related to perf 
Primary 
and 
secondary 
care 
Acctbly  Policy: managerial 
freedom over inputs 
 Incentives: perf 
agreement and bonuses 
(17% hospital funds) 
From 
socialism to 
market 
system 
Jacobs 1997 PR; 
accountan
cy 
PR; policy 
analysis 
NZ 1980s 
1990s 
Policy uses 
various 
terms and 
definitions  
Author 
interpretation 
Various 
public 
sector 
services; 
education 
case study  
Acctbly 
 
 Dec accompanied by 
monitoring, perf mgt and 
accountancy control 
 Questions link between 
dec and perf 
Privatisation
, market, 
reform, 
empowerme
nt, and 
restructuring 
Janovsky 
1997 
WHO 
seminar 
Review of 
policy and 
literature 
27 
developing 
and 
developed 
nations 
n/a Review of 
evidence 
n/a 
Constraints of 
measurement 
identified 
Health 
services 
Various  Dec serves various aims 
including competition and 
solidarity 
 Implementation and 
meaning context-specific 
 Streams: shift to district 
mgt, forms of NPM, new 
relations private and 
wider public sector reform 
 Impact difficult to 
measure: lack of data and 
fragmented implem 
 Regulation and implem 
units aid dec 
 Dec not a 
magic bullet 
 No clear 
evidence 
that it 
improves 
equity or a 
focus on 
primary care 
 Some 
functions 
benefit from 
cent 
Jervis and 
Plowden 
2003 
Report Policy 
review/ 
analysis 
UK 1999
–
2003 
Devolution 
(political) 
Changes in 
relations 
between 
Whitehall and 
devolved 
admin 
Devolved 
health 
services 
Acctbly  No departure from 
values of NHS but now 
family of health systems 
(not just one NHS) 
 Greater similarity 
between Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland than 
w/England 
 Apparent divergence 
 Little 
desire for 
private 
sector role 
in S,W,NI 
 Limited 
English 
devolution 
 Adaptive 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 186 
from England: decreasing 
lines of acctbly, 
decreasing volume of 
Whitehall activities 
prof org 
 
Department 
of Health 
success in 
UK-wide role 
Johansson 
and Borell 
1999 
PR Policy 
analysis 
Sweden: 
health 
1992
–7 
Networks; 
eval; 
incentives 
Equity; finance Old age 
care 
Finance; equity Steering and economic 
incentives 
 
John and 
Chathukula
m 2003 
PR; devel 
studies 
QT India n/a Dec 
(definitions 
problematic)
; devolution 
Subjective 
assessment by 
9 ‘experts’ 
Various   Measuring dec 
underdeveloped due to 
lack of common standards 
and lack of consensus 
about meaning of dec 
 Model scores 0–5 
 Kerala scores 2 despite 
dec policies; low score 
due to planning concerns 
 Vengroff 
and Salem 
model 
(Tunisia) 
 
Johnson 
2001 
PR; devel 
studies 
Literature 
review 
Intl: 
developing 
countries 
n/a Dec: deconc 
and 
devolution ~ 
downward 
delegation 
of authority 
Review of 
evidence 
Anti-
poverty 
policies 
Acctbly; 
democracy 
 Little evidence that 
democracy or dec 
necessary for poverty 
reduction. Some evidence 
that they are c/produtive 
 Need for 
acctbly/autonomy 
balance: autonomy to 
overcome interests but 
acctbly to public 
 Certain degree of re-
cent may be needed  
 Support 
from 
external 
actors 
important 
Jones 2000 PR? Policy 
commentary 
USA 1980s 
1990s 
Dec, cent 
(not 
defined) 
Org 
arrangements 
for policy 
making and 
funding 
Various, 
incl. 
academic 
medical 
centres 
Efficiency  USA has no centralised 
policy-making or 
financing org 
 Dec allows flexibility but 
never resolves financing 
 Is health 
care a 
business or 
public 
service 
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and 
Medicare 
or service questions   Muddling 
through 
Kapiriri et al. 
2003 
PR QV Uganda n/a Dec: various 
forms 
recognised 
 Public 
participati
on 
Responsiveness; 
acctbly 
 Local councils and 
committees facilitate 
participation 
 Structural- and 
individual-level barriers to 
participation identified; 
poverty (and 
demotivation) most 
important 
 Leaders 
and public 
experience 
of 
participation 
 
Kelleher and 
Yackee 2004 
PR; 
public 
admin 
Policy 
analysis 
USA (North 
Carolina) 
1997 Devolution: 
authorizer 
and 
recipient 
govts; 
multiple 
meanings  
Changes in 
welfare 
caseload, 
family poverty 
and workforce 
participation 
Welfare 
services 
Efficiency; staff 
involvement (?) 
 100 counties 
w/additional policy-
making authority since 
1997 
 Perceived level of 
increasing authority 
(post-devolution) had no 
impact on outcomes 
 Fiscal flexibility 
important to achieving 
welfare reform goals 
 Devolution 
affects 
perception 
of policy-
making 
effectivenes
s (symbolic 
value) but 
outcomes 
are mixed 
Kelly 2003 PR Documentar
y analysis 
and 
interviews 
UK: local 
govt 
2000
–1 
Audit 
practices 
Various Audit; 
regulation 
Efficiency; 
effectiveness; 
finances 
Impact of levels of audit  
Kessler and 
Dopson 1998 
PR; mgt Policy 
analysis 
UK 1990s Dec; cent Balance of 
power 
between 
Department of 
Health/civil 
service and 
NHS 
NHS org Various; mainly 
efficiency 
 Dec/cent tension in Care 
Programme Approach: 
autonomy and role of 
centre? 
 Dec essential to int mkt 
 Civil service/NHS culture 
difference 
 First, second and third- 
order decisions 
 Tension 
and 
ambiguity 
similar to 
private 
sector 
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Kewell et al. 
2002 
PR Interviews 
observations
; 
documentar
y analysis 
UK: health 1999 Networks; 
regional 
approaches 
 Cancer 
services - 
networks 
Decision-
making; 
responsiveness 
Network models moving 
to convergence 
 
Khaleghian 
2003 
World 
Bank 
paper 
QT and 
literature 
review 
Cross-
national: 
health 
1980
–97 
Differential 
effects of 
dec 
Financial; 
equity; health 
outcomes 
Immunisa
tion 
Equity; finance; 
health outcomes 
 Differential effects of 
dec 
 Need to identify 
institutional correlates of 
successful dec but no 
evidence that incr 
capacity makes dec 
more/less effective 
 
Klein 2003b Editorial Commentary
; policy 
analysis 
UK 1997
–
2003 
Localism; 
cent; dec 
Various Health 
services 
(esp 
commissio
ning) 
Equity; 
responsiveness 
 Revolving-door analogy 
 Localism associated 
w/pluralism 
 Dec questions role of 
c/govt – how much scope 
for diversity? 
 Equity: gravitational pull 
to centre 
 Rhetoric to reality still 
distant 
 Cent’g 
power and 
blame 
 Treasury 
may not 
welcome 
local powers 
to spend 
Klein and 
Maynard 
1998 
Editorial Commentary
; policy 
analysis 
UK 1997
–8 
Cent Capacity of 
c/govt 
Health 
services 
Equity; efficiency  ‘New NHS’ will involve 
more control from c/govt 
in directing change 
 Questions central 
capacity to implement 
national service 
frameworks 
 Command 
and control 
concentrate 
blame and 
conflict 
 Ministers 
may rethink 
cent 
strategy 
Kleinman et 
al. 2002 
Research 
report for 
Literature 
review 
UK nd Central–
local 
Finance and 
non-finance 
elements of 
Local govt 
services 
Acctbly: local 
choice; efficiency 
 Lit focuses on finance, 
delivery, polit structures, 
 Limited 
evidence ~ 
improved 
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govt relations local govt (allocative)  and delivery 
 Local govt reform 
supports Tiebout 
approach 
 Measurement problems 
~ input, output, outcome 
 Funding and structure 
not fully separable 
efficiency 
from local 
tax (cf 
central 
grants) 
Koivusalo 
1999 
PR; HSR/ 
health 
policy 
Policy 
analysis 
Finland 1990s Dec Changes in 
funding of 
services 
following dec 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; equity  In 1990s, c/govt dec’d 
powers to municipalities 
w/tax raising powers 
(mainly user fees) 
 Local governance does 
not guarantee equitable 
provision w/o legal 
powers. 
 Danger of reduced 
c/govt subsidy and rising 
user fees  
 Need for 
subsidies to 
poorer areas 
continue 
 To ensure 
equity, dec 
must 
consider 
quality and 
financing 
Kolehmainen-
Aitken 1999 
Book Policy 
analysis 
Africa, Asia, 
Latin 
America 
1990s Dec Policy impacts Health 
services 
Equity; efficiency  Lessons and challenges 
on implementing dec in 
different countries 
Case study: 
Indonesia 
Ladenheim 
and Kee 1998 
PR; 
public 
admin 
Policy 
analysis; 
legislative 
framework 
USA 1996 Federalism Balance of 
power and 
resp between 
federal and 
state govt 
Structure 
and 
functions 
of 
Medicaid 
Acctbly  Federal/state differences 
made compromise 
difficult over Medicaid 
 Criteria to assess 
federalism: 
structure, stabilisation, 
distribution and allocation 
of power and funding  
 
Leese et al. 
2001 
PR; mgt QV (52 Total 
Purchasing 
Pilots); 
policy 
UK 1995
–7 
Dec; cent Not stated Primary 
care 
Various 
evaluative 
criteria (total 
purchasing eval) 
 Simultaneous dec and 
cent 
 Broad goals need to be 
operationalised for eval 
 Eval of 
success 
problematic 
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analysis   3 years=short period to 
evaluate ‘success’ 
Leichter 1997 PR  Commentary USA nd US states as 
labs of 
democracy 
Differences 
between 
States 
Various, 
mainly 
spending 
and 
outputs 
Variation ~ 
equity  
Variation is not always 
bad and it is the price of 
federalism 
Inter-state 
variation 
requires 
evaluative 
criteria 
Levaggi and 
Zanola 2003 
PR Expenditure 
analysis 
Italy: 
health 
1989
–93 
 Financial Expenditu
re 
Financial Finance related to quality 
and access 
 
Levaggi and 
Smith 2004 
Working 
paper/ 
chapter; 
public 
economic
s 
Review: 
conceptual/ 
fiscal 
federalism 
Intl nd Dec: 
transfer of 
powers from 
a central 
authority to 
more local 
institutions 
Various: 
mainly 
financial 
Various Mainly 
purchasing of 
services 
 Transaction costs will be 
higher under dec 
 Little evidence that 
diversity encouraged by 
dec leads to innovation 
 Sensitivity of QT weights 
on measures (e.g. 
acctbly) 
 
 Logic: dec 
to household 
 Arguments 
for/against 
dec and cent 
 Discussion 
of diversity, 
information 
asymmetry 
and spillover 
effects 
Litwinenko 
and Cooper 
1994 
PR; mgt Staff 
questionnair
e (n= 
1050 sent; 
51% 
response) 
UK Early 
1990s 
Delegation 
of resp to 
org; org 
culture 
Org culture ~ 
role, power, 
trust, support 
Health 
services 
Staff 
satisfaction/ 
morale 
 Main org culture before 
and after trust status: 
combination of role and 
power 
 Trend towards more 
power and less 
task/support 
 Main 
culture shift 
in clinicians 
and 
managers, 
not non-
clinicians 
Lloyd 1997 PR Case studies UK: health 1993 Union 
activity 
Various Human 
resources 
Negotiation External factors impacting 
on unions 
 
Locock and 
Dopson 1999 
PR; mgt, 
public 
admin 
QV: ‘tracer 
study’ of 2 
regional 
health 
authorities/ 
offices 
UK; 
England 
1994
–6 
Dec; cent Relations 
between 
central 
agencies 
Health 
care 
planning 
and mgt 
Not stated  Centre of NHS cannot be 
treated as one org 
 Increased central HQ 
control and market-style 
devolution 
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 Regional offices occupy 
boundary position in NHS 
Lomas 1997 PR; HSR Policy 
analysis; 
survey of 
board 
members in 
5 provinces 
Canada n/a Devolution 
of authority 
from 
provinces to 
regional or 
local boards 
Opinions from 
board 
members 
Health 
care org 
and mgt 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Devolution ~ community 
empowerment, service 
integration and conflict 
containment 
 Need to trade off 
 Canada: 123 devolved 
authorities in 9 provinces 
 Devolved 
authorities 
will deflect 
blame from 
Provinces 
Lomas et al. 
1997 
PR; 
HSR 
Survey of 62 
boards in 5 
provinces 
Canada 1990s Devolution 
of authority; 
most 
devolution ~ 
dec or de-
concentratio
n 
Opinions from 
board 
members 
Health 
care org 
and mgt 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Variations in scope of 
devolved services, 
acctbly, number of tiers, 
funding and degree of 
authority ~ different 
objectives. Narrow 
objective ~ efficiency aim 
 No revenue raising 
power 
 Much 
scepticism 
about 
devolution 
(not just a 
good thing) 
 Dev 
authority 
between 
c/govt and 
public 
Loudoun and 
Harley 2001 
PR; mgt Legislative 
and policy 
review 
Australia 1996 Dec of IR Social/ 
economic 
impact of dec 
IR 
IR Staff morale 
 
 Impact of growth of 
12-hour shifts 
 Onus on workers to 
identify H&S impacts 
 
Lowndes 
2002 
Policy 
analysis;
public 
admin/ 
local 
govt 
Policy 
review 
UK 2001 Dec; cent; 
central–local 
relations 
Balance of 
power 
between 
c/govt and 
(individual) 
local govt 
Local govt 
white 
paper 
(2001); 
no 
mention 
of 
autonomy 
Acctbly  ‘Confessions’ of prior 
cent do not reverse cent 
trend of Labour govt 
 Dec mainly managerial 
not political 
 Shift from bilateral 
relations to individual 
relations with local 
authorities 
 Individual 
relations 
aided by 
perf mgt 
 Lack of 
joined-up 
govt 
centrally 
may hinder 
local 
delivery 
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Luft 1985 PR; 
public 
health/ 
HSR 
Editorial USA 1980s Regionalizati
on: 
arguments 
for and 
against 
Cost; quality Health 
services 
Outcomes; 
efficiency (costs) 
 Wax and wane of 
regionalization, partly due 
to lack of research 
 Higher volume-better 
outcomes relations 
unclear 
 Regionalization may 
contain cost but incr 
travel 
 
Malcolm 1989 PR; 
health 
policy  
Policy 
analysis 
NZ 1980s Dec; 
devolution 
Expected 
changes 
following dec 
Health 
services  
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Elected area health 
board ~ funding and co-
ordination 
 Models (deconc, 
devolution, delegislation, 
privatisation) evident 
 Dec policy 
will reverse 
cent trend of 
last century 
 Primary 
care part of 
area boards 
Malcolm 1993 PR?; HSR Commentary NZ 1990s Dec Anticipated 
impact of 
reforms 
Health 
services 
Acctbly  NZ possibly moving 
further than other 
countries in dec, acctbly, 
integrated systems due to 
area boards not market 
reforms  
 Crown 
Health 
Enterprises 
shaping 
primary care 
services 
Malcolm et al. 
1994 
PR; 
health 
service 
mgt 
QV NZ 1990s Dec Views of 
general 
managers 
Health 
services 
Acctbly  Dec of general mgt to 
programme or product 
groupings widely 
implemented 
 Managers report 
increasing acctbly, 
commitment and 
innovation 
 Population-
based (not 
institutional) 
approach to 
mgt 
Malcolm and 
Barnett 1995 
P; health 
services 
mgt 
Survey of 
senior 
managers 
NZ 1990s Dec Views of 
impact of new 
dec’d org 
strcuture 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Respondents favoured 
new org structure 
 Seemed to achieve incr 
efficiency and acctbly 
 Services have replaced 
 Dec~ 
decision-
making to 
integrated 
patient 
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hospitals as org entities groups 
McClelland 
2002 
PR; 
social 
policy 
Review UK: Wales 1992
–7 
Devolution 
(political and 
admin) 
n/a Policy-
making 
n/a  Little evidence of major 
changes in service 
delivery 
 Welsh NHS plan 
strengthens central 
control but lack stringent 
targets (as in England) 
Closely 
integrated 
policy 
community 
in Wales 
McDonald 
and Harrison 
2004 
PR; 
social 
policy 
Case study 
(n=1); QV 
UK 2001
–3 
Dec; 
autonomy 
Views and 
attitudes of 
staff 
Primary 
care 
Various  Dec policy focus on 
primary care 
 How far can autonomy 
be exercised given top-
down directives? 
 Central control via 
autonomy~ 
internalisation of central 
values 
 Strategy more effective 
and less costly than direct 
control 
 Unintended 
consequence
s likely 
 Cent via 
targets and 
indicators 
 Earned 
autonomy vs 
loose/tight 
org 
 Incr 
autonomy 
not always 
welcomed 
McEldowney 
2003 
PR; law Review: 
admin, law 
UK: local 
govt  
1997 
onwar
ds 
Devolution; 
dec 
n/a Public 
services 
Efficiency 
(allocative); 
responsiveness 
 Modernisation 
complicated by devolution 
to Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and 
London 
 Centre retains control 
via legal/econ 
instruments →limited 
local autonomy 
 Privatisation changed 
service delivery 
 Local 
freedom 
based on 
perf 
 Financial 
relations vs 
complex 
McFarlane 
and Meier 
PR Policy 
analysis and 
USA: health 1982
–94 
Programme 
impacts - 
Financial; 
outcomes 
Family 
planning 
Finance; equity Type of finance linked to 
outcome 
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1998 model to 
test  
finance 
McKee et al. 
1996 
Peer 
reviewed 
Policy 
analysis 
EU: health 1985
–95 
EU policy 
impact 
Human 
resources; 
equity 
Human 
resources 
Equity Lack of policy impact  
Meads and 
Wild 2003 
Practition
er 
journal 
article; 
HSR/ 
health 
policy 
Policy 
review/ 
commentary 
and 
comparison 
Canada; 
Finland; NZ 
nd Dec Changes in 
control of org 
features 
Primary 
care 
Responsiveness; 
equity; quality 
 Devolutionary tide may 
be turning in countries 
which have dec’d primary 
care services 
 Central control over 
standards in UK, NZ and 
Canada 
 Dec seen as way of incr 
responsiveness and 
democracy 
 Dec of control (NZ) 
 Localism at 
high point in 
Finland, 
Canada and 
NZ due to 
negative 
public 
perceptions 
about equity 
and quality 
Milewa et al. 
1998 
PR; 
social 
policy 
a. Survey of 
12 South 
Thames HAs 
b. Two case 
studies 
 
UK: 2 case 
studies  
nd ~ 
1990s 
Dec (internal 
rather than 
external); 
autonomy 
Attitudes of 
and views of 
managers 
Health 
services: 
public 
involveme
nt 
Responsiveness 
‘Consumerist 
acctbly’ 
 Dec aimed to offer mgrl 
autonomy to be locally 
responsive 
 Reforms have not been 
responsiveness to local 
populations 
 Context of highly 
centralised state 
 
Miller et al. 
1980 
PR; 
public 
heath/ 
HSR 
Epidemiologi
cal/ 
HSR study 
USA 
(Tennessee
) 
1970s Dec (not 
defined) 
Changes in 
health status 
Neighbour
hood clinic 
(10 000 
patients, 
500k 
visits over 
7 years) 
Outcomes: BP, 
hospital days, 
outpatient visits 
(of 1004 
patients) 
 Dec neighbourhood 
clinics effective in 
providing services 
(otherwise gone to o/pat) 
 Nurses are main 
providers in dec clinics 
 Clinic costs less than 
hospital 
 
Mills 1994 PR; devel 
studies 
Review Intl  nd Dec= 
transfer of 
Forms and 
levels of dec 
Revenue 
raising, 
Acctbly; 
efficiency; equity 
 Trade-offs and tensions 
associated with acctbly, 
Term (dec) 
often used 
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authority/ 
dispersal of 
power 
(Rondinelli) 
 policy-
making, 
resource 
allocation, 
funding 
and 
coord/n 
efficiency and equity 
 Tasks and balance of 
responsibility between 
levels will influence 
degree of local power 
w/o 
discussion of 
level 
Mohan 2003 Report Commentary UK: 
England 
Post- 
1945 
Dec Impact of 
central–local 
relations 
Health 
services 
(foundatio
n trusts) 
Equity; acctbly  Labour’s policy: only 
partly due to diversity 
and consumer choice; 
also, catering to middle-
class voters in marginals 
 Potential to destabilise 
smaller hospitals, 
exacerbate staff 
shortages, be 
unrepresentative, 
threaten access to 
services  
 Claims of 
mutual 
benefits 
overstate 
their 
benefits in 
the past 
Moon and 
Brown 2000 
PR Discourse 
analysis 
UK: health 1992
–7 
Spatial 
language 
n/a Reorganis
ation 
Responsiveness  Contested terms 
 Notion of govermentality 
 
Moran 1994 PR Review of 
policy 
UK, USA, 
Scandinavia
, Germany 
nd Dec not 
defined 
Balance of 
power 
between 
interests 
Various n/a  Where institutional 
structures encourage 
innovation, cost inflation 
results 
 Where institutional 
structures curb 
innovation, rationing 
becomes politicized 
 Cent systems vulnerable 
to technical changes 
 Americanisation of 
health care resulted in 
open and unstable 
networks 
Features 
previously 
shared by 
countries: 
dec, implict 
rationing, 
weak 
democratic 
control and 
medical 
dominance 
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Moreno 2003 PR; 
politics 
Policy 
analysis 
Europe 
Case study: 
Spain 
nd Dec; 
subsidiarity;  
‘cosmopolita
n localism’ 
Differences in 
ideiology, 
goals, funding, 
etc. (typology) 
Welfare 
services 
Responsiveness; 
acctbly; 
efficiency 
(allocative) 
 Dec of safety net 
policies to meso-level 
 Dec policy linked to 
cultural/identity 
considerations; also 
innovation and effective 
mgt 
 Dec ~ 
1992 
Maastricht 
treaty: 
subsidiarity 
 Typology: 
EU welfare 
system 
Mouzinho et 
al. 2001 
PR; devel 
studies 
QV Mozambiqu
e 
1990s Dec Views of 
managers on 
impact of dec 
Health 
services 
Equity; 
responsiveness 
 W/o clear guidelines, 
monitoring and adequate 
resources 
(human/financial), dec 
will have a low impact 
and inequalities will incr 
 Dec= 
common 
feature of 
reform 
programmes 
Mulgan and 6 
1996 
DEMOS 
article 
Comment/ 
opinion 
UK 1990s Dec Central–local 
relations 
Local govt 
services 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Limits to local autonomy 
in centralised nation 
 Legitimacy better than 
most efficient 
geographical unit 
 Empower competent 
authorities, not just all 
authorities 
 Empower by each 
service 
 
Mullen 1995 PR; mgt Policy eval UK Early 
1990s 
Devolution Eval of 
different 
models (low–
high) 
according to 
criteria 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; equity 
(and other 
author defined 
criteria ~ eval) 
 Dev of funding and 
contracting is problematic 
for low volume, 
specialised services 
 No model was ideal 
 Model may vary 
between sectors 
 Value 
conflicts 
Mulligan 
2001 
PR; 
accountin
g/mgt 
QT; 30 US 
computer 
companies 
Ireland 1994
–5 
 Dec/cent 
~ resp for 
decision-
5 ratios of 
cash mgt 
functions 
Cash mgt 
functions 
of multi-
national 
Efficiency  Is cent cash mgt of 
multi-national companies 
more effective than dec 
 Main 
reason for 
cent=risk 
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Interviews making 
 Regional 
cent 
companies cash mgt? 
 Literature: favours cent 
of treasury mgt functions 
and no generic optimal 
structure  
control 
 
Nativel et al. 
2002 
 
PR; 
geograph
y 
QV: 5 case 
studies of 
New Deal for 
Young 
People (200 
interviewed) 
UK 2000
–1 
Dec; 
localisation 
 Dec~ 
improved 
learning, 
partnership, 
innovation and 
resource 
targeting 
Services ~ 
New Deal 
for young 
People 
Responsiveness; 
efficiency; equity 
(territorial) 
 Workforce associated 
w/dec and localisation of 
welfare delivery agencies 
 New Deal: some local 
discretion and 
co-operation w/in central 
constraints 
 
 Limited dec 
yielded 
some benefit 
 Cent 
labour 
market 
resistant to 
change 
Oates 1999  PR; 
economic
s 
Theoretical Mainly USA n/a Dec; cent; 
fiscal 
federalism 
Benefits and 
costs of dec 
and cent 
Various 
public 
services 
Responsiveness  Goal to align resp and 
fiscal instruments 
w/proper levels of govt 
 Trade-off: spillover and 
local diversity 
 ‘There is not much 
evidence on the 
relationship between 
fiscal dec and econ perf’ 
 Efficient 
output vary 
by costs and 
preferences 
 Local 
innovation ~ 
free-riding 
but neither 
dec nor cent 
more 
innovative 
O’Neill 1998 PR Policy 
review 
UK and 
Canada: 
health 
1984
–90 
Impact of 
medical 
profession 
n/a Participati
on; policy 
n/a Who shapes change?  
Onyach-Olaa 
2003 
PR; devel 
studies 
Policy 
analysis/ 
review 
Uganda 1993 
to 
now 
Dec ~ local 
democratic 
empowerme
nt 
Descriptive 
changes 
Local 
councils 
Responsiveness; 
acctbly; 
efficiency 
(allocative) 
 Elections mean shift on 
central–local relations 
 Benefits: improved 
governance and service 
delivery 
 Problems: technical 
capacity and stakeholder 
conflict 
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Palley 1987 PR Policy 
analysis 
Canada: 
health 
nd Fiscal 
federalism 
Financial; 
equity 
Commissi
oning 
 
Equity Variation between states  
Palley 1997 PR Policy 
analysis 
USA: health 1994
–7 
Patterns of 
reform 
Financial: 
various 
Finance Finance; equity Contain costs 
Improve access 
Quality of care 
 
Paton 1993 PR; 
social 
policy 
Review of 
policy 
UK Late 
1980s
/ 
early 
1990s 
Devolution 
(handing 
down respo-
nsibility); 
centralism 
(locating 
power for 
decisions at 
centre of 
policy-
making 
system) 
Power and 
responsibility 
(see Other 
comments) 
Purchasin
g and 
service 
provision 
Strategic 
decision; 
operational/ 
administrative 
roles 
 Cycle from centralism to 
devolution and back 
 3 models: 
-full devolution/autonomy 
-managed devolution 
-full control 
 Potential that devolution 
may mask centralism 
 Cent of 
agenda/objectives but 
operational dec in late 
1980s 
 Power: 
discussion of 
definitions 
 
Responsibilit
y: beholden 
to higher 
authority 
Pendleton 
1994 
PR; mgt  Policy 
analysis 
UK: 
railways 
1980s 
and 
1990s 
Dec 
(decision 
making and 
); devolution 
Org impact of 
changes in IR  
IR in 
British 
Rail 
Efficiency  Thatcher reforms ~ 
managerial autonomy 
 2 main IR changes: 
retreat from 
standardisation (incr 
diversity) and access of 
trade union reps to 
decision-making 
 Limits on the move from 
uniformity  
 Dec ~ 
conflict 
between 
sectors 
 Structural 
changes 
encourage 
short-term 
approach to 
IR 
Pennings 
1976 
PR; mgt Survey of 
901 staff 
(88 
response 
rate) 
USA nd  Cent: 
distribution 
of influence 
among org 
units 
Control in 40 
offices of US 
brokerage firm 
Private 
sector 
Effectiveness  Criteria for 
effectiveness: total 
production, decline in 
prodn, financial loss, 
morale/anxiety 
 Cent= 
distribution 
of control+ 
total amount 
of control 
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 Org 
autonomy 
 Participative, dec and 
autonomous org are most 
effective  
 
Effectivenes
s is multi-
faceted 
Perkins 2001 Book 
review: 
Kolehmai
nen-
Aitken 
n/a USA Book 
publis
hed 
1999 
Dec n/a n/a n/a  Autonomy/inequality 
trade-off 
 Dec can shift blame for 
downsizing 
 
Regionalisati
on in 
Canada=dec 
and cent 
Perrone et al. 
2003 
PR; org 
science 
QV/QT; 
interview 
and 
questionnair
e  
Not stated nd Role 
autonomy; 
discretion to 
interpret 
and enact 
their roles 
Autonomy ~ 
functional 
influence, 
tenure and 
clan culture 
Buyer–
supplier 
relations 
Staff 
morale/satisfacti
on 
 Granting greater 
autonomy enhances trust 
 Importance of org/al 
context and 
understanding trust 
 
 Trust 
crucial when 
perf is 
ambiguous/
behaviour 
unobserved 
Petretto 2000 PR; 
economic
s/politics 
QT Italy nd Regionalisati
on 
devolution: 
provision 
decided by a 
region and 
financed by 
its revenues 
 Marginal 
benefit > 
marginal cost? 
 Spillover and 
redistributive 
effects 
Health 
services 
Equity; efficiency  Regional fiscal 
autonomy is more 
desirable than benchmark 
social welfare framework 
 
 Dec: ratio 
of local to 
central 
expenditures 
Pinch 1991 PR; 
geograph
y 
QT Australia; 
public 
sector 
1980s Cent (not 
defined) 
Indices of 
need by area 
Elderly 
care 
services 
Equity; territorial 
justice 
Cent aids redistributive 
policies; dec aids 
responsiveness 
 
Powell 1998 PR; 
public 
policy 
Policy 
analysis 
UK  Cent; dec 
 
Central–local 
relations 
Health 
services 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness; 
equity 
 NHS moving in 2 
directions at same time: 
dec and cent 
 Lack of clear definition 
about what is ‘national’ or 
‘local’ 
 Trends 
suggest 
worst of 
both: central 
control and 
diversity w/o 
autonomy 
Powell and 
Exworthy 
PR Comparative UK: health Up to 
2002 
Equity Equity: various ‘Old and 
new’ NHS 
Equity Focus on variation which 
could reduce 
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2003 analysis 
Provan and 
Milward 1995 
PR; mgt QT and QV US public 
sector 
1991
–2 
Network 
effectivenes
s 
Client 
outcomes 
Mental 
health 
Network 
integration 
Client outcomes ~ 
network cent and system 
stability 
 
Quadrado et 
al. 2001 
PR QT; 
modelling 
Spain: 
health 
1964 
–91 
Regional 
inequality 
Equity: various nd Equity; finance Inequality related to 
devolved govt 
 
Quennell 
2001 
PR; mgt QV UK 1999
–
2001 
Dec; cent Views/ 
perspectives of 
key 
stakeholders in 
NICE 
Health 
services: 
evidence-
based 
medicine 
Effectiveness; 
responsiveness 
 Policy paradox: 
cent/participation 
 Tension: sharing power 
between powerful 
interests and patients 
 
Ranade and 
Hudson 2003 
PR; local 
govt 
Review of 
policy 
UK nd Term dec 
not used 
Resource 
dependency 
(money and 
authority) 
Health 
and social 
care 
services 
Inter-agency 
colaboration 
 C/govt limited in 
steering local networks 
 Governance should not 
be confused w/org form 
 Most productive 
partnerships ~ loose/tight 
structure (local freedom 
w/in agreed framework) 
 Co-
evolving 
partnerships 
 Imposed 
partnerships 
 Reticulists 
Redoano and 
Scharf 2004 
PR; 
economic
s 
Economic 
modelling; 
fiscal 
federalism 
n/a nd Cent; dec Degree of 
responsivenes
s to public 
preferences 
Public 
services 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness; 
efficiency 
(allocative) 
 Compares outcomes 
under direct referendum 
and representative 
democracy 
 Cent more likely if 
choice to cent made by 
elected policy-makers 
 Policies converge to 
level of jurisdiction that 
least favours cent 
 Assumes 
heteregenou
s policy 
preferences 
and 
spillovers 
Reed 2003 Commen
t 
Policy 
comment 
UK nd Dec: no 
agreed 
definition 
Localism 
Power Public 
services 
Democracy= 
responsiveness, 
acctbly  
 Localism=any measure 
of structural dec; little to 
do w/devolving power 
 Democratic input 
important when difficult 
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decisions need to 
overcome vested 
interests 
Reich 2002 PR; devel 
studies 
QV Intl; 
developing 
countries 
nd Dec Fiscal 
measures; 
decision-
making powers 
Public 
health 
Efficiency 
(technical and 
allocative) 
Dec does not always 
improve efficiency 
Dec is part 
of reshaping 
state-above, 
below and 
within 
Rico 2000 Commen
tary 
Policy 
review 
Spain 1990s Regional 
devolution; 
autonomy 
Power 
symmetry and 
aymmetry 
between 
regions and 
govt 
Health 
services 
Effectiveness; 
coordination; 
equity 
 7 special regions w/high 
political autonomy (62% 
population); 10 regions 
have limited admin 
powers (e.g. public 
health) 
 In 10 regions, health 
care governed by state 
 Dec pro/con resemble 
market: incr effectiveness 
but lacks co-ordination 
 Devol: incr innovation 
 Some cost containment 
problems; limited rise in 
inequality due to low 
fiscal powers 
 2 of special 
regions have 
full fiscal 
autonomy 
 Spenish 
reform: 
moderate, 
incremental 
 Full 
political 
autonomy at 
expense of 
decr central 
political and 
financial 
control 
Rico et al. 
2003 
PR Literature 
review and 
policy 
analysis 
Western 
Europe: 
health 
1990s Collaboratio
n; shift in 
resources 
and acctbly 
Various Restructur
ing 
Various Influence of pre-existing 
model 
Potential for reduced 
costs 
 
Robalino et 
al. 2001 
World 
Bank 
paper; 
economics  
QT Developing 
countries 
1970
–95 
Fiscal dec; 
recognises 
variety of 
terms used 
Infant 
mortality rate 
Health 
spending 
Efficiency tech 
and alloc; share 
of local spending 
as % of national 
spending 
Higher fiscal dec 
consistently associated 
with lower infant 
mortality rate 
Effects 
enhanced by 
strong 
political 
rights but 
reduced by 
ethnic 
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divisions 
Robinson 
and Dixon 
2003 
Fabian 
report 
Policy 
comment 
UK: 
England 
1997
–
2003 
Autonomy ‘National 
standards 
versus local 
autonomy’ 
(Chapter 3) 
Health 
services 
Efficiency; 
equity; acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Need to address 
excessive central 
direction. Govt must have 
more confidence in local 
managers and to steer 
with a lighter touch 
 No easy answers to 
dilemma of finding 
acceptable balance 
between central control 
and devolution of resp 
Stability 
required to 
bring about 
sustainable 
improvemen
ts, with 
greater 
continuity 
than in 
previous 
decade  
Roche 2004 Report 
(Institute 
for Public 
Policy 
Research) 
Policy 
review 
UK: 
England 
2001
–
today 
Dec; 
autonomy 
 Health 
services: 
primary 
care, 
commissio
ning 
  PCTs are semi-
autonomous 
 PCTs squeezed between 
dec and secondary care 
 Need to unlock PCT 
discretionary budgets 
(though small), aided by 
payment by results 
 Strong need for centre 
to balance autonomy 
w/acctbly as PCT become 
only link between centre 
and providers 
 Need to identify what is 
best commissioned at 
what level by whom 
 Shifting comfort 
between diversity and 
variations 
 PCT 
constrained 
by lack of 
information 
and own 
mgt systems 
 Potential 
not being 
realised: 
commissioni
ng and 
public 
involvement 
 Chronic 
conditions 
being better 
managed 
especially 
w/GPSIs 
Roos and 
Lyttle 1985 
PR; public 
health/ 
HSR 
QT Canada 1973
–8 
Access rates 
across 
population 
Geographical 
access by 
population 
groups 
Access to 
total hip 
replaceme
nt 
Effectiveness  Impact of cent facilities 
on access to care (total 
hip replacement) 
 No differences in access 
 Total hip 
replacement 
numbers 
incr in 
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to care between urban 
and rural populations 
 Cent probably not 
restricted rate of 
performing total hip 
replacement 
1970s 
 Total hip 
replacement 
amenable to 
cent 
Ross and 
Tomaney 
2001 
Peer 
reviewed 
Policy 
analysis 
UK/England 
health, 
regional 
govt 
1999
–
2000 
Devolution; 
regional 
policy 
Health 
outcomes; 
equity 
Regional 
service 
delivery 
Equity; finance; 
responsiveness 
Regional distinctiveness/ 
local policies 
 
Rowe and 
Shepherd 
2002 
PR Policy 
analysis and 
survey 
UK: health 1997
–
2000 
Participation Ownership; 
participation 
Public 
involveme
nt 
Decision-making Participation needs 
culture change 
 
Rubio and 
Smith 2004 
Conferenc
e paper 
QT; 
economics 
Canada 1979
–95 
Dec Fiscal 
measures 
(only QT 
measure) 
Infant 
mortality 
Efficiency (alloc 
and tech); health 
outcomes 
Dec leads to an 
improvement in health 
outcomes  
Precise 
measures 
are difficult 
to find 
Saltman et 
al. 2003 
WHO 
paper 
Review 
(book 
proposal) 
Intl: Europe nd Dec: 
vertical, 
horizontal 
and re-cent 
Autonomy Health 
policy 
implement
ation, 
costs 
Equity (mainly); 
also efficiency 
(alloc and tech) 
Effects of dec depend 
upon its design and 
institutional 
arrangements governing 
implementation 
Debates 
disciplinary 
approaches 
(Rondinelli, 
Bossert) 
Sass 1995 PR Literature 
review 
Western 
Europe: 
health 
nd Individual 
responsibiliti
es 
n/a Policy 
change 
Expenditure; 
equity 
Basic needs/cost 
constraints 
 
Schmid 
2002 
PR; mgt Questinnaire
s in 3 
non-profit 
orgs 
Israel nd Dec/cent Empowerment, 
control, 
equity, 
training and 
working 
conditions 
Communit
y centres, 
home care 
and 
boarding 
schools  
Adaptation, 
satisfaction and 
assessment of 
perf 
 Very high probability 
that relations between 
structural properties and 
org effectiveness are 
statistical and causal 
 Dec mgt appropriate in 
voluntary non-profit org 
where structure and mgt 
are informal and 
professionalism high 
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Schneider 
2003 
PR; devel 
studies 
Factor 
analysis  
Intl; 68 
countries 
1996 Dec: 
transfer of 
power and 
resources 
away from 
c/govt 
Core 
dimensions of 
dec: fiscal, 
admin, 
political 
Fiscal: 
cede fiscal 
impact 
locally; 
admin: 
autonomy 
Political; 
represent
ation 
Fiscal, political 
and admin 
factors 
 Little agreement on 
what dec means/how it 
should be measured 
 Comparisons of 
disciplinary definitions 
 
 Radar 
diagram of 
balance 
between 3 
dimensions 
Schram and 
Weissert 
1999 
PR Policy 
analysis 
USA: health 
and other 
public 
sector 
1998
–9 
Roles of 
levels of 
govt 
Financial; org Policy 
change; 
finances 
Financial; equity Contention between state 
and federal roles 
 
Seabright 
1996 
PR; 
economics 
Economic 
modelling 
Theoretical nd Dec: power 
to decided 
what a 
policy 
should be is 
devolved to 
mechanism 
of local 
public choice 
Merits of dec 
and cent 
Various 
public 
services 
Responsiveness; 
acctbly 
 Dec~problem of 
allocation of control rights 
under incomplete 
contracts 
 Cent ~ ↑ co-ordination, 
↓ acctbly 
 Acctbly ↑ responsiveness 
and overall perf (despite 
spillovers) 
 Trade-offs 
inevitable 
 Dec/cent 
as a means 
to give 
incentives to 
act in citizen 
interests 
Segall 2003 PR; mgt Policy 
review 
Intl/develop
ing 
countries 
nd Dec Advantages/ 
disadvantages 
of reform 
Health 
care 
especially
primary 
care 
Acctbly; 
responsiveness 
 Critique of World Bank 
policy (relegate primary 
care to seond-generation 
reform) 
 Dec likely to benefit 
most systems but exact 
form needs careful 
implementation 
 Democracy and public 
involvement enhances 
dec 
 
Simonis 
1995 
PR; local 
govt 
Review of 
policy 
The 
Netherlands 
nd, 
1990s
Dec not 
defined; 
n/a Local govt 
spending 
n/a  Differentiation between 
municipalities does not fit 
Local 
autonomy 
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? term 
‘territorial 
and 
functional 
dec’ used  
the Dutch egalitarian 
admin culture 
 Some local govts wary 
of autonomy 
has been 
incr though 
central 
safeguards 
remain 
Singh 1986 PR; mgt QT 
modelling; 
survey of 
173 firms 
USA, 
Canada 
1973
–5 
Dec  Profit 
 Subjective 
view of perf 
Private 
sector 
Efficiency  Poor perf reduces dec 
and good perf incr dec 
 Link between org perf 
and risk-taking 
- direct relationship 
negative (when perf is 
below standards) 
 - indirect relationship 
positive (mediated by dec 
and org slack) 
 As competition incr, org 
slack decreased and 
control (cent) also incr  
 Innovation 
and perf: 
mixed 
evidence 
 Satisficing 
levels of perf 
 Org 
respond to 
poor perf via 
cent 
Smith 1980 
  
Book 
chapter 
Review of 
literature 
n/a; 
reference to 
UK 
n/a Dec: 
geographical 
dimension of 
state 
apparatus 
Hypotheses 
tested against 
evidence 
Public 
services 
Measures~ 
a. functions 
b. taxation 
c. field offices of 
c/govt 
d. delegation to 
area political 
authorities 
e. methods of 
creating local 
govt 
f. local expend 
as % of total 
g. single/multi- 
tier authorities 
h. % of local 
govt revenues 
 Dec is a variable; need a 
method to measure it 
 Control may be a 
function of technology 
 Incr dec does not imply 
more autonomy 
 Hypotheses re. 
situations w/more or less 
dec 
 Dec associated with 
greater distribution of 
power w/in community, 
govt less remote, higher 
participation, incr 
potential for conflict, 
more acctbly, uncertain 
efficiency, more 
innovation, more 
 Impt to 
distinguish 
dec from its 
political, 
econ and 
ideological 
context 
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i. personnel 
j. org size 
problems w/vertical 
integration 
Smith 1997 PR; 
politics 
Review of 
policies 
Intl; 
developing 
countries 
nd Dec re. 
decision-
making 
structures of 
the state; 
other terms 
too broad 
Optimum size 
to conduct 
decentralized 
powers 
Various 
functions 
at 
different 
levels 
Acctbly; equity; 
participation 
Specifying functions 
assumes political 
decisions 
Participation 
capable of 
intensifying 
political 
conflict 
Smith and 
Barnes 2000 
PR Policy 
analysis 
UK: health 1999 Central/local 
priorities 
Local priorities Commissi
oning 
Various Diversity of 
implementation 
 
Smith and 
Scheffler 
2003 
Research 
report 
Spending 
analysis 
USA: 
California 
1986
–
2000 
Dec Changes in 
health 
spending by 
state and 
county 
Publicly 
funded 
health 
services 
Efficiency  Realignment had a 
dampening effect on 
public health spending 
including a sharper 
decline of spending in 
poorer counties 
 Counties were able to 
transfer funds between 
health, mental health and 
social services 
 The spending ‘pie’ of 
health services became 
less evenly cut due to dec  
 California 
1991 
Realignment 
Legislation 
shifted resp 
for county 
health 
services 
from state 
to counties  
Snape 2003 
 
PR; local 
govt 
Review of 
policy 
UK 1974 
onwar
ds 
Central–
local 
relations 
n/a Health 
and social 
care 
services 
Partnership; 
service 
improvement 
30 years of centralised 
control may have 
produced local govt tier 
conditioned to top-down 
policy: learnt behaviour 
Barrier to 
collaboration 
is differing 
perf mgt 
systems 
Sparer 1999 PR Policy 
analysis 
USA: health 1990s Privatisation Various Org; 
policy 
Finance; equity Govt involvement in 
various functions 
 
Stevens 
2004 
PR; health 
policy 
Policy 
analysis; 
comment- 
UK; 
England 
1997
–
2004 
Localism; 
autonomy 
Hierarchy; 
local control 
Various Efficiency; 
equity; acctbly; 
responsiveness 
Three-dimensional reform 
involves: 
a. Provider support: staff, 
Health 
policy: new 
pragmatic 
phase (not 
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ary infrastructure 
b. Hierarchy: national 
standards, inspection, 
perf targets, direct 
intervention 
c. Localism: active 
purchasing, choice, 
provider incentives, 
pluralism, democractic 
accbtly 
path- 
dependent)
~ 
constructive 
discomfort 
Talbot 2004 Book 
chapter 
Policy 
review; 
public admin 
UK mainly n/a Agency: 
arm’s length 
from 
hierarchical 
spine of 
c/govt. 
Structural 
separation 
often 
confused 
w/Dec 
Autonomy of 
agencies (e.g. 
earned 
autonomy) 
Various Acctbly; 
efficiency 
 3 central elements of 
agencies: 
- structural 
disaggregation 
-perf contracting 
-deregulation 
 Cycle between focus and 
co-ordination (policy and 
execution; purchase and 
provision) 
 Have agencies given 
managers more freedom? 
 Structural 
separation 
by degree, 
not absolute 
 Agency 
failures 
rarely lead 
to punitive 
action 
Tang and 
Bloom 2000 
PR; health 
service 
mgt 
Case study China 1990s Dec Changes in 
funding 
following dec 
Rural 
health 
services 
Equity; 
efficiency; 
effectiveness 
 Case study: dec to 
township (lowest level of 
govt) 
 Little evidence of incr 
resources or ability to 
tackle mgt problems 
 Dec used 
to achieve 
equity, 
efficiency, 
effectivenes
s 
 
Taylor 2000 Policy 
journal 
Comment UK 1997 
Labou
r’s 1st 
term 
Dec Changes in 
central–local 
govt relations 
All public 
services 
Innovation  Labour objectives 
(quality, fairness) 
required cent 
 1999 modernisation 
excluded dec as a goal 
 Cent may 
be anti-
innovatory 
 Rise of 
freedom for 
modernisati
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 Spatial policymaking 
(zones)=central direction 
 Challenge cent as 
default but what should 
be dec’d? Can cent → 
dec?  
on/reward 
to do what 
you are told 
Tester 1994 PR; social 
policy 
Exploratory 
study 
Germany: 
social care 
1992 Subsidiarity Financial Financial Equity Regional inequality  
Thompson 
1986 
PR Policy 
review 
USA: health 1980s States 
capacity 
Financial Financial Financial Economic limits, variation 
in provision 
 
Thornley 
1998 
PR National 
survey, case 
study 
UK: health 1996 IR Various HR; 
finance 
Finance Devolved mgt and local 
pay 
 
Van der 
Laan 1983 
PR; social 
science 
QT analysis: 
secondary 
data 
Intl (57 
nations); 
health 
1970 Federalism 
Cent: 
a. fiscal 
b. legal 
c. 
representati
on 
Bi-variate 
relationships 
between 
different 
aspects of cent 
Health 
spending 
Efficiency; 
acctbly 
 As fiscal cent, health 
spending decreases 
 Federal-unitary status 
has no impact on health 
spending 
 Fiscal cent has negative 
impact on expenditures 
 Govt cent is not uni-
dimensional concept 
 
Vandenburg
h 2001 
PR; 
sociology 
Review of 
forces 
underlying 
cent and dec 
USA 1990s Dec; cent Impact of 
relative forces 
behind cent 
and dec 
Health 
services 
Efficiency 
(versus) 
responsiveness 
 Cent via payers 
tightening funding 
controls; dec via 
consumerism 
 Patient control likely to 
be ephemeral given 
globalisation 
 Cent: technology, 
managed care, disease 
mgt 
 Dec: prosumerism 
(purchasing portions of 
 Cent and 
dec likely to 
continue in a 
tense 
relationship 
 Cent will 
dominate 
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services), alternative 
medicine, medical 
globalisation 
Varatharaja
n et al. 2004 
PR; devel 
studies 
Survey all 
Kerala local 
govt and QV  
India: 
Kerala 
1997
–9 
Dec Resource 
allocation 
Primary 
care 
Efficiency; equity  1996 reform: primary 
health centres managed 
by local govt (=dec) 
 Local govt allocated 
lower share of funding to 
primary health care than 
c/govt 
 ‘Dec brought no 
significant change to the 
health sector’ 
 Active local govt support 
led to ‘positive’ results 
 Second- 
degree dec: 
¾ tasks dec 
(admin, 
mgrl, fiscal 
but not risk) 
 Dec still at 
nascent 
stage 
Walker 2002 Report Policy 
commentary 
UK nd Centralism; 
devolution 
Competency of 
c/govt 
(especially re. 
equity) 
Public 
services 
Equity; 
efficiency; 
acctbly 
 Localism might be 
reaction to c/govt failure 
 C/govt ability to 
regulate markets and to 
achieve equality 
 
Walshe et 
al. 2004 
Editorial 
HSR/ 
health 
policy 
Policy 
commentary 
UK: 
England 
2004 Devolution; 
merger 
Org capacity of 
PCTs 
Primary 
care orgs: 
PCTs 
Efficiency; 
responsiveness 
 Possible PCT mergers 
100–150 PCTs? 
 No good evidence that 
mergers work 
 PCT: no 1 right size 
 No evidence that larger 
HAs were effective 
 PCT mgt gaining in 
experience 
 In devolved NHS, top-
down merger outdated 
 Epidemic 
of merger 
after 2005 
election? 
 Mergers 
are clumsy 
tool; seldom 
deliver 
 
Wasem 
1997 
PR Policy 
analysis 
Germany: 
health and 
social care 
1992
–6 
Home care Financial Acute 
care/ 
elderly 
Financial Choice  
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West 2001 PR; HSR Literature 
review 
UK n/a Dec Comparison of 
literature 
‘research 
traditions’ 
Various 
(public 
and 
private 
sectors) 
Job satisfaction  Theoretical and method 
problems w/studies of 
org/mgt link 
 Private sector evidence 
~dec, participation and 
innovation 
 Importance of structure, 
strategy and environment 
 
Longitudinal 
studies and 
multilevel 
modelling 
needed 
White 1996 PR; public 
admin 
Policy 
review 
UK 1980s
to 
mid- 
1990s 
Dec Public services 
pay 
baragaining 
Public 
services 
Effectiveness  Resilience of national 
pay bargaining despite 
political rhetoric 
 Dec is not panacea for 
poor perf and not 
problem free (cost 
escalation and leapfrog) 
 Incr pay dec but within 
tighter central limits 
 
Contradictio
n of govt: 
keen to 
devolve pay 
decision and 
economic 
regulator 
 
Wistow 
1997 
PR; social 
policy 
Review of 
policies 
UK: 
England; 
health and 
social care 
1980s 
and 
1990s 
Dc. Patient/client 
activity 
Hospital 
services; 
home/ 
social care 
services 
Service provision Dual trends; cent and dec 
uncertain; acctbly 
 
Yesilkagit 
and De Vries 
2002 
PR; public 
admin 
QV and 
policy 
analysis 
The 
Netherlands 
1980s Dec 
a. transfer 
of tasks and 
discretions 
from c/govt 
to local govt 
b. internal 
admin org 
Unintended 
consequences 
of dec and 
managerialism 
South 
Holland 
banking 
scandal 
link to 
central 
and local 
govt 
Democracy; 
efficiency 
 Policy aimed to increase 
democracy and efficiency, 
linked to NPM (mgrl 
autonomy) 
 Over-reliance that dec 
would enhance quality of 
l/govt 
 Dec to 
provincial 
and 
municipal 
authorities ~ 
deconc and 
deregulation 
Zweifel 2000 PR; HSR/ 
public 
admin 
Policy 
commentary 
Switzerland 1990s Dec 
(central–
local 
relations) 
Changes to 
central–local 
relations 
Publicly 
funded 
health 
services 
Efficiency; 
acctbly/ 
responsiveness; 
equity 
 Switzerland has very 
dec political system: 
central=social health 
insurance; local=public 
hospital funding 
 1994 
introduction 
of managed 
competition 
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 1996 reform: aim to 
shelter c/govt budgets 
Quality: PR, peer review; Op-Ed, opinion-editorial. Methods: QT, quantitative; QV, qualitative. Context: Intl, international. 
Terms/Impact/Other: Cent, centralisation; Dec, decentralisation. Misc. terms: acctbly, accountability; admin, 
administration; alloc, allocative; c/govt, central government; coord/n, co-ordination; deconc, deconcentration; devel, 
development; econ, economic; est’d, established; eval, evalaution; expend, expenditure; govt, government; GPSI, GPs 
with special interest; HA, health authority; HR, human resources; H&S, health and safety; HSR, health services 
research; implem, implementation; impt, important; incr, increased; info, information; int mkt, internal market; IR, 
industrial relations; mgt, management; natl, national; nd, no date; NPM, new public management; NZ, New Zealand; 
org, organisation/organisational; perf, performance; prof, professional; resp, responsibility; tech, technical; w/, with; 
w/in, within;w/o, without. 
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Appendix 2  Database search results 
The following databases were searched. The results are given in the 
corresponding tables on the following pages. 
1 BIDS IBSS 
2 HMIC HELMIS 1994–98 and DH-Data and King’s Fund database 
2004-01 
3 CINAHL 
4 PubMed 
5 ASSIA 
6  SIGLE 
7 Sociological Abstracts 
8  Zetoc (British Library) 
9  Business Source Premier 
10 Emerald Full Text 
Search terms 
decentralisation/decentralization 
centralisation/centralization 
localism/centralism 
devolution 
subsidiarity 
federal and federalism 
concentration/deconcentration 
centering/centring 
decentering/decentring 
central-local relations 
inter-governmental relations 
organisational/organizational autonomy 
health policy 
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Table A1  Database: BIDS IBSS (International Bibliography of the Social 
Sciences) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 626 15/3/04 
Decentralization TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 3562 15/3/04 
Centralisation TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 101 15/3/04 
Centralization TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 751 15/3/04 
Decentralisation and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 23 15/3/04 
Decentralization and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 143 15/3/04 
Centralisation and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 5 15/3/04 
Centralization and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 15 15/3/04 
Decentring TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 15 15/3/04 
Decentering TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 20 15/3/04 
Centring TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 35 15/3/04 
Centering TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 39 15/3/04 
Deconcentration TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 112 15/3/04 
Deconcentration and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 2 15/3/04 
Concentration  TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 3176  15/3/04 
Concentration and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 50 15/3/04 
Devolution TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 896 15/3/04 
Devolution and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 25 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 283 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 4 15/3/04 
Localism TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 119 15/3/04 
Localism and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 2 15/3/04 
Centralism TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 112 15/3/04 
Centralism and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 1 15/3/04 
Federal TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 8883 15/3/04 
Federal and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 180 15/3/04 
Federalism TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 4045 15/3/04 
Federalism and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 58 15/3/04 
Central-local relations TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 22 075 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and health TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 392 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 3210 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 117 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Organizational autonomy TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 5 15/3/04 
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Health policy TI, KW,AB 1974–2004 4829 15/3/04 
Notes: no facility to limit to English language. Includes books and book reviews. 
TI, KW, AB means that the title, keywords and abstract were searched. 
Table A2  Database: HMIC (Health Management Information Consortium) 
HELMIS 1994–98 and DH-Data and King’s Fund database 2004-01 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 693 15/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1974–2004 81 15/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 186 15/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1974–2004 20 15/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 511 15/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 58 15/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 144 15/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 6 15/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1974–2004 29 15/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1974–2004 8 15/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1974–2004 3 15/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1974–2004 3 15/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1974–2004 577 15/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1974–2004 293 15/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1974–2004 309 15/3/04 
Devolution and health Anywhere 1974–2004 247 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1974–2004 15 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1974–2004 10 15/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1974–2004 9 15/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 5 15/3/04 
Centralism Anywhere 1974–2004 14 15/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 11 15/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1974–2004 701 15/3/04 
Federal and health Anywhere 1974–2004 486 15/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1974–2004 13 15/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 8 15/3/04 
Central-local relations Anywhere 1974–2004 3 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and health Anywhere 1974–2004 1 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1974–2004 1 29/3/04 
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Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
Anywhere 1974–2004 0 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1974–2004 7577 15/3/04 
Notes: allows combining of searches. Multiple database searches simultaneously. 
Table A3  Database: CINAHL (Cumulative Index to Nursing and Health 
Literature) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 37 15/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1974–2004 322 15/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 38 15/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1974–2004 165 15/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 33 15/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 202 15/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 26 15/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 107 15/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1974–2004 2 15/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1974–2004 38 15/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1974–2004 13 15/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1974–2004 124 15/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1974–2004 0 15/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1974–2004 6350 15/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1974–2004 2861 15/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1974–2004 135 15/3/04 
Devolution and health Anywhere 1974–2004 117 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1974–2004 5 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1974–2004 2 15/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1974–2004 6 15/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 5 15/3/04 
Centralism Anywhere 1974–2004 3 15/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 3 15/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1974–2004 10 177 15/3/04 
Federal and health Anywhere 1974–2004 8109 15/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1974–2004 72 15/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 64 15/3/04 
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Central-local relations Anywhere 1974–2004 0 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and 
health 
Anywhere 1974–2004 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1974–2004 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations 
and health 
Anywhere 1974–2004 0 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 1 15/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 7 15/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1974–2004 12 727 15/3/04 
Notes: English language limit set. 
Table A4  Database: PubMed 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 102 15/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1974–2004 24 049 15/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1974–2004 105 15/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1974–2004 516 15/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 71 15/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 13 214 15/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2004 39 15/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1974–2004 144 15/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1974–2004 8 15/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1974–2004 28 15/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1974–2004 48 15/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1974–2004 674 15/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1974–2004 39 15/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1974–2004 8 15/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1974–2004 602 451 15/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1974–2004 9459 15/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1974–2004 148 15/3/04 
Devolution and health Anywhere 1974–2004 99 15/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1974–2004 25 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1974–2004 22 16/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1974–2004 7 16/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 4 16/3/04 
Centralism Anywhere 1974–2004 4 16/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 4 16/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1974–2004 59 164 16/3/04 
Decentralisation in publicly funded health services 
©NCCSDO 2006 217 
Federal and health Anywhere 1974–2004 14 111 16/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1974–2004 139 16/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1974–2004 99 16/3/04 
Central-local relations Anywhere 1974–2004 3 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and 
health 
Anywhere 1974–2004 2 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1974–2004 1 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations 
and health 
Anywhere 1974–2004 1 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 40 16/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2004 1336 16/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1974–2004 39 298 16/3/04 
Notes: English language limit set. 
Table A5  Database: ASSIA (Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1975–2004 231 16/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1975–2004 486 16/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1975–2004 82 16/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1975–2004 134 16/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1975–2004 33 16/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1975–2004 116 16/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1975–2004 8 16/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1975–2004 15 16/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1975–2004 6 16/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1975–2004 9 16/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1975–2004 26 16/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1975–2004 58 16/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1975–2004 21 16/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1975–2004 1 16/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1975–2004 958 16/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1975–2004 173 16/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1975–2004 227 16/3/04 
Devolution and health Anywhere 1975–2004 62 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1975–2004 42 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1975–2004 3 16/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1975–2004 26 16/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 1 16/3/04 
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Centralism Anywhere 1975–2004 19 16/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 3 16/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1975–2004 2136 16/3/04 
Federal and health Anywhere 1975–2004 447 16/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1975–2004 192 16/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 12 16/3/04 
Central-local relations Anywhere 1975–2004 10 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and health Anywhere 1975–2004 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1975–2004 5 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
Anywhere 1975–2004 0 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1975–2004 1 16/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1975–2004 4 16/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1975–2004 1787 16/3/04 
Notes: English language limit set. 
Table A6  Database: SIGLE (System for Information on Grey Literature in 
Europe) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1974–2003 144 16/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1974–2003 72 16/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1974–2003 16 16/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1974–2003 41 16/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2003 10  16/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1974–2003 3  16/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1974–2003 1  16/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1974–2003 1  16/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1974–2003 0 16/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1974–2003 2 16/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1974–2003 5 16/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1974–2003 5 16/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1974–2003 2 16/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1974–2003 0 16/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1974–2003 1366 16/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1974–2003 70 16/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1974–2003 178 16/3/04 
Devolution and health Anywhere 1974–2003 8  16/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1974–2003 35 16/3/04 
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Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1974–2003 0  16/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1974–2003 7 16/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1974–2003 0  16/3/04 
Centralism Anywhere 1974–2003 7 16/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1974–2003 0  16/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1974–2003 2236 16/3/04 
Federal and health Anywhere 1974–2003 62  16/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1974–2003 125 16/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1974–2003 1 16/3/04 
Central-local relations Anywhere 1974–2003 0 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and health Anywhere 1974–2003 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1974–2003 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
Anywhere 1974–2003 0 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2003 0 16/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1974–2003 0 16/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1974–2003 197 16/3/04 
Notes: English language limit set. 
Table A7  Database: Sociological Abstracts 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation Anywhere 1975–2004 48 16/3/04 
Decentralization Anywhere 1975–2004 1175 16/3/04 
Centralisation Anywhere 1975–2004 11 16/3/04 
Centralization Anywhere 1975–2004 832 16/3/04 
Decentralisation and health Anywhere 1975–2004 10 16/3/04 
Decentralization and health Anywhere 1975–2004 107 16/3/04 
Centralisation and health Anywhere 1975–2004 3 16/3/04 
Centralization and health Anywhere 1975–2004 51 16/3/04 
Decentring Anywhere 1975–2004 13 16/3/04 
Decentering Anywhere 1975–2004 87 16/3/04 
Centring Anywhere 1975–2004 11 16/3/04 
Centering Anywhere 1975–2004 337 16/3/04 
Deconcentration Anywhere 1975–2004 95 16/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  Anywhere 1975–2004 1 16/3/04 
Concentration  Anywhere 1975–2004 2137 16/3/04 
Concentration and health Anywhere 1975–2004 236 16/3/04 
Devolution Anywhere 1975–2004 287 16/3/04 
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Devolution and health Anywhere 1975–2004 39 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity Anywhere 1975–2004 31 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health Anywhere 1975–2004 0 16/3/04 
Localism Anywhere 1975–2004 635 16/3/04 
Localism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 24 16/3/04 
Centralism Anywhere 1975–2004 121 16/3/04 
Centralism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 8 16/3/04 
Federal Anywhere 1975–2004 11 748 16/3/04 
Federal and health Anywhere 1975–2004 1389 16/3/04 
Federalism Anywhere 1975–2004 548 16/3/04 
Federalism and health Anywhere 1975–2004 52 16/3/04 
Central-local relations Anywhere 1975–2004 7 4/4/04 
Central-local relations and health Anywhere 1975–2004 0 4/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations Anywhere 1975–2004 1 4/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations 
and health 
Anywhere 1975–2004 0 4/4/04 
Organisational autonomy Anywhere 1975–2004 0 16/3/04 
Organizational autonomy Anywhere 1975–2004 34 16/3/04 
Health policy Anywhere 1975–2004 2093 16/3/04 
Notes: English language limit set. 
Table A8  Database: Zetoc (electronic table of contents from the British 
Library) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation All fields 1993–2004 743 16/3/04 
Decentralization All fields 1993–2004 1135 16/3/04 
Centralisation All fields 1993–2004 156 16/3/04 
Centralization All fields 1993–2004 404 16/3/04 
Decentralisation and health All fields 1993–2004 29  16/3/04 
Decentralization and health All fields 1993–2004 91  16/3/04 
Centralisation and health All fields 1993–2004 2  16/3/04 
Centralization and health All fields 1993–2004 14  16/3/04 
Decentring All fields 1993–2004 39 16/3/04 
Decentering All fields 1993–2004 75 16/3/04 
Centring All fields 1993–2004 70 16/3/04 
Centering All fields 1993–2004 560 16/3/04 
Deconcentration All fields 1993–2004 61 16/3/04 
Deconcentration and health  All fields 1993–2004 N/A 16/3/04 
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Concentration  All fields 1993–2004 111 993 16/3/04 
Concentration and health All fields 1993–2004 1587 16/3/04 
Devolution All fields 1993–2004 1318 16/3/04 
Devolution and health All fields 1993–2004 60  16/3/04 
Subsidiarity All fields 1993–2004 355 16/3/04 
Subsidiarity and health All fields 1993–2004 1 16/3/04 
Localism All fields 1993–2004 145 16/3/04 
Localism and health All fields 1993–2004 3  16/3/04 
Centralism All fields 1993–2004 43 16/3/04 
Centralism and health All fields 1993–2004 3  16/3/04 
Federal All fields 1993–2004 38 316 16/3/04 
Federal and health All fields 1993–2004 1584 16/3/04 
Federalism All fields 1993–2004 2695 16/3/04 
Federalism and health All fields 1993–2004 72  25/3/04 
Central-local relations All fields 1993–2004 75 29/3/04 
Central-local relations and health All fields 1993–2004 0 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations All fields 1993–2004 4 29/3/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
All fields 1993–2004 0 29/3/04 
Organisational autonomy All fields 1993–2004 1 16/3/04 
Organizational autonomy All fields 1993–2004 36 16/3/04 
Health policy All fields 1993–2004 12 942 16/3/04 
Notes: unable to set English language limit. Only available since 1993; updated 
daily. 
Table A9  Database: Business Source Premier 
Term Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation 1974–2004 1232 2/4/04 
Decentralisation and health 1974–2004 60 2/4/04 
Centralisation  1974–2004 550 2/4/04 
Centralisation and health 1974–2004 20 2/4/04 
Centralization 1974–2004 550 2/4/04 
Centralization and health 1974–2004 20 2/4/04 
Decentralization 1974–2004 1232 2/4/04 
Decentralization and health 1974–2004 60 2/4/04 
Decentering 1974–2004 12 2/4/04 
Decentring 1974–2004 10 2/4/04 
Centering 1974–2004 63 2/4/04 
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Centring 1974–2004 17 2/4/04 
Deconcentration 1974–2004 46 2/4/04 
Deconcentration and health 1974–2004 1 2/4/04 
Concentration  1974–2004 3697 2/4/04 
Concentration and health 1974–2004 235 2/4/04 
Devolution 1974–2004 299 2/4/04 
Devolution and health 1974–2004 16 2/4/04 
Subsidiarity 1974–2004 124 2/4/04 
Subsidiarity and health 1974–2004 1 2/4/04 
Localism 1974–2004 127 2/4/04 
Localism and health 1974–2004 0 2/4/04 
Centralism  1974–2004 72 2/4/04 
Centralism and health 1974–2004 0 2/4/04 
Federal 1974–2004 173 579 2/4/04 
Federal and health 1974–2004 9583 2/4/04 
Federalism 1974–2004 1365 2/4/04 
Organisational autonomy 1974–2004 1 2/4/04 
Organizational autonomy 1974–2004 16 2/4/04 
Central local relations 1974–2004 26 2/4/04 
Central-local relations and health 1974–2004 2 4/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations 1974–2004 12 2/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
1974–2004 0 2/4/04 
Health policy 1974–2004 2033 2/4/04 
Table A10  Database: Emerald Full Text (management and library and 
information services) 
Term Limit Years Hits Date 
Decentralisation All fields  1974–2004 50 5/4/04 
Decentralization All fields  1974–2004 122 5/4/04 
Centralisation All fields 1974–2004 24 5/4/04 
Centralization All fields 1974–2004 27 5/4/04 
Decentralisation and health All fields 1974–2004 2 5/4/04 
Decentralization and health All fields 1974–2004 12 5/4/04 
Centralisation and health All fields 1974–2004 2 5/4/04 
Centralization and health All fields 1974–2004 4 5/4/04 
Decentring All fields 1974–2004 3 5/4/04 
Decentering All fields 1974–2004 2 5/4/04 
Centring All fields 1974–2004 11 5/4/04 
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Centering All fields 1974–2004 5 5/4/04 
Deconcentration All fields  1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Deconcentration and health  All fields  1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Concentration  All fields 1974–2004 279 5/4/04 
Concentration and health All fields 1974–2004 35 5/4/04 
Devolution All fields 1974–2004 45 5/4/04 
Devolution and health All fields 1974–2004 6 5/4/04 
Subsidiarity All fields 1974–2004 8 5/4/04 
Subsidiarity and health All fields 1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Localism All fields 1974–2004 2 5/4/04 
Localism and health All fields 1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Centralism All fields 1974–2004 5 5/4/04 
Centralism and health All fields 1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Federal All fields 1974–2004 254 5/4/04 
Federal and health All fields 1974–2004 22 5/4/04 
Federalism All fields 1974–2004 7 5/4/04 
Federalism and health All fields 1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Central-local relations 
Central local relations 
All fields 1974–2004 0 
7 
5/4/04 
Central local relations and health All fields 1974–2004 0 5/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations 
Inter governmental relations 
All fields 1974–2004 1 
0 
5/4/04 
Inter-governmental relations and 
health 
All fields 1974–2004 14  5/4/04 
Organisational autonomy All fields 1974–2004 14 5/4/04 
Organizational autonomy All fields 1974–2004 57 5/4/04 
Health policy All fields 1974–2004 365 5/4/04 
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